Peiffer v. State (2002)

Id. at 443-44 (adopting the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in McIntyre v. Caspari, 35 F.3d 338, 344 (8th Cir.1994), that, under Missouri law, first-degree tampering is a lesser-included offense of stealing).

Id. at 443-44 (adopting the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in McIntyre v. Caspari, 35 F.3d 338, 344 (8th Cir. 1994), that, under Missouri law, first- degree tampering is a lesser-included offense of stealing).

Missouri courts have adopted the rule that “double jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea upon its unconditional acceptance.” Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peijfer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002); see also Johnson v. State, 529 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Mo. banc 2002).

However, in Hardin, the Missouri Supreme Court held the 8 See State v. Sutton, 320 S.W.3d 729, 736 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (similarly referring to the elements test under section 556.046 as “the same elements test”) (citing, inter alia, Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Mo. banc 2002)). 6 definition of a lesser-included offense requires a court to “compare the [s]tatute of the greater offense with the factual and legal elements of the lesser offense,” instead of comparing “…

“When reviewing a double jeopardy claim after a guilty plea, we consider the transcript from the guilty plea and the information or indictment.” Id. (citing Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Mo. banc 2002)).

Of course, however, it is axiomatic of the double jeopardy clause that jeopardy attached once [the defendant’s] guilty plea was accepted”); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 572 (6th Cir.1995), rev’d on other grounds, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo.2002); State v. McAlear, 519 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D.1994). {¶ 39} The majority cites United States v. Soto-Alvarez, 958 F.2d 473 (1st Cir.1992), and United States…

“The prohibition against multiple punishment is ‘designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of the court is confined to the limits established by the legislature.’” Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Mo. banc 1992) (quoting Ohio, v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 2536 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984)) (overruled on different grounds by State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. banc 1992)). “[D]ouble jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea upon its unconditional acceptance.” Pei…

State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Mo. bane 1992) (quoting Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (overruled on different grounds by State v. Heslop, 842 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. bane 1992)). “[D]Jouble jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea upon its unconditional acceptance.” Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002).

See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 580 F.3d -9- 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1980); Thomas, 995 A.2d at 74 ; Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 892 (Tenn. 2009); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. 2002); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991).

See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 580 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1980); Thomas, 995 A.2d at 74 ; Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 892 (Tenn. 2009); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. 2002); State v. Duval, 589 A.2d 321, 324 (Vt. 1991).

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to a guilty plea may succeed only if the movant proves that it “impinge[d] the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made.” Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Moreover, “[i]f a conviction results from a guilty plea, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent that it impinges the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made.” Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Young (“Movant”) pleaded guilty to one count of involuntary manslaughter, two counts of second-degree assault, and one count of driving with a revoked license. 1 Movant now claims his convictions and sentences should be set aside because his first attorney’s failure to sufficiently review Movant’s discovery and prepare for trial rendered Movant’s guilty plea involuntary in that Movant “was forced to choose between proceeding to trial with an unprepared attorney — either his …

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Mo. banc 2002); McTush, 827 S.W.2d at 188 .

Rule 24.035(k); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

In order to receive an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction motion, a “movant must meet three requirements: (1) the motion must allege facts, not conclusions, warranting relief; (2) the facts' alleged must raise matters not conclusively refuted by the files and records in the case; and (3) the matters complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant.” Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Mo. banc 2002).

W.D.2009), quoting Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002).

Rule 24.035(k); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Mo. banc 2002).

Rule 24.035(k); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002); Simmons v. State, 100 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Mo.App.

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002); Latham v. State, 439 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Mo.1969); Rollins v. State, 974 S.W.2d 593 , 596 n. 3 (Mo.App.1998).

Rule 24.035(h); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002); State v. Driver, 912 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1995).

See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 58–59 (1985) (holding that petitioner may satisfy prejudice prong of two- part Strickland standard following guilty plea if petitioner shows “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial”); State v. McDermott, 677 N.W.2d 156, 161 (Neb. 2004) (“[I]n a postconviction action brought by a defendant convicted because of a guilty plea, a court …

Rule 24.035(k); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 441 (Mo. banc 2002).

The instant case is more akin to Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Rule 24.035(k); Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002); see also Jackson v. State, 90 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Mo.App.2002); Moore, 39 S.W.3d at 892 ; Sexton v. State, 36 S.W.3d 782, 784-85 (Mo.App.2001).

“The Missouri offenses of ‘tampering by operation’ [Mo.Rev.Stat. § 569.080.1(2) ] and ‘automobile theft’ [Mo. Rev.Stat. § 570.030.1] differ only with respect to the permanence of the offender’s intent to deprive the owner of possession.” Johnson, 417 F.3d at 997 ; see also Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002) (per curiam) (holding that tampering by possession is the lesser included offense of automobile theft for purposes of double jeopardy).

Compare, e.g., State v. Angel, 132 N.M. 501 , 51 P.3d 1155, 1157-59 (2002) (holding, citing Johnson and Santiago Soto, that jeopardy did not attach when trial court accepted a no contest plea but dismissed charges before sentencing), with Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444-45 (Mo.2002) (“[D]ouble jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea upon its unconditional acceptance.” (citing Fransaw, 810 F.2d at 523 )), and State v. McAlear, 519 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D.1994) (“In the case of a…

Stat. § 570.030.1 ] differ only with respect to the permanence of the offender’s intent to deprive the owner of possession.” Johnson, No.04-1839, slip op. at 9-10; see also Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. banc 2002) (per curiam) (holding that tampering by possession is the lesser included offense of automobile theft for purposes of double jeopardy).

Compare, e.g., State v. Angel, 51 P.3d 1155, 1157-59 (N.M. 2002) (holding, citing Johnson and Santiago Soto, that jeopardy did not attach when trial court accepted a no contest plea but dismissed charges before sentencing), with Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444-45 (Mo. 2002) (“[D]ouble jeopardy attaches to a guilty plea upon its unconditional acceptance.” (citing Fransaw, 810 F.2d at 523 )), and State v. McAlear, 519 N.W.2d 596, 599 (S.D. 1994) (“In the case of a plea ba…

See Jackson, 118 Ill. 2d at 188 ; People v. Guillen, 2014 IL App (2d) 131216, ¶ 32 ; see also, e.g., Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (“sentencing has never been a prerequisite to the attachment of jeopardy”).

State v. Prince, 518 S.W.3d 847, 852-53 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (citing State v. Creamer, 161 S.W.3d 420, 425-26 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005)); see also Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 444-45 (Mo. banc 2002). 3 While double jeopardy principles generally limit the authority of the circuit court to set aside a guilty plea which it has unconditionally accepted, the court is not prohibited from setting aside a guilty plea where the defendant consents to that course of action.

See Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2002).

Compare Peiffer v. State, 88 S.W.3d 439, 446 (Mo. banc 2002).