Cluster 2418989

Mar. 8, 2002)); Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (reversing and remanding for calculation of benefits where “it would be virtually impossible for [the ALJ] to find against [the] plaintiff upon remand”).

When courts have granted an immediate award of benefits, they have stated that “it would be virtually impossible for [the ALJ] to find against [the] plaintiff upon remand.” Lockhard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 2001); 6 see Perkins v. Berryhill, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2019) (the standard for reversing a Commissioner’s decision and ordering an immediate award of benefits presents a “high bar”).

A hypothetical question must “‘encompass all relevant impairments.’” Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (quoting Hunt v. Masanari, 250 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2001)).

“Hypothetical questions to a [VE] ‘must present a faithful summary of the treating physician’s diagnosis unless the ALJ provides good reason to disregard that physician’s conclusions.’” Espinosa v. Colvin, 953 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2001).

When courts have granted an immediate award of benefits, they have stated that “it would be virtually impossible for [the ALJ] to find against [the] plaintiff upon remand.” Lockhard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 2001); see Perkins v. Berryhill, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2019) (the standard for reversing a Commissioner’s decision and ordering an immediate award of benefits presents a “high bar”). 8 III.

When courts have granted an immediate award of benefits, they have stated that “it would be virtually impossible for [the ALJ] to find against [the] plaintiff upon remand.” Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 2001).

At.Step 5 of the SSA analysis, an ALJ will .“obtain evidence from a vocational expert to clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on the claimant’s past relevant work and/or other work within the remaining occupational base (SSR 85-15)” and pose “hypothetical questions [that] reflect the specific capacity/limitations established by the record as a whole.” Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F.Supp.2d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2001).

Finally, citing Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F.Supp.2d 28, 34 (D.D.C.2001), Plaintiff notes that the Court should take account of the extraordinary number of years that have passed since Plaintiff filed his initial claim for DIB and *320 place an extra weight in the scale in favor of awarding benefits.

See, e.g., Martin v. Apfel, 118 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2000) (remanding for benefits where ALJ’s “ultimate conclusion that [plaintiff] was not disabled was not based on substantial evidence” but instead was “arrived at by irrationally disregarding highly probative evidence,” including the opinions of 5 the two most reliable examining physicians); Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2001) (ordering award of benefits based on ALJ’s “cavalier disregard of the…

Hypothetical questions to a vocational expert “must present a faithful summary -of the treating physician’s diagnosis unless the ALJ provides good reason to disregard that physician’s conclusions.” Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F.Supp.2d 28, 32 (D.D.C.2001).

The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE must “present a faithful summary of the treating physician’s diagnosis unless the ALJ provides good reason to disregard the physician’s conclusions.” Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F.Supp.2d 28, 33 (D.D.C.2001).

See 175 F. Supp. 2d at 33–34.

See Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F.Supp.2d 28, 33 (D.D.C.2001).

See also Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28 , 33–34 (D.D.C. 2001) (reversing a denial of disability benefits because the ALJ incorrectly applied legal standards to a fully developed record at the final stage of the five-step process).

March 8, 2002) (citation omitted); see also Lockard v. Apfel, 175 F.Supp.2d 28, 34 (D.D.C.2001) (reversal is appropriate where “the administrative record has been fully developed and new facts would not be explored on remand[]”); Martin v. Apfel, 118 F.Supp.2d 9, 18 (D.D.C.2000) (“[W]here the record in the case has been thoroughly developed, and a hearing would merely function to delay the award of benefits, reversal [instead of remand] is appropriate.”) (citation omitted).

Ademakinwa v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration 7 No. 00-2102, 2002 WL 379898 , at *4 (D.D.C March 8, 2002) (citation omitted); see also Lockard v. Apel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (reversal is appropriate where “the administrative record has been fully developed and new facts would not be explored on remand[]”); Martin v. Apel, 118 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2000) (“[W]here the record in the case has been thoroughly developed, and a hearing would merely …