Cluster 4508172

But see United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2018) (analyzing § 2252 and concluding that "relating to" must be read narrowly and requiring a categorical match between state definition and federal definition of child pornography); United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 776-77 (6th Cir. 2014) (concluding that state conviction did not trigger § 2252's enhancement because state's definition was broader than federal definition of child pornography).

See also United States v. Colson, 683 F.3d 507 , 511 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that conviction under state statute that extended to lewd exhibitions of buttocks and female breasts qualified as prior conviction under § 2252A(b)(1)); but see United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 , 615 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (b)(2)).

United States, 856 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2017)). 21 Id. 22 Flores, 856 F.3d at 297 (Shwartz, J., concurring) (quoting Denis, 633 F.3d at 209 ). 8 understood generically,23 or must be defined strictly in light of its federal counterparts.24 Taking into account all of the relevant words, and not just “child pornography,” we conclude that “the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography,” like “aggravated sexua…

Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949)); cf. Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 613 (“[A]pplying well-established statutory principles, where there is a federal definition of ‘child pornography’ in the same statutory chapter as the sentencing enhancement provision at § 2252(b)(2), we apply that definition.”).

United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 610 (9th Cir. 2018).

“Section 2252(b)(2) is a recidivist penalty and sentencing enhancement for those . . . convicted federally of possession of child pornography under § 2252(a)(4), and who have certain prior offenses.” United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2018).

United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 610 (9th Cir. 2018).

Like the California statute in United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 617-21 (9th Cir. 2018), the Washington statute defines “sexually explicit conduct” more expansively than the federal one, as it includes conduct such as clothed touching of a person’s genitals.

See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990 (2015); United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 610 (9th Cir. 2018).

See United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 , 617–18 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that § 311.11 fails the categorical test but using a narrower definition of the generic offense than the Tenth Circuit does); Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004 , 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that § 311.11 is overinclusive).

See United States v. Dunlap, 731 F. App’x 698 , 699 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (remanding for resentencing in light of United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2018)).

The term “sexual exploitation of children” is not defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (e), so the district court had to “‘defin[e] the offense based on the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the statutory words.’” United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2007)); accord United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 611–12 (9th Cir. 2018).

Because the term “sexual exploitation of children” is not defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2251 , the district court was required to “‘defin[e] the offense based on the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the statutory words.’” United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2007)); accord United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 611-12 (9th Cir 2018).

See United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 610 (9th Cir. 2018).

Compare United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1322-25 (10th Cir. 2016), which reached the same decision as Mayokok and distinguished the use of “relating to” in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) from the entirely different statute at issue in Mellouli, with United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606 , 615 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018), which relied on Mellouli in reaching a conclusion contrary to our decision in Mayokok.