Cluster 37726

See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.”).

See, e.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 359 (“Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.”); Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.”).

See, e.g., United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination of a Guideline sentencing range[.]”).

See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence ... all facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence.”).

This “broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the 9 The court’s actual finding did alter Bazemore’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range, but it did not change the maximum punishment allowable by law. 20 No. 15-10805 Sixth Amendment.” Tuma, 738 F.3d at 693 ; see also United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the deter…

See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.”); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 , 127 S.Ct. 2456 , 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (“[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”).

Our circuit has yet to hold that pleading guilty to an indictment entails an admission of all the facts contained in the indictment, see United States v. Morales–Martinez, 496 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2007), and, as I explain below, we need not do so here. 13 Case: 09-10240 Document: 00511231658 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/13/2010 No. 09-10240 v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts re…

Further, because Carrillo was sentenced within the Guidelines, we cannot say that his sentence was “unreasonable.” See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.”).

See Mares, 402 F.3d at 521 (“It is enough that the law was settled at the time of appellate consideration to make the error plain.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We still must determine, however, whether the degree or extent of the departure or the sentence as a whole was unreasonable.59 The district court did not rely on any impermissible factors in making its decision to depart upwardly, and we have held that, in such cases, we owe great deference to the sentence imposed by the district court.60 Furthermore, the Supreme Court instructs us to measure the reasonableness of a sentence against the policy and justifications for the Guid…

He has not carried his “burden of demonstrating that the result would have likely been different had the judge been sentencing under the Booker advisory regime rather than the pre-Booker mandatory regime.” Mares, 402 F.3d at 522 (emphasis added); see also id. at 521 (“[T]he pertinent question is whether [Appellant] demonstrated that the sentencing judge — sentencing under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one — would have reached a significantly different result.”).

See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“Given the deference due the sentencing judge’s discretion under the Booker/Fanfan regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say [a sentence in which the district court properly applied the Guidelines] is ‘unreasonable.’”).

Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”); see also Mares, 402 F.3d at 522 (“[W]e find no support for [the limited remand] approach in the Supreme Court plain error cases.

As the Elev- enth Circuit has recognized, “[t]he determination of plain error is the duty of courts of appeal, not district courts.” Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1305 ; see also United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e find no support for [the Crosby approach] in the Supreme Court plain error cases.

United States v. Mares, No. 03-21035, 2005 WL 503715, at *7 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005) (“Given the deference due the sentencing judge’s discretion under the Booker/Fanfan regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say . . . a sentence [in which the district court properly applied the Guidelines] is ‘unreasonable.’”).

See Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“Given the deference due the sentencing judge’s discretion under the Booker/Fanfan regime, it will be rare for a reviewing court to say [a sentence in which the district court properly applied the Guidelines] is ‘unreasonable.’ ”). * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. 1 .

See United States v. Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at *9 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005) ("[T]he pertinent question is whether . . . the sentencing judge—sentencing under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one—would have reached a significantly different result."); United States v. Paladino, 2005 WL 435430 , at *10 (7th Cir. Feb. 25, 2005) ("[I]f the judge would have imposed the same sentence even if he had thought the guidelines merely advisory . . . and the sen- tence would be la…

See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 521 , 2005 WL 503715, at *9 (5th Cir. Mar.4, 2005) (“[T]he pertinent question is whether ... the sentencing judge — sentencing under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one — would have reached a significantly different result.”); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 , 483, 2005 WL 435430 , at *10 (7th Cir. Feb.25, 2005) (“[I]f the judge would have imposed the same sentence even if he had thought the guidelines merely advis…

For such sentences, a district court must “carefully articulate the reasons” for its decision and include “facts specific to the case at hand which led the court to conclude that the sentence imposed was fair and reasonable.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

For such sentences, a district court must “carefully articulate the reasons” for its decision and include “facts specific to the case at hand which led the court to conclude that the sentence imposed was fair and reasonable.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

See United States v. Shah, 95 F.4th 328, 385 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hebert, 813 F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hernandez, 633 F.3d 370 , 374–75 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 498 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005).

Based on facts that were before the district court, it “understandably concluded” that Lodgson’s co-defendant invoked her privilege because she “had a reasonable apprehension of self-incrimination as a result of [her] responses to essentially any questions relevant to [Logsdon’s] defense.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005).

See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 849 F.3d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 2017); Anderson, 559 F.3d at 352 ; United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004).

Thus, in deciding whether serious doubt infects the verdict, the Court considers three factors: “(1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

While a district court is required to explain its reasons for imposing a particular sentence, see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007), “little explanation is required” if the sentence is within the guidelines range, United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that “little explanation is required” when a sentence is within the guidelines range).

Thus, in deciding whether serious doubt infects the verdict, the Court considers three factors: “(1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, “[a] prosecutor’s closing remarks are reversible error when they ‘cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Bush, 451 F. App’x 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005).

See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2005).

See United States v. Scroggins, 485 F.3d 824, 834 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (providing “little explanation is required” when court orders within-Guidelines sentence).

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).

The Court imposed a sentence within the 4 guideline range, which required “little explanation.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).1 The Court considered the advisory guidelines as well as the statutory concerns listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a), and determined that the sentence imposed was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the Court’s sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public.

Additionally, “[a] prosecutor’s closing remarks are reversible error when they ‘cast serious doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Bush, 451 F. App’x 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 498 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

“If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

He is not entitled to resentencing. 9 United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83 ). 10 United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Garcia–Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir. 2009)). 11 Cf. Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 199-200 ; United States v. Rodriguez-Pena, 957 F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). 12 See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564…

Section 3583 directs courts to consider certain factors outlined in § 3553 in deciding the proper term of supervised release. 39 36 Cancino-Trinidad, 710 F.3d at 605 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 ). 37 See id. at 607; United States v. Acosta-Navarro, 781 F. App’x 318 , 323 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). 38 See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.2005) (“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the re…

However, this court has already rejected this same argument in Smith, holding that “[a] defendant’s criminal history is one of the factors that a court may consider in imposing a non-Guideline[s] sentence.” Smith, 440 F.3d at 709 (citing United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)). 6 Case: 22-60005 Document: 00516534440 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/04/2022 No. 22-60005 Here, even if many of Stabler’s past convictions do not involve violence against others, Stabler’s…

With respect to unpreserved errors, these limitations serve to induce the timely raising of claims and objections, which gives the district court the opportunity to 18 Case: 20-60098 Document: 00516423193 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/08/2022 No. 20-60098 consider and resolve them”. (citation omitted)); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting prejudice prong enforces policies underpinning Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b): “to encourage timely obje…

Thus, in deciding whether serious doubt infected the verdict, the Court considers three factors: “(1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks, (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction by the judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See § 3553(a)(6) (need to avoid unwarranted disparities); United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469, 475 (5th Cir. 2010) (factors already accounted for by the Guidelines); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (relevant conduct); Smith, 440 F.3d at 706, 708-09 (factors not accounted for by the Guidelines).

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 198 (2d ed.) (Proximate cause means that an individual is responsible for “harms he foreseeably risked by his negligent conduct . . . to the class of persons he put at risk by that conduct.”). 18 Case: 19-50997 Document: 00515936062 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/13/2021 No. 19-50997 explanation.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005).

“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the judge should “carefully articulate the reasons” when imposing a non-guideline sentence).