Cluster 1394635

See Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 487 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding no federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim where the basis for the claim was "independent of the rate on file with the FCC" ); cf. In re NOS Commc'ns, 495 F.3d 1052 , 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[I]nsofar as [the state-claim plaintiffs] can prove damages that do not refer to the filed-rate, its state law claims may proceed.").

“A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete 4 preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so 5 extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal 6 claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 1357, 7 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). 8 In spite of its title, the “complete preempti…

However, “[a] 15 corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, 16 which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary 17 that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal 18 claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL 19 No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 .). 20 Section 301 carries this…

However, “[t]he presence or absence of federal–question jurisdiction 21 is governed by the ‘well–pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists 22 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 23 complaint.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 24 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).

Id. (“If at 9 any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 10 case shall be remanded.”) 11 “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded 12 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 13 presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 . 14 However, “[a] corollary to the…

Id. §§ 1331, 1332. “[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule 4 ‘provides that federal [question] jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 5 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Hunter v. Philip 6 Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 7 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007)). “[T]he plaintiff is ‘the master of the complaint’ 8 and may ‘avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on s…

However, “[a] corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 ).

“A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the 15 ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute 16 is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a 17 federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 18 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393).

“The presence or absence of federal–question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well– pleaded 11 complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is 12 presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL 13 No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 , 14 392 (1987)). 15 III.

Such a clause is “fundamentally incompatible with complete field preemption.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007).

Cal. 27 2015) (“[The] court may look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the claims alleged as state law causes of action in fact are necessarily federal claims.”) (internal citations 28 omitted). 1 ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute 2 is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a 3 federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’”…

“The presence or absence of federal–question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well– 23 pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 24 question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” In re NOS 25 Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. 26 Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). 27 C.

Honolulu, 39 F.4th at 26 1111. 27 Where a basis for removal is rooted in a federal question, as is the case with Exxon’s 1 federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's 2 properly pleaded complaint.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).

Honolulu, 39 F.4th at 26 1111. 27 Where a basis for removal is rooted in a federal question, as is the case with Exxon’s 1 federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's 2 properly pleaded complaint.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th 3 Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).

However, “[a] corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is 27 the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a 28 statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state-common law complaint into one 1 stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc’ns, 2 MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). 3 Section 301 of the LMRA is one s…

“A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the 22 ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute 23 is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a 24 federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 25 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). 26 B.

“In determining federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule ‘provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.’” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fisher v. NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir.2007)).

“A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the 21 ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute 22 is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a 23 federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 24 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393). 25 Defendant removed on the grounds some of…

“A corollary to the well–pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common–law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well–pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, _________________________________________________________________________…

“A corollary to the well–pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common–law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well–pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, _________________________________________________________________________…

Standard of Review 2 A defendant may remove an action to federal court where there is either federal 3 question jurisdiction based on the complaint or there is diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 4 1441; Fisher v. NOS Commc'ns (In re NOS Commc'ns), 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 5 2007).

LEGAL STANDARD “A defendant may remove an action originally filed in state court only if the case originally could have been filed in federal court.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a)).

Whether federal question jurisdiction exists is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which “‘provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Fisher v. NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007)); Takeda v. Nw.

LEGAL STANDARD “A defendant may remove an action originally filed in state court only if the case originally could have been filed in federal court.” In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a)).

The filed—rate doctrine “precludes courts from deciding whether a tariff is reasonable, reserving the evaluation of tariffs to the FCC.” In re NOS Communications, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007).

“A corollary to the well–pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete preemption’ doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common–law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well–pleaded complaint rule.’” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 ).

Whether federal question jurisdiction exists is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which “‘provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Fisher v. NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007)); Takeda v. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins.

In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 11 (holding that federal law provides the exclusive cause of action for usury claims against national banks such that there is “no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank”).

In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 22 CITY OF OAKLAND V.

It is 11 well settled that “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, 12 including the defense of pre-emption.” In re NOS Commc’ns, 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th 13 Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 ).

