Cluster 170000

Rather, “limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 , 593 n.14 (1998); see also Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is well established that limited discovery may be necessary to resolve qualified immunity claims on summary judgment.”).

See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[D]enials of qualified immunity based on a motion to dismiss are only immediately appealable to the extent they turn on issues of law.”). 11 inappropriate for us to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the Heck issue.

Vol. I at 148.) Because this is a factual determination, we do not address it on this appeal. 3 Weise, 507 F.3d at 1264 (“If a district court cannot rule on the merits of a qualified immunity defense at the dismissal stage because the allegations in the pleadings are insufficient as to some factual matter, the district court’s determination is not immediately appealable.”).

Vol. I at 148.) Because this is a factual determination, we do not address it on this appeal.3 See Weise, 507 F.3d at 1264 (“If a district court cannot rule on the merits of a qualified immunity defense at the dismissal stage because the allegations in the pleadings are insufficient as to some factual matter, the district court’s determination is not immediately appealable.”).

See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (“[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”; Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “a district court cannot avoid ruling on the merits of a qualified immunity defense when it can resolve the purely legal question of whether a defendant’s conduct, as alleged by plaintiff, violates clearly establi…

Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007) (the qualified immunity analysis “can only proceed after the court determines that a defendant is entitled to assert qualified immunity in the first instance”).

And, because “discovery may inform the context [of the individual defendants’] actions,” the “‘denial of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage does not preclude a renewal of that defense at summary judgment after further factual development has occurred.’” Schwartz, 702 F.3d at 587 (quoting Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007)).5 III.

ANALYSIS 4 Plaintiff argues that an entitlement to a discovery stay does not exist if the success of qualified immunity hinges on fact rather than law, citing Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007), A Brighter Day, Inc. v. Barnes, 860 F. App’x 569 , 574–76 (10th Cir. 2021), and Riley v. Spangler, No. 1:20-cv-00983-KWR-SCY, 2021 WL 5881999 at *7–8 (D.N.M.

But even in the qualified immunity context, the “right to immunity is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in general; when immunity with respect to those claims has been finally denied, 4 Appellate Case: 21-1309 Document: 010110699363 Date Filed: 06/21/2022 Page: 5 rule on the merits of [an] . . . immunity defense at the dismissal stage because the allegations in the pleadings are insufficient as to some factual matter, the district court’s determina…

No. 21-1.1 See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007).

In support of the failure to exhaust affirmative defense, the Army directs the court to the decision of the EEOC Office of Federal Operations, dated August 18, 2020, as to Ms. Bond’s appeal (Appeal No. 2020003416). “[W]hen a defendant’s motion to dismiss raises an affirmative defense that is not apparent on the face of the pleadings and outside matter is presented and accepted, federal courts will generally treat the motion as if it were one for summary judgment.” Cirocco, 7…

Whether Dr. Tubbs May Claim Qualified Immunity Because Dr. Tubbs is a private physician, as opposed to a government employee, we must determine whether he is entitled to claim qualified immunity. 9 See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2007).

Id. (quoting Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007)).

And, because “discovery may inform the context [of the individual defendants’] actions,” the “‘denial of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage does not preclude a renewal of that defense at summary judgment after further factual development has occurred.’” Schwartz, 702 F.3d at 587 (quoting Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007)).

Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “a district court cannot avoid ruling on the merits of a qualified immunity defense when it can resolve the purely legal question of whether a defendant’s conduct, as alleged by plaintiff, violates clearly established law’); Lybrook v. Members of the Farmington Mun.

Unsurprisingly, this is not addressed by Rota in either the Motion to Stay [#52] or the Motion for a Protective Order [#56]. - 19 - made no legal decision whatsoever, explicit or implicit, on the merits of [Rota’s] [motion].” Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that district court’s order denying without prejudice motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds was not immediately appealable).

But “when a defendant’s motion to dismiss raises an affirmative defense that is not apparent on the face of the pleadings and outside matter is presented and accepted, federal courts will generally treat the motion as if it were one for summary judgment.” Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 Here, the district court considered matters beyond Ms. Cirocco’s complaint in determining she had not exhausted her administrative r…

Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2007). .

Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir.2007).

"Under the Supreme Court’s collateral order doctrine, ‘a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable "final decision” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.' ” Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir.2007) (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). 2 .

We also note that this treatment of the matter is bolstered by its consistency with our cases recognizing the unique nature of qualified immunity, which serves as an immunity from the burdens of litigation rather than a mere defense to liability, Serna v. Colo. Dep’t of Carr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir.2006), and as such should remain available to the defendant at multiple stages of the case, see, e.g., Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 634 (10th Cir.2009); Weise v. Casp…

See Weise v. Casper, 598 F.3d 1163, 1165-66 (10th Cir.2010) (“Weise II”); Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Weise I”).

In contrast, pretrial determinations of evidentiary sufficiency in qualified immunity cases are not immediately appealable.” Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (10th Cir.2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (“[Ejvidentiary sufficiency determinations are not separable from a plaintiffs claim and thus do not constitute final decisions.... ”).

Background Although our prior decision in this case set out most of the operative facts, Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir.2007), later proceedings have better developed the factual record.

In contrast, pretrial determinations of eviden-tiary sufficiency in qualified immunity cases are not immediately appealable.” Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1263-64 (10th Cir.2007) (internal citations and quotation omitted) (“[Ejvidentiary sufficiency determinations are not separable from a plaintiffs claim and thus do not constitute final decisions.... ”).

See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 2007).

See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir.2007).

See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1262-64 (10th Cir.2007). .

See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th Cir.2007).

See Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007). [59] The same analysis would be applicable even if the order entered in the adversary proceeding were final and appealable as of right.

See Guy v. Lampert, 748 F. App’x 178 , 181 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010)); Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1126 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “a district court cannot avoid ruling on the merits of a qualified immunity defense when it can resolve the purely legal question of whether a defendant’s conduct, as alleged by plaintiff, violates clearly esta…

See C.R.C.P. 12(b) ("If, on a [ C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion], matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment....") (emphasis added); see also Weise v. Casper , 507 F.3d 1260 , 1267 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur P. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366, for the proposition that consideration of an affirmative defense in a Fed.

See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 , 116 S.Ct. 834 , 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) (“Thus, Mitchell clearly establishes that an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a ‘final’ judgment subject to immediate appeal.”); see also Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007).

Id. at 294 (citing authority from the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits); see also Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir.2007) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity by defendants who were not public officials).