Florida Convalescent Centers v. Somberg (2003)

Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 2003) (“Logically, if the Legislature had intended for the Nursing Home Act to be limited by the Wrongful Death Act, it would have said so, rather than broadly providing not only for damages but also for a personal representative to claim those damages”).

See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 390-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The only reliable indication of that [legislative] intent—the only thing we know for sure can be attributed to all of them—is the words of the bill that they voted to make law”); Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 2003) (“Logically, if the Legislature had intended for the Nursing Home Act to be limited by the Wrongful Death Act, it would have said so,…

Another point, this one well illustrated by the facts of this case and a possible reason behind the common law’s settled reluctance to create good Samaritan liability (part of a more general conservatism, further illustrated by the common law’s refusing to create a remedy in cases of wrongful death — in Illinois as elsewhere, suits for wrongful death are entirely creatures of statute, Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill.2d 337 , 211 Ill.Dec. 314 , 654 N.E.2d 1365…

Another point, this one well illustrated by the facts of this case and a possible reason behind the common law’s settled reluctance to create good Samaritan liability (part of a more general conservatism, further illustrated by the common law’s refusing to create a remedy in cases of wrongful death—in Illinois as elsewhere, suits for wrongful death are entirely creatures of statute, Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 654 N.E.2d 1365, 1378 (Ill. 1995); Florida Conva- les…

When construing a statute or constitutional provision, we should first look to the plain meaning of the words used; “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Holly…

When construing a statute or constitutional provision, we should first look to the plain meaning of the words used; “[w]hen the language of the statute is- clear and Unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Holly …

The appointment of a guardian does not limit the court’s power to determine that certain authority granted by a durable power of attorney is to remain exercisable by the attorney in fact. § 744.331(6)(b),(f), Fla. Stat. (2010). “ ‘When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (quoting Holly v. …

Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Florida, Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla.2004) (“[I]t is well settled that courts will consider the “history of a statute as an aid in determining the Legislature’s intent.””) While legislative history cannot alter the plain meaning of a statute, the Florida Supreme Court frequently “has relied on the plain meaning of statutes and legislative history in determining the legislature’s intent.” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1003 (F…

Co. v. Ryan Inc. E., 974 So.2d 368, 373 (Fla.2008). ‘“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)).

The purpose of the Wrongful Death Act is to “shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer.” § 768.17, Fla. Stat. See also Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1008 (Fla.2003) (stating that purpose of the Act is “to provide recovery to those who need it, specifically the surviving spouse, children, and dependents of the decedent”) (citation omitted).

Florida Convalescent Centers v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1007 (Fla.2003) (saying that the liberal construction is only "to give effect to the legislation"); Taylor Woodrow Const. Corp. v. Burke Co., 606 So.2d 1154, 1155-56 (Fla.1992) (citing remedial canon but holding that where a statutory provision is clear and not unreasonable or illogical in its operation, the court must construe the words chosen by the legislature in their plain and ordinary meaning and may not give the …

Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 2003 WL 252155 , 840 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. Feb. 6, 2003).

See Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003). "[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Id. (citations omitted). *925 "Livestock" is a word with a "clear and definite" meaning: "the horses, cattle, sheep and other useful animals kept or rai…

Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 , 137 So. 157 , 159 (1931) ); see Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg , 840 So. 2d 998 , 1000 (Fla. 2003).

Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 , 137 So. 157 , 159 (1931) ); see Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg , 840 So. 2d 998 , 1000 (Fla. 2003).

See First Healthcare Corp. v. Hamilton, 740 So.2d 1189 , 1193 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), disapproved of on other grounds by Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998 (Fla.2003) (finding such conduct to constitute discovery abuse and improper delaying tactics) (citing Greenleaf v. Amerada Hess Corp., 626 So.2d 263 , 264 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).

See, e.g., Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1008 (Fla.2003) ("Courts are obligated `to adopt an interpretation that harmonizes two related, if conflicting, statutes while giving effect to both.'") (quoting Palm Harbor Special Fire Control District v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla.1987)).

See Florida Convalescent Centers v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis").

See Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998, 1000 (Fla.2003). "[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Id. (citation omitted).

See Fla. Convalescent Ctrs. v. Somberg, 840 So.2d 998,1003 (Fla.2003) (Anstead, C.J., specially concurring).