Cluster 1663756

See Thacker v. State, 990 So.2d 1223, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (following Spera); see also Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“Nothing in the limited record before this court demonstrates that [the postconviction mov-ant] could not allege sufficient facts or prejudice in connection with this claim if given the opportunity to amend his motion.”).

However, “[ajffirmative misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and provides a basis on which to withdraw the plea.” Roberti v. State, 782 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“[Wjhile counsel has no obligation to be proactive by voluntarily advising a defendant about the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, if counsel chooses to offer such advice…

A defendant is not required to allege in a rule 3.850 motion that the motion to request would have been granted; “[i]nstead, ‘to show prejudice in a plea bargain case, [the defendant] must show only that without the misadvice of counsel, there was a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty and would have chosen to go to trial.’” Deck v. State, 985 So. 2d 1234, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 967 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)).

Mr. Slade “was not required to allege that his motion to suppress would have been granted in order to state a facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance.” Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Finally, while I disagree with the majority that the failure to advise a defendant of possible jail time and prison time credits can support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, I recognize that “if counsel chooses to offer such advice, then the advice given must be accurate.” Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

However, even when counsel has no obligation to advise a defendant about a collateral consequence of a plea, “ ‘[affirmative misadvice about even a collateral consequence of a plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Roberti v. State, 782 So.2d 919, 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).

See Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in a case involving a plea, the defendant must allege and prove only that ’there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.…

See Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1237-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Brown, 967 So.2d at 443 .

See Ghanavati v. State, 820 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“[I]t is well-settled that affirmative misadvice regarding even collateral consequences • of a plea forms a basis for withdrawing the plea.” (quoting Watrous v. State, 793 So.2d 6, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)); see also Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Marshall v. State, 983 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (en banc); Joyner v. State, 795 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

See, e.g., Deck v. State, 985 So.2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that defendant’s allegation in postcon-viction relief motion that trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him of collateral consequences of his plea presented facially sufficient claim for postconviction relief; defendant’s motion alleged that, but for the misadvice, defendant would not have entered plea).