Cluster 2487867

Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A party may raise a defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where the basis for that defense is set forth on the face of the complaint or established by public record.”).

Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap, Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Plaintiffs may not reformulate garden variety trademark infringement claims into mail or wire fraud in order to state a violation of RICO”); Helios Int’] S.A.R.L. v. Cantamessa USA, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 173, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“allegations of trademark infringement are not cognizable as a RICO predicate act”); cf 1 Melville B.

See also Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A party may raise a defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where the basis for that defense is set forth on the face of the complaint or established by public record.”).

Rule 9(b) only requires the plaintiff to delineate, with adequate particularity, the specific circumstances constituting the overall fraudulent scheme.”); Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[W]here the plaintiff claims that the mail or wires were simply used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, the complaint need not be specific as to each allegation of mail or wire fraud as long as the nature of the RICO scheme is sufficiently pleade…

Mar. 31, 2021) (“A party may raise a defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where the basis for that defense is set forth on the face of the complaint or established by public record.” (quoting Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y.

“A party may raise a defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or judicial estoppel on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) where the basis for that defense is set forth on the face of the complaint or established by public record." Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y.

Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (declining to resolve a factual dispute on a motion to dismiss).

Oct. 11, 2012) (“[Plaintiff] fails to satisfy the required continuity element of a RICO claim, because the scheme he alleges is too narrow, and the victims too few, to constitute a continuous pattern.”); Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Courts have uniformly and consistently held that schemes involving a single, narrow purpose and one or few participants directed towards a single victim do not satisfy the RICO requirement of a closed…

Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

Of note, the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina has suggested that North Carolina law would recognize such a claim in appropriate circumstances because North Carolina courts recognize that a professional may be liable for negligently performing a contract that proximately causes foreseeable 1 Apart from the typical fraud claim wherein plaintiff is alleged to have relied on a false statement that defendant made directly to plaintiff (“first-party relianc…

Congress did not intend that every trademark dispute would be brought under RICO.” (quoting Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 631 (S.D.N.Y.2006))); Melville B.

Ass’n v. United Healthcare Corp., 588 F.Supp.2d 432, 442 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“Allegations said to be in furtherance of fraud are held to a different pleading standard entirely.”); Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“[W]here the plaintiff claims that the mail or wires were simply used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, the complaint need not be specific as to each allegation of mail or wire fraud as long as the nature of the RICO scheme is s…

Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y.2006). 6 This is because “[a] trade name or mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it has no independent significance apart from the goodwill it symbolizes.” Fitzpatrick v. Sony-BMG Music Entertainment, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2933(SAS), 2010 WL 3377500 , at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

“Thus, if plaintiff claims that the mail or wire transmissions ‘were themselves fraudulent, i.e., themselves contained false or misleading information, the complaint should specify the fraud involved, identify the parties responsible for the fraud, and where and when the fraud occurred.’ ” M’Baye, 2007 WL 431881 , at *7 (quoting Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y.2006)).

See also Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F. Supp. 2d 612 , 630 & n.141 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (collecting cases for proposition that garden-variety trademark infringement is not a RICO predicate).

Mar. 11, 1993) (dismissing fraudulent inducement claim because contractual disclaimers made clear that representations were not directed at plaintiff); see also Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 628 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (dismissing fraud claim where plaintiff did not allege defendant intended misrepresentation to be relayed to plaintiff); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Fidata Corp., 700 F.Supp. 1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (same).

See, e.g., Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (concluding factual dispute could not be resolved on motion to dismiss); S.E.C v. Apolant, 411 F.Supp.2d 271, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting all potential factual disputes must be resolved in plaintiffs favor on motion to dismiss) (citing S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818, 122 S.Ct. 1899 , 153 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).) Giant has also contended that the Registration Statement disclosed the problem of go…

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1060 (a)(1) (“A registered mark or a mark for which an application to register has been filed shall be assignable ....”) & (a)(4) (“An assignment shall be void against any subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information reporting the assignment is recorded in the United States Patent and Trademark Office .... ”); see also Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (discussing assignm…

See, e.g., Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., 429 F.Supp.2d 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y.2006).