Cluster 3205874

But cf. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743 (2016) (reversing as clearly erroneous the Georgia courts' rejection of a capital defendant's Batson challenge, where the state prosecutor's file, obtained post-trial pursuant to an open records request, highlighted every black juror's name, marked each as a "definite NO," and indicated, "If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay").

Cir. 2019) (“It is well settled that . . . the court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 496 (2016))); Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed.

See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (“[A]s a general rule, federal prisoners may not use a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to relitigate a claim that was previously rejected on direct appeal.”).

See Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019), quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016) ("The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was 'motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent'"); Commonwealth v. Burnett, 418 Mass. 769, 771 (1994).

ECF No. 47 at 27. “[A]s a general rule, federal prisoners may not use a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to relitigate a claim that was previously rejected on direct appeal.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring).

See id. at 507 (“As an initial matter, the prosecutor’s principal reasons for the strike shifted over time, suggesting that those reasons may be pretextual.”). ¶ 76 Here, the prosecutor’s “fair and impartial” reasoning during the initial Batson inquiry was contradicted by the record, and his “focus” reasoning during the rehearing amounted to a shifting explanation.

See id. at 507 (“As an initial matter, the prosecutor’s principal reasons for the strike shifted over time, suggesting that those reasons may be pretextual.”). ¶ 76 Here, the prosecutor’s “fair and impartial” reasoning during the initial Batson inquiry was contradicted by the record, and his “focus” reasoning during the rehearing amounted to a shifting explanation.

See id. at 507 (“As an initial matter, the prosecutor’s principal reasons for the strike shifted over time, suggesting that those reasons may be pretextual.”). ¶ 76 Here, the prosecutor’s “fair and impartial” reasoning during the initial Batson inquiry was contradicted by the record, and his “focus” reasoning during the rehearing amounted to a shifting explanation.

Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1745 (2016) (“Neither party contests our jurisdiction to review Foster’s claims, but we ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’”) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).

See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1751 (2016) (“[T]he prosecution’s principal reasons for the strike shifted over time, suggesting that those reasons may be pretextual.”). 36 As an initial matter, whether or not the FBI agents thought Mr. Flynn was lying is irrelevant in a false statements case.

Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (“The ‘Constitution for- bids striking even a single prospective juror for a discrimina- tory purpose.’”), quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (Batson applies to civil cases).

See Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1749 (“On their face, [the 12 prosecutor’s] justifications for the strike seem reasonable enough.

See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, -- U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (“[I]f that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race- neutral basis for striking the juror in question.”) (emphasis added) (summarizing Batson three step process).

Cir. 2019) (“It is well settled that . . . the court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.”) (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488 , 496–97 (2016)); Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed.

Foster v. Chatman , 578 U.S. ----, 136 S. Ct. 1737 , 1747, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) ("The 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' "), quoting Snyder v. Louisiana , 552 U.S. 472 , 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203 , 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) ; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U.S. 614 , 631, 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991) ( Batson applies to civil cases).

See also Foster v. Chatman, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1748 , ___L.Ed.2d ___ (2016) (“[A]ll of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.”).

Cir. 2019) (“[T]he court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 495 (2016)) (alterations added); Int’l Elec.

“The ultimate inquiry is whether the 10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS State was ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’” Id. at 303 , quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016). {¶36} As the party challenging the strike, the defendant maintains the burden of persuasion.

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).

Cir. 2019) (“[T]he court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.” (alteration added) (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 495 (2016))); Int’l Elec.

Citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 498 (2016), the Court said that “a state ground of decision is independent only when it does not depend on a federal holding.” Glossip, 604 U.S. at 242 .

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 500 (2016); Wright v. Harris Cnty., 536 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2008). “[W]e will affirm the district court’s ruling on a Batson challenge unless . . . we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed.” Heckman v. Gonzalez‑Caballero, 65 F.4th 222, 229 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). 7 Case: 24-30730 Document: 86-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 No. 24-30730 B.

Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1758 (2016).

Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1758 (2016).

Cir. 2019) (“[T]he court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 496 (2016)) (alteration added); Int’l Elec.

Accordingly, the “Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)).

Bernard Parish Gov’t, 916 F.3d at 992-93 (a “court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1745 (2016))).

“The ‘trial court has a pivotal role in evaluating . . . not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike.” Id. at 302 (alteration in original) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)). “[T]he issue of whether a defendant establishes purposeful discrimination ‘turns on factual determinations.’” Id. (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S.…

The scope of collateral review under § 2255 is narrower than on appeal, and a “‘collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.’” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).

"The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was 'motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.'" Id. (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)).

No. 24-1963 Houston v. Tanner Page 6 This is “a very demanding test.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 520 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring).

This is not a case where the State had an established policy (or a written manual) advocating the striking of minority prospective jurors based on race, Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 264, where the State exhibited dramatic disparate treatment toward minority prospective jurors, Flowers, 588 U.S. at 288, or where the prosecutors’ contemporaneous jury selection files plainly demonstrated discriminatory intent, Foster, 578 U.S. at 495.

Thus, we are only reviewing to assess whether the trial court erred by finding that McNeal did not satisfy his burden of proving that the prosecutor’s striking of DD was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019) (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)). ¶ 31 Before the start of jury selection, all the prospective jurors completed questionnaires.

A prosecutor must “state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on 8 the plausibility of the reasons he gives.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 250-52 (2005) 9 (“Miller-El II”); Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 490, 505, 514 (2016) (Supreme Court, quoting 10 Miller-El II, rejected state’s explanation for striking black jurors because it “reeks of 11 afterthought.”) 12 Third, the court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving 13 purposef…

Bernard Parish Gov’t, 916 F.3d at 992-93 (a “court must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1745 (2016))).

The scope of collateral review under § 2255 is narrower than on appeal, and a “collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.’” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).

Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 42 “The ‘Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.’” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016) (citation omitted).

See Flowers, 588 U.S. at 315–16; Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 514 (2016); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 , 477–78, 486 (2008).

To establish a Batson violation, “[f]irst, a [movant] must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the [proponent] must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the [movant] has shown purposeful discrimination.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016) (quoting Snyder v.…

A state ground of decision is independent only when it does not de- pend on a federal holding, Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. 488, 498 (2016), and also is not intertwined with questions of federal law, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 , 1040–1041 (1983). “[W]hen the adequacy and independence of any pos- sible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opin- ion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did becau…

A state ground of decision is independent only when it does not de- pend on a federal holding, Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. 488, 498 (2016), and also is not intertwined with questions of federal law, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 , 1040–1041 (1983). “[W]hen the adequacy and independence of any pos- sible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opin- ion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did becau…

Additionally, because the California Court of Appeal found Jones’s experience visiting his aunt to be a “serious disqualifying issue,” it was not unreasonable for the court, examining the totality of the circumstances, to conclude that the prosecutor was not “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” 3 Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019) (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)). 3.

(ECF No. 44.) The scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is markedly narrower than an appeal, and a “collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted). “[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack [of a conviction] unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Addonizio, …

Bryant asserts—and the district court agreed—that the state trial court’s refusal to permit his proposed amendment “depends on a federal constitutional ruling.” Bryant Br. 32 (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 497 (2016)).

Under the substantial-motivating factor approach a court will sustain a Batson challenge where the striking party was “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303 (2019) (quoting Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)). ¶ 16 The supreme court remanded the case to this court to determine whether the domestic-violence explanation or the bias-against-law-enforcement explanation was the prosecutor’s substantial motivati…

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 499 (2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-77 (2008)).

Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1758 (2016).

The scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is markedly narrower than an appeal, and a “collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

The scope of a § 2255 collateral attack is markedly narrower than an appeal, and a “collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (citations omitted).