Cluster 4420721
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· 84 citation events
across 8 courts.
Showing the 36 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
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Annette Sutton v. Plainfield Board of Education (2024)
See Singer, 650 F.3d at 228 (“[T]he change in the parties’ legal relationship must be the product of judicial action.”); CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 578 U.S. 419, 422 (2016) (“This change must be marked by judicial imprimatur.”) (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted) (emphasis added); M.R., 868 F.3d at 224 (“[A] party must obtain a material alteration . . . that is judicially sanctioned.”) (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted) (emphasis…
“[A] party must obtain a material alteration . . . that is judicially sanctioned.”
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Rena C. v. Colonial School District (2018)
See M.R. v. Ridley School District (Ridley II), 868 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Although ordinarily we review attorneys’ fees rulings for abuse of discretion, our review is plenary where, as here, the district court based its denial on legal conclusions.”); Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 403 , 406 (3d Cir. 2003) (exercising “plenary review over both legal questions regarding the interpretation of Rule 68 and the construction of the offer of judgment”).
“Although ordinarily we review attorneys’ fees rulings for abuse of discretion, our review is plenary where, as here, the district court based its denial on legal conclusions.”
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A.L.L., A.L. v. Laboratory Charter School (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
cleaned up
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J.D. v. HADDONFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting the applicability of stay-puts in the context of students ages 21 and younger).
noting the applicability of stay-puts in the context of students ages 21 and younger
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Micayla Augustyn v. Wall Township Board of Education (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2017)).
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Micayla Augustyn v. Wall Township Board of Education (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2017)).
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V. v. CHERRY HILL BOARD OF EDUCATION (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, New Jersey, 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2016)). “[P]revail[ing] through a settlement rather than through litigation” may constitute a material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship.
quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, New Jersey, 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2016)
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M. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017)) (cleaned up).
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F. V. v. Cherry Hill Township Board of Edu (2025)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2017).
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M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District (2024)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017); Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d at 855 (quoting Farrar for the proposition that an award under Section 504 may be nominal and still render plaintiff a prevailing party).
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HEMPFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT v. S.C. (2024)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017). 420 Id. (citation omitted).
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LABORATORY CHARTER SCHOOL v. MRS, by and through her Parent SS, and her Parent Individually (2023)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)).
quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)
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M. A. v. WALL TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION (2023)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that plaintiff was a prevailing party where she obtained backward-looking reimbursement under the IDEA’s stay-put provision, “[e]ven though [her] parents did not succeed with respect to their request for a permanent private school placement,” because the parents’ “procedural success [was] a victory ‘on the merits’ that conferred ‘prevailing party’ status”).
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UPPER DARBY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. K.W. (2023)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, N.J., 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3rd Cir. 2016)) (alteration supplied). “[W]here the action enforces the parents’ right to reimbursement or the child's right to compensatory education and the parents obtain backward- looking compensatory relief, the action requires an independent merits determination and the parents are eligible for a fee award.” Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, N.J., 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3rd Cir. 2016)
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W. v. Upper Darby School District (2023)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, N.J., 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3rd Cir. 2016)) (alteration supplied). “[W]here the action enforces the parents’ right to reimbursement or the child's right to compensatory education and the parents obtain backward- looking compensatory relief, the action requires an independent merits determination and the parents are eligible for a fee award.” Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, N.J., 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3rd Cir. 2016)
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Pocono Mountain School District v. T. D. (2023)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up).
cleaned up
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017); see also D.F., 694 F.3d at 501 .
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CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Q.M. (2022)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted). 42 Id. (quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2016)). 43 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (emphasis added) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 33 44 P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 856 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Apr. 27, 2006), as amended (May 16, 2006). 45 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(C). 46 LeJeune v. Khepera Charter Sch., 420 F. Supp. 3d 331 , 340 (E.…
internal citations omitted
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).
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CENTRAL BUCKS SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Q.M. (2022)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017). 373 Id. (internal citation omitted). 374 Arlington Cent.
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United States v. Dorian Dawson (2022)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 (2008); see also Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019) (“This Court does not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same or related statutes.”).
citing Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 (2008); see also Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (2019) (“This Court does not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same or related statutes.”
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DAWN M. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CHATHAMS (2021)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 230 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). provided to N.M.
internal citation omitted
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K.S. v. UPPER DARBY SCHOOL DISTRICT (2021)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017). “[T]o ‘prevail’ under the IDEA, . . . a party must obtain a ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ that is ‘judicially sanctioned.’” /d. (citation omitted).
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PERKIOMEN VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. R.B. (2021)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (i)(3)(B)(i))). “[F]or attorneys’ fees purposes, [a party prevails] only if he obtains relief that is ‘in some way merit[s]-based.’” Id. (quoting Raab, 833 F.3d at 293)). “[W]here the action enforces the parents’ right to reimbursement or the child’s right to compensatory education and the parents obtain backward- looking compensatory relief, the action requires an independent merits determination and the par…
citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (i)(3)(B)(i)
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Rena C. v. Colonial School District (2020)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2017). 9 favorable than the offer.” (App. at 21.) Combining these principles, the Court concluded it was “require[d] … to reduce the time spent on those issues on which Rena did not prevail or had been included in Colonial’s … offer.” (App. at 21.) 1.
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GRESKO v. PEMBERTON TWP. BD. OF EDUCATION (2020)
In assessing a fee petition, the Court must first assess whether Plaintiffs qualify as “prevailing parties.” To “prevail” under the IDEA, “a party must obtain a ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ that is ‘judicially sanctioned.’” M.R. v. Ridley School District, 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)).
quoting Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)
Courts should not “allow school districts [to] ignore their obligations under the IDEA’s ‘stay put’ provision... with impunity.” ZR. v. Ridley School District, 868 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2017).
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P.B. v. KHEPERA CHARTER SCHOOL (2019)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).
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G. v. KHEPERA CHARTER SCHOOL (2019)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).
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S.P. v. Pennsylvania Department of Edu (2018)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Rabb v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)).
quoting Rabb v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)
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Philadelphia School District v. Robert Kirsch (2018)
Dist., 868 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)).
citing Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016)
We ordinarily would review that order for abuse of discretion, but “our review is plenary where, as here, the district court based its denial on legal conclusions” and “determined, as a threshold matter, that [Plaintiffs] were not prevailing parties, so the District Court lacked discretion to award any fees.” M.R., 868 F.3d at 223 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
brackets and internal quotation marks omitted
Id. at 223-24, 225-26 , 2017 WL 3597707 at *3, *5 .
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Velma Olu-Cole v. E.L. Haynes Public Charter Sc (2019)
Tr. at 16 (Olu-Cole's attorney explaining that stay put and compensatory education are "inextricably intertwined"); see also M.R. , 868 F.3d at 229 -230 . 2 Lastly, the School challenges the predicate assumption that stay put applied at all *532 in this case.