Whether federal question jurisdiction exists is determined by the well- pleaded complaint rule, which “‘provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Fisher v. NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007)); Kerr v. Delaware N. Cos., Inc., No. 116CV01797LJOSAB, 2017 WL 880409 , at *1 (E.D.

In re NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 , 61 (2d Cir.1998)).

In addition, the regulation imposes new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. at 1062. .

The presence of a savings provision “is fundamentally incompatible with complete field preemption; if Congress intended to preempt the entire field ... there would be nothing ... to ‘save,’ and the provision would be mere surplusage.” In re NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir.2007); see also Holk, 575 F.3d at 338 ; Time Warner Cable v. Doyle, 66 F.3d 867, 878 (7th Cir.1995).

In re NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir.2007).

(In re NOS Communs.), 495 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir.2007).

Id. at 1058. 204 . 138 F.3d 46 , 54 (2d Cir.1998) (“The FCA not only does not manifest a clear [cjongressional intent to preempt state law actions prohibiting deceptive business practices, false advertisement, or common law fraud, it evidences Congress’s intent to allow such claims to proceed under state law.”). 205 . 495 F.3d at 1058 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 414 ). 206 .

In determining federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded com- plaint.” Fisher v. NOS Commc’ns (In re NOS Commc’ns), 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT & T, 138 F.3d 479, 487 (2d Cir.1998) (finding no federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiffs breach-of-contract claim where the basis for the claim was “independent of the rate on file with the FCC”); cf. In re NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th *916 Cir.2007) (“[IJnsofar as [the state-claim plaintiffs] can prove damages that do not refer to the filed-rate, its state law claims may proceed.”).

In Firstcom, we rejected a fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine and declined to follow a Ninth Circuit case that “held that the filed rate doctrine did not preclude a fraud claim provided that the damages could be proved without attacking the filed rate.” Firstcom, 555 F.3d at 679-81 (dis *882 agreeing with In re NOS Commc’ns MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.2007)).

In Firstcom, we rejected a fraud exception to the filed rate doctrine and declined to follow a Ninth Circuit case that "held that the filed rate doctrine did not preclude a fraud claim provided that the damages could be proved without attacking the filed rate." Firstcom, 2009 WL 291064, at *7-8 (disagreeing with In re NOS Commc'ns MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Although the Ninth Circuit recently held that the filed rate doctrine did not preclude a fraud claim provided that the damages could be proved without attacking the filed rate, see In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.2007), we are persuaded by the statement of an earlier Ninth Circuit panel that: It is tempting to believe that, in Congress’s new perspective [embodied in the 1996 amendments to the Act introducing a competitive regime for local telec…

Although the Ninth Circuit recently held that the filed rate doctrine did not preclude a fraud claim provided that the damages could be proved without attacking the filed rate, see In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007), we are persuaded by the statement of an earlier Ninth Circuit panel that: It is tempting to believe that, in Congress’s new perspective [embodied in the 1996 amendments to the Act introducing a competitive regime for local tele…

See In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "[a] savings clause is fundamentally incompatible with complete field preemption.”). .

See In re NOS Commc’ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir.2007) (stating that the Communication Act’s savings clause “is fundamentally incompatible with complete field preemption; if Congress intended to preempt the entire field of telecommunications regulation, there would be nothing for section 414 to ‘save’ and the provision would be mere surplusage” (citing Marcus, 138 F.3d at 54)); accord Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292 , 1313 (11th Cir.2001).

See In re NOS Commc’s, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir.2007) (“[S]ection 414 evidences Congressional intent to allow some state law claims to proceed.”) (discussing Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 , 54 (2d Cir.1998)).

See In re NOS Commc’ns., 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (holding fraudulent inducement claim not preempted).

See, e.g., In re NOS Commc’ns, 495 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir.2007) (referring to “complete field preemption”); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 , 1135 (9th Cir.2003) (“[Fjederal law can preempt and displace state law through ... field preemption (sometimes referred to as complete preemption).”); ARCO Envtl.