Cluster 334453

See also Id. at 566 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“In its simple, most blatant form, a prior restraint is a law which requires submission of speech to an official who may grant or deny permission to utter or publish it based upon its contents.”) (emphasis supplied); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir. 1976) (“The plaintiffs’ reliance on the prior restraint doctrine is, in our view, mistaken.

Clean Energy Cmty. Found. v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934, 936-37 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that state-created foundation was not a state agency and therefore could sue the state for taking its property); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.1976) ("That [plaintiff] is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983.").

Clean Energy Cmty. Found. v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934, 936-37 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that state-created foundation was not a state agency and therefore could sue the state for taking its property); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.1976) ("That [plaintiff] is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983.").

Clean Energy Cmty. Found, v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934, 936-37 (7th Cir.2004) (holding that state-created foundation was not a state agency and therefore could sue the state for taking its property); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.1976) (“That [plaintiff] is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. [§ ]1983.”).

"That [plaintiff] is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ." Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.1976); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 , 780 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).

"That [plaintiff] is a corporation has no bearing on its standing to assert violations of the first and fourteenth amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .” Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.1976); see also First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 , 780 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (recognizing that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).

The "very assumption" of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according to the "artistic worth of competing applicants," and absolute neutrality is simply "inconceivable." Advo- *586 cates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F. 2d 792, 795-796 (CA1), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 894 (1976).

Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

Without a more specific mandate from the Supreme Court, we are reluctant to extend the forum doctrine’s regulatory tradition of “absolute neutrality,” Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976), accord Bonner-Lyons v. School Committee, 480 F.2d 442, 444 (1st Cir.1973), to this instance in which Massachusetts participates as a player in the marketplace of ideas, using its subsidies rather …

Cf. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796-97 (1st Cir.) (emphasizing broad discretion in allocating public funding for the arts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

Cf. Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796-97 (1st Cir.) (emphasizing broad discretion in allocating public funding for the arts), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 , 96 S.Ct. 612, 669 , 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), discussed the aim of public funding of the arts and stated that “public funding of the arts seeks ‘not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge’ artistic expression.” Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir.1976) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, supra).

See California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 283 (9th Cir.1974) (corporations can bring section 1983 actions to vindicate their due process rights); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir.1979) (corporations are "persons" under section 1983 entitled to bring actions to vindicate their equal protection rights); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d…

See California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 283 (9th Cir.1974) (corporations can bring section 1983 actions to vindicate their due process rights); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir.1979) (corporations are "persons" under section 1983 entitled to bring actions to vindicate their equal protection rights); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d…

Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 1079 (7th Cir.1978), ce rt. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 , 99 S.Ct. 1033 , 59 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F.Supp. 906, 911 (D.Hawaii 1974).

Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071, 1079 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 , 99 S.Ct. 1033 , 59 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F.Supp. 906, 911 (D.Hawaii 1974). 11 The Fifth Circuit has held, however, that a municipal corporation was not a proper plaintiff because it was not a "person" within the meanin…

See California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 283 (9th Cir.1974) (corporations can bring section 1983 actions to vindicate their due process rights); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1979) (corporations are “persons” under section 1983 entitled to bring actions to vindicate their equal protection rights); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2…

See California Diversified Promotions, Inc. v. Musick, 505 F.2d 278, 283 (9th Cir.1974) (corporations can bring section 1983 actions to vindicate their due process rights); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water District, 601 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir.1979) (corporations are “persons” under section 1983 entitled to bring actions to vindicate their equal protection rights); Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d…

Finally, the Eleventh Amendment might well bar an action for damages against a state official in his representative capacity when such a judgment would be paid from state funds, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-71 , 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356-59 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), but this in no way suggests that a state official is not a "person" under § 1983. [12] It is well established that a corporation, such as the ACLU, has standing to assert violations of the First and Fourteen…

It is well established that a corporation, such as the ACLU, has standing to assert violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments under § 1983, both with respect to freedom of speech, Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976), and freedom of association, see Gay Students Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 654-55 (1st Cir.1974) (injunctive relief …

Although the First Circuit has sustained discretionary state action withholding funds from a literary magazine because of a poem which officials considered “an item of filth,” the court found it “most troubling” that the denial of support “should be based on a reading of just one poem in a back issue, without consideration of the overall quality of the publication either alone or as compared to competing grant applicants.” Advocates For Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 797 (1s…

As defendant notes, it is es *510 tablished that a corporation has a cause of action under § 1983, e. g., Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1976), because it is a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, id.

Advocates for Arts v. Thompson, 532 F.2d 792, 794 (1st Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co. v. Hanisek, 426 F.Supp. 410, 412-13 (W.D.Pa.1977). 2 Plaintiffs, as shareholders, also have property interest adequate to sustain their claims.

Congress has a substantial interest in avoiding the use of government funds to endorse a “political” message. 63 “The real danger in the injection of government money into the marketplace of ideas is that the market will be distorted by the promotion of certain messages but not others.” Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 798 (1st Cir. 1976).

See Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.1976) (decision by government to cancel a program is editorial in nature and not a First Amendment violation); Muir v. Ala. Educ.

See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517 (university's student activities fund, while not a traditional physical forum, was subject to First Amendment constraints) 21 NEA and the Dissent rely on two cases, Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976), and Piarowski v. Illinois Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985).

See, Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 794-95 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

See Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

See Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

See Avins v. Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 , 88 S.Ct. 855 , 19 L.Ed.2d 982 (1968), and Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976).

See 532 F.2d at 795 -96 n.7, quoted supra at pp. 1064-1065.

See note 6, supra. Cf. Advocates of Arts, supra. 11 .

See Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 466 , 101 S.Ct. at 2465 ; see also Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 797 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 , 97 S.Ct. 254 , 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976) (no entitlement to funds for arts).

See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), for cases requiring explicit standards for the guidance of those who apply them, particularly where the statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," id. at 109, 92 S.Ct. at 2299. [15] Although the First Circuit has sustained discretionary state action withholding funds from a literary magazine because of a poem which officials considered "an…

See also Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976) (corporation as an institution has standing to assert violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ).

See also Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 , 798 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1976).