Manbeck v. Micka (2009)

Corp., 7 F.3d 1085 , 1088 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that a Section 1985 conspiracy must "be motivated by 'some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action'" (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 82-29 (1983)); Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[A] Section 1985 conspiracy differs from a Section 1983 conspiracy in that the plaintiff must also provide evidence th…

In support of his § 1985 claim, plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that could provide a “basis supporting a meeting of the minds” regarding the alleged conspiracy, see Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2003), or a basis supporting discriminatory animus, see Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Instead, they employ broad generalizations and frequently use the passive voice, which makes it “difficult to discern the precise nature of [their] claim[s].” Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

“In addition, ‘[c]laims adjudicated through summary judgment are regarded as final judgments on the merits’ for the purpose of issue preclusion.” Clark, 2022 WL 1471349 , at *9 (quoting Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); see Reeves v. City of Yonkers, No. 17-CV- 5341 (KMK), 2019 WL 2602897 , at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

(See ECF No. 43 at 5– 17; ECF No. 45-1 at 4–5; ECF No. 48-1 at 1–2.) See, e.g., Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (shotgun pleadings “set[] forth a potpourri of vague and conclusory allegations . . . that illustrate[] . . . utter disrespect for Rule 8 . . . making it extremely difficult to discern the precise nature of the claim[s]” (quoting Coakley v. Jaffe, 49 F. Supp. 2d 615, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)); Fed.

Such pleadings are improper when the complaint makes it “extremely difficult to discern the precise nature of the claims,” Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), or when it is “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact were intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Croons v. N.Y.

Aug. 12, 2008) (citing Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Lienau, 2013 WL 6697834 , at *5; Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

Mangino v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 739 F. Supp. 2d 205, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Bianco, J.) (citing cases); Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim were plaintiff “was merely issued appearance tickets to appear in Town Justice Court to answer misdemeanor charges of violations of the Town’s Zoning Laws,” was never “physically detained in any way,” and suffered no “‘seizure’ sufficient to satisfy the constitutio…

In Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) the complaint listed “vague and conclusory allegations . . . making it extremely difficult to discern the precise nature of the claim[s].” In Alexander v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:17-CV-1195, 2018 WL 6591426 , (N.D.N.Y 2018) the plaintiff’s complaint mistakenly used the same label to refer to two different groups of theories of liability and also “failed to connect his various theories of liability to the particula…

Likewise, “[c]laims adjudicated through summary judgment are regarded as final judgments on the merits.” Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Dec, 16, 2008) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 claim based on allegations that the defendants gave the police false information “out of malice and in an effort to get [the plaintiff] ejected from the home he was renting” where plaintiff failed to “allege facts suggesting that defendants and the police had any meeting of the minds or intent to conspire”); Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (requiring a “meeting of the minds between law e…

Thus “[t]o state a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must allege the four elements of malicious prosecution under New York state law and a ‘sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.’” Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Rohman v. N.Y.C.

Manganiello, 612 F.3d at 160-61 , “[M]alice may be shown by proving that the prosecution complained of was undertaken from improper or wrongful motives, or in reckless disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.” Id. at 163 ; see also TADCO Const. Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of State of New York, 700 F.Supp.2d 253, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Actual malice requires pleading facts that show the defendant ‘commenced the prior criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, somethi…

Although “conclusory allegations” of a § 1983 conspiracy are insufficient, Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 Fed.Appx. 18, 22 (2nd Cir.2012) (quoting Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2002)), the Second Circuit has “recognized that such ‘conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations,’ and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.” Pang burn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2…

See Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778 (2d Cir.2007) (while there was evidence to suggest that each individual acted with racial animus, there was no evidence to suggest that there' was an understanding among the defendants to do so); Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.1998); Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 379 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (dismissing conspiracy claim where there was no evidence that the state and private defendants had a “meeting of the minds” wi…

See, e.g., Ruston v. Town Bd. of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 57 (2d Cir.2010) ("class of one”); LaTrieste Restaurant v. Village of Port Chester, 188 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir.1999) (selective enforcement); Lisa’s Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12 , 16-17 (2d Cir.1999) (selective enforcement); Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 678, 683 (2d Cir.1995) (selective enforcement); Nemeth, 2011 WL 56063 , at *5 (selective enforcement and "class of one”); Christian v. T…

Aug. 24, 2010) (applying Burg to conclude “that requiring plaintiffs to appear in court twice in connection with the summons — for an initial appearance and a one-day trial — is not a sufficient deprivation of liberty to rise to the level of a constitutional injury”); Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 370 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (finding that a seizure had not occurred where plaintiff had not been detained at any point after she had been “issued appearance tickets to appear in Tow…

Dec. 1, 2011) (same); Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F.Supp.2d 569, 586-87 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (same); cf. Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 382 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (noting that a § 1985 conspiracy is “[njarrower in scope” than a § 1983 conspiracy because in a § 1985 conspiracy, “the plaintiff must also provide evidence that Defendants acted in concert with a racial or discriminatory animus.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 34 This interpretation contem plates that Defendants must in…

When determining whether an agreement exists to commit an unlawful act, courts consider a wide range of evidence. “[Conspiracies are by their very nature secretive operations, and may have to be proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.” Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 379 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting Pa ngburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.1999)); Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2009) (noting “that direct evide…

Commission, 290 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir.2002); Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y.2009).

See Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 3 Defendants hint at, but do not explicitly invoke, res judicata in their motion papers.

“When no objections are filed, the Court reviews [a Report and Recommendation] on a dispositive motion for clear error.” See, e.g., Andrews v. LeClaire, 709 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding no clear error in Report and Recommendation, as to which no objections were filed, and adopting it in full); accord Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

“When no objections are filed, the Court reviews [a Report and Recommendation] on a dispositive motion for clear error.” See, e.g., Andrews v. LeClaire, 709 F. Supp. 2d 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding no clear error in Report and Recommendation, as to which no objections were filed, and adopting it in full); accord Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F. Supp. 2d 351, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

See Manbeck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 370 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Here, in the criminal actions, Gennimi was merely issued appearance tickets to appear in Town Justice Court to answer misdemean- or charges of violations of the Town’s Zoning Laws.

Instead, there must be proof of a “plan, prearrangement, conspiracy, custom or policy.” Id. (citation omitted); see Valez, 2008 WL 5329974 *3; see also Man-beck v. Micka, 640 F.Supp.2d 351, 379 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (requiring a “meeting of the minds between law enforcement and private individual to support a finding of state action”).

See Manbeck v. Micha, 640 F.Supp.2d 351 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (suggesting that Wang is contradicted by Iqbal’s admonition that Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”) Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that the “[defendant's imposition of a disciplinary penalty against Edwin Aleman was on the basis of his race and national origin, Hispanic,” (Compl. ¶ 39), and that the “[d]efendant’s actions were intentional …