Calef v. The Gillette Co. (2003)

Tex. Nov. 7, 2007) (finding that Plaintiff who was able to read, write, graduate from high school and college, and maintain employment was not disabled within the definition of the ADA merely because it took Plaintiff longer to learn the skills required to be an anesthesia technician); Calef, 322 F.3d at 86 (stating that “[m]erely pointing to a diagnosis of ADHD is inadequate” to show that a plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity and plaintiff’s assertio…

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. King, under the facts presented here this does not constitute “a substantial limitation on a major life activity.” Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 86 (1st Cir. 2003) (employee with ADD who had difficulty concentrating failed to establish under the facts presented that he was disabled under the ADA because he was substantially limited in major life activities of learning or speaking).

A more formal follow-up note dated September 14, 2006 then explained that Dr. Luber thought Jones “should not have to stand or walk for greater than 30 minutes at a duration without being allowed to take a break, change positions or sit down when necessary.” If given a short break, Dr. Luber added, Jones could “again stand for an additional 30 minutes,” but could spend “no more than 4-5 total hours each day ... in a standing position, [ ] with frequent breaks as necessary.” …

Calef, 322 F.3d at 83.

It is not disputed that “Plaintiff bears the burden of showing [s]he is qualified.” Calef, 322 F.3d at 85.

The employer concluded that the plaintiff, who was a production manager, was unable to handle stressful situations. 322 F.3d at 86.

Id. at 85.

C.f., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 87 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Put simply, the ADA does not require that an employee whose unacceptable behavior threatens the safety of others be retained, even if the behavior stems from a mental disability.

C.f., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 87 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Put simply, the ADA does not require that an employee whose unacceptable behavior threatens the safety of others be retained, even if the behavior stems from a mental disability.

See Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 86 n.8 (1st Cir. 2003) (“If the plaintiff, with or without reasonable accommodation, cannot perform an essential function of the job, then he is not a qualified individual and there is no duty to accommodate.”).

See generally Simpson v. Alabama Dep't of Human Resources, 311 Fed.Appx. 264 (11th Cir.2009) (affirming summary judgment against DHR social worker with ADHD on grounds that plaintiff had failed to show that he was "disabled” as defined by the Rehabilitation Act); Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir.2003) ("ADHD might disable an individual such that the ADA applies,” but "[mjerely pointing to a diagnosis of ADHD is inadequate” to establish disability).

(See, e.g., Calef supra, 322 F.3d at p. 87; Palmer, supra, 117 F.3d at p. 352 .) Other cases permitting this distinction treat the misconduct as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee.

See, e.g., Calef, 322 F.3d at 83-86 (discussing this requirement).

See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 84 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s medical testing evidence and life experience showed no substantial limitation on learning); Palotai v. Univ. of Md. at Coll.

See Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 84 (1st Cir.2003) (concluding that a medical assessment that verbal abilities *160 were within the average range, including articulation, fluency, grammar and syntax, and that plaintiff was able to satisfactorily speak with customers failed to demonstrate a substantial limitation of the major life activity of speaking); Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.1998) (observing that the life activity of speaking “…

See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) (defining “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual”); see also Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 83-84 (1st Cir.2003).

See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 84 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that plaintiff's medical testing evidence and life experience showed no substantial limitation on learning); Palotai v. Univ. of Md. at Coll.

See id. at page 2. 9 .

See Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 83 (1st Cir. 2003).

See id.

See e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.2003); Axelrod v. Phillips Academy, Andover, 86 F.Supp.2d 46 (D.Mass1999).

On this point, the Supreme Court has held that: “[i]t is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.” Toyota, 534 U.S. at 184, 122 S.Ct. 681 . 15 The ADA requires those “claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is substantial.” Id. at 19…

In Amego, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was “eminently reasonable for Amego to be concerned about whether [plaintiff] could meet her responsibilities” where Amego’s judgment “about the risks of future behavior by an employee [was] based on past behavior and reasonable indicia of future behavior.” Amego, 110 F.3d at 145 (finding that plaintiff was not qualified for a position that required her to handle medications and posed a direct threat to herself and ot…

See, e.g., Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 86 (1st Cir.2003) (Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) case holding that the ADA does not require an employer to retain a threatening employee even if the behavior stems from a mental disability).

Instead, the ADA requires those “claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is substantial.” Id., at 198 ; see also Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 83 (1st Cir.2003); Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238 ; Alamo Rodríguez, 286 F.Supp.2d at 156.

Instead, the ADA requires those “claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is substantial.” Id., at 198 , 122 S.Ct. 681 ; see also Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75 , 83 (1st Cir.2003); Carroll, 294 F.3d at 238 ; Alamo-Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 156 (D.P.R.2003).

See also, Calef, 322 F.3d at 85 ("Like the Supreme Court in Toyota , we do not pass on the validity of these regulations.'') 7 .

See Calef v. Gillette Co., 322 F.3d 75, 87 (1st Cir.2003).