Cluster 4464860

Antitrust Litig. , 881 F.3d at 274 ("Crucially, unlike the plaintiff in Mid-West Paper, who sued price-fixing suppliers from whom it made no purchases and with whom it had no direct relationship, here the Purchasers are pressing claims against price-fixing suppliers from whom they directly purchased products that incorporate a price-fixed component.") (emphasis in original); id. ("The direct relationship between the Purchasers and their Suppliers, and the fact that the Suppl…

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2018). 3 Amalgamated Transit Union Loc. 85 v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 39 F.4th 95 , 103 (3d Cir. 2022). 4 Flora v. Cnty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2015). 2 establish protected speech.5 For speech to be protected, a public employee must “[speak] as a private citizen.”6 Key to this determination is whether the employee spoke “pursuant to [his] official duties,”7 and “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinari…

Antitrust standing is “something of a misnomer” in that it requires more than ordinary Article II standing: “For a party to have ‘antitrust standing,’ it must do more than satisfy the familiar three-part test for standing—injury in fact, causation, and redressability—that arises from the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, 881 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Eggs TIT’) (internal citations and footnote omitte…

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 264 (3d Cir. 2018).

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 269 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Ethypharm, 707 F.3d at 232–33). 1.

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 276 (3d Cir. 2018). 22 P.3d 871, 877 (Cal. 2013) (“Interpretations of federal antitrust law are at most instructive, not conclusive, when construing the Cartwright Act.”).

Antitrust Litig., the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs could seek overcharge damages for all egg products purchased from a conspirator, even where those egg products included some amount of eggs from a third-party non-conspirator. 881 F.3d 262, 274-76 (3d Cir. 2018).

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2018).

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 536 (“There is a similarity between the struggle of common-law judges to articulate a precise definition of the concept of ‘proximate cause,’ and the struggle of federal judges to articulate a precise test to determine whether a party injured by an antitrust violation may recover treble damages.”)).

Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing AGC, 459 U.S. at 536 (“There is a similarity between the struggle of common-law judges to articulate a precise definition of the concept of ‘proximate cause,’ and the struggle of federal judges to articulate a precise test to determine whether a party injured by an antitrust violation may recover treble damages.”)).

See In re Processed Egg Prods., Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262 , 276–77 (3d Cir. 2018) (reiterating Mid-West Paper’s holdings that “antitrust plaintiffs must prove ‘actual causation’ with ‘reasonable certainty,’ and provide the trier of fact enough to ‘make a reasonable estimate of damages.’”).