Cluster 2024928
green
· 130 citation events
across 6 courts.
Showing the 23 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
green
In re D.R. (2022)
Id. (“adequate procedural safeguards at the conviction stage are sufficient to obviate the need for any additional process at the registration stage”). {¶ 65} Thus, D.R.’s procedural-due-process claim fails.
“adequate procedural safeguards at the conviction stage are sufficient to obviate the need for any additional process at the registration stage”
green
Prinova Solutions, LLC v. Process Technology, LLC (2020)
In re J.R., 341 Ill.
green
People v. Guy (2019)
See In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 66-72 (registration requirement for juveniles does not violate substantive due process under rational basis test); Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 204 (Internet dissemination provisions are rationally related to state purpose of protecting public from sex offenders and assisting law enforcement); Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 151938-B , ¶¶ 30-35 (SORA is rationally related to legitimate government interest of protecting public from sex offenders); Par…
SORA statutory scheme requirements applied to a juvenile do not violate substantive due process under rational basis test
green
People v. Jackson (2018)
See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 767-68 (7th Cir. 2004); In re J.R., 341 Ill.
green
Alex Jordan Vaughn v. State (2017)
In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784 , 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 697 (2003).
green
In re A.C. (2016)
See also People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991) (holding that SORA registration was reasonable and rationally related to the interest of protecting children); People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 425-26 (2000) (finding that SORA and the Notification Law did not violate the state or federal right to privacy). ¶40 This court followed In re J.W. in ruling that "the supreme court first noted that the respondent did not argue, and it did not find, that the Registration Act a…
green
People v. Pollard (2016)
See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 , 767- 68 (7th Cir. 2004); In re J.R., 341 Ill.
green
People v. Avila-Briones (2015)
App. 3d 441, 448-50 (2006); In re J.R., 341 Ill.
green
In re Maurice D. (2015)
App. 3d 784, 793 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 695 (2003), the First District followed the principles stated by the supreme court in J.W. and concluded that “[t]he [sex-offender-]registration requirement under the Act does not violate substantive due process because there is a rational relationship between the registration of juvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from juvenile sex offenders.” ¶ 36 While recognizing the prior holdings of our courts, specifically of T.W.…
green
In re Maurice D. (2015)
App. 3d 784, 793 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 695 (2003), the First District followed the principles stated by the supreme court in J.W. and concluded that "[t]he [sex-offender-]registration requirement under the Act does not violate substantive due process because there is a rational relationship between the registration of juvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from juvenile sex offenders." ¶ 36 While recognizing the prior holdings of our courts, specifically of T.W.…
See United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1009-10 (9th Cir.) (application of SORNA to juvenile sex offenders satisfies rational basis review), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 234 (2012); In re J.R., 793 N.E.2d 687, 694-96 (Ill.
registration and limited community notification as applied to juvenile sex offenders survive rational basis review
green
State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Logan D.) (2013)
See United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1009-10 (9th Cir.) (application of SORNA to juvenile sex offenders satisfies rational basis review), cert. denied, 568 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 234 (2012); In re J.R., 793 N.E.2d 687, 694-96 (Ill.
registration and limited community notification as applied to juvenile sex offenders survive rational basis review
green
People, in Interest of Zb (2008)
See In re D.R., 342 Ill.App.3d 512 , 276 Ill.Dec. 638 , 794 *604 N.E.2d 888, 892 (2003); In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784 , 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 693 (2003).
green
People ex rel. Z.B. (2008)
See In re D.R., 342 Ill.App.3d 512 , 276 Ill.Dec. 638 , 794 N.E.2d 888, 892 (2003); In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784 , 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 693 (2003).
green
In Re Phillip C. (2006)
App.3d 714 , 238 Ill.Dec. 941 , 713 N.E.2d 187 (1999) (finding section 9.3 did not implicate any protected liberty interests)), defendant had a meaningful opportunity to be heard at trial (see In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d at 784, 796-97, 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687 (2003); Logan, 302 Ill. *809 App.3d at 332-33, 235 Ill.Dec. 539 , 705 N.E.2d 152 ).
green
People v. Phillip C. (2006)
Defendant has not indicated what more process is “due.” See In re J.R., 341 Ill.
green
People v. D.R. (2003)
This same argument was made and rejected in In re J.R., 341 Ill.
green
In Re DR (2003)
In re J.R., slip op. at 3, 341 Ill.App.3d at 788, 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687 .
green
People v. Velez (2012)
See In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784, 799 , 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687 (2003) (reputation alone is neither liberty nor property interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the due process clause.
reputation alone is neither liberty nor property interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the due process clause. Rather, a defendant must show both (1
green
People v. Velez (2012)
See In re J.R., 341 Ill.
reputation alone is neither liberty nor property interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the due process clause. Rather, a defendant must show both (1
green
In re D.L.C. (2003)
See In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784 , 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 702 (2003) (holding that respondent’s argument that statute barring expungement of previously submitted blood specimens was unconstitutional was premature because he had made no effort to expunge the information).
holding that respondent’s argument that statute barring expungement of previously submitted blood specimens was unconstitutional was premature because he had made no effort to expunge the information
green
In Re DLC (2003)
See In re J.R., 341 Ill.App.3d 784 , 275 Ill.Dec. 916 , 793 N.E.2d 687, 702 (2003) (holding that respondent's argument that statute barring expungement of previously submitted blood specimens was unconstitutional was premature because he had made no effort to expunge the information).
holding that respondent's argument that statute barring expungement of previously submitted blood specimens was unconstitutional was premature because he had made no effort to expunge the information
green
in the Matter of R.W.W. (2003)
See In re J.R. , 793 N.E.2d 687, 702 (Ill.
holding that respondent’s argument that statute barring expungement of previously submitted blood specimens was unconstitutional was premature because he had made no effort to expunge the information