Cluster 4584448

See United States v. Douglas, 907 F.3d 1 , 8–15 (1st Cir. 2018); Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 , 1244–52 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc); United States v. Barrett, 903 F.3d 166 , 178–84 (2d Cir. 2018); but see United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 , 239–243 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 4 No. 18-11062 Because reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s procedural ruling, the motion for a COA is DENIED. ___________________________________ ANDREW S. OLDHAM UNITED…

Accord Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding, as a matter of first impression, that defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a “crime of violence”); United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2019) (“If there is anything Davis makes clear, it is the Supreme Court’s conviction that the substantially similar residual clause definitions for a violent crime in [the] ACCA, in § 16(b), and in …

As we stated in Manning, exercising our discretion to reach an abandoned issue is warranted where three criteria are satisfied: (1) the record provides an adequate basis to consider the issue, (2) neither party is prejudiced by such consideration, and (3) the issue is one of “‘exceptional importance.’” See 930 F.3d at 271–72 (quoting United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 239 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e opt to proceed to the merits in view of the exceptional importance and recurri…

We reached similar conclusions in other conspiracy-predicated § 924(c) cases after Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis. 9 Our sister circuits support this conclusion. 10 8See United States v. Lewis, 907 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2776 (2019); accord Davis, 903 F.3d at 485 (“[C]onspiracy to commit an offense is merely an agreement to commit an offense.”). 9 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 18-30256, 2019 WL 3774078 , at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2019) (p…

“In some cases, when we reverse convictions or 9 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 18-30256, 2019 WL 3774078 , at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2019) (per curiam) (ruling that “RICO conspiracy is not a § 924(c) [COV]”); Lewis, 907 F.3d at 895 (holding that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a COV under § 924(c)); Davis, 903 F.3d at 485 (same). 10 See, e.g., United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Simms’s offense—conspiracy to commit Ho…

In 2019, the Fourth Circuit held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not constitute a crime of violence under the “force clause.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

Where CASA’s reading of the statute would render unnecessary and superfluous the phrase “shall not be effective earlier than 60 days after the date the notice is published,” it runs afoul of the canon against surplusage, pursuant to which courts generally do not adopt a reading that renders part of a statute superfluous over a reading that give effect to a statute’s “every clause and word.” See United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States …

To prove Mays conspired to commit the robbery, the Government had to show “that [Mays] agreed with another to commit actions that, if realized, would violate the Hobbs Act.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

The requirement of “delivery” is more akin to the Shular’s list of “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute” than it is to “burglary.” And § 1320a-7(a)’s further requirement that the delivery be “under any State health care program” is a “detailed qualifier[] far too specific to refer to [a] generic crime[].” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 244 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

Sherifi, 2020 WL 5026846 , at *3 (quoting United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc)).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

To constitute a crime of violence, a predicate offense must have as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc); 18 U.S.C. § 924 (a)(3)(A).

In assessing whether a predicate offense satisfies the force clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), we examine “whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, 23 USCA4 Appeal: 22-5 Doc: 49 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 24 of 34 attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” See United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

In assessing whether a predicate offense satisfies the force clause of § 924(c)(3)(A), we examine “whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, 23 USCA4 Appeal: 23-1 Doc: 43 Filed: 03/18/2024 Pg: 24 of 34 attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” See United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

That is, we “look to whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019).

That is, we “look to whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

As to the carjacking conviction, he argued that that crime “may be 2 The elements clause is also commonly referred to as the “force clause.” See e.g., United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 5 USCA4 Appeal: 21-7171 Doc: 36 Filed: 08/10/2023 Pg: 6 of 22 accomplished with intimidation,” without the use of “strong physical force.” Id.

See In re Thomas, __F3d__,__, 2021 WL 725619 (4th Cir, Feb. 23, 2021) (No. 19-292); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

To consider the application of the force clause to those statutes, this Court must apply the “categorical approach,” which looks to “whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

To consider the application of the force clause to those statutes, this Court must apply the “categorical approach,” which looks to “whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

See United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (holding that residual clause of § 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague); In re Thomas, 988 F.3d 783, 789 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding that Davis “applies retroactively to cases on collateral review”); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that Hobbs Act conspiracy could not constitute a “crime of violence” under elements clause of § 924(c)). 2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4420 Doc: 29 Filed: 0…

See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (noting that the presumption of consistent meaning between statutory language “certainly makes the most sense when the statutes were enacted 53 USCA4 Appeal: 20-7024 Doc: 42 Filed: 05/04/2023 Pg: 54 of 112 by the same legislative body at the same time”) (quoted in United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 243 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc)); see also Stevenson’s Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. 207 , 220 (1820) (“These laws have ex…

He also cited Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 , 1223 (2018), which invalidated the residual clause defining “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16 (b) as unconstitutionally vague, and United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 246, 250 (4th 3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-221 Doc: 40 Filed: 03/08/2023 Pg: 4 of 17 Cir. 2019), wherein we relied on Johnson and Dimaya to nullify § 924(c)’s residual clause.

After being stayed pending United States v. Ali, 991 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. (2019); and most recently United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022), the Court ordered the Government to respond to Petitioner’s amended motion to vacate. [CV Doc. 35].

See United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 2019). -12- No. 20-1929, Edmond v. United States “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a proceeding under [ 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ].” 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1)(B).

See United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

According to Rivas, because Count 3 was predicated on both Count 1—conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, which is not a crime of violence after Johnson, see United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2019)—and Count 2—Hobbs Act robbery, which remains a crime of violence after Johnson, see United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019)— his § 924(c) conviction is invalid.

Because later-issued authority establishes that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 2 does not qualify, categorically, as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc), and in light of the Supreme Court’s later invalidation of the residual language in 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(3)(B), United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), Wilson asks us to vacate his conviction on Count 3 and to remand his case for rese…

Because later-issued authority establishes that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 2 USCA4 Appeal: 16-4002 Doc: 59 Filed: 04/20/2022 Pg: 3 of 4 does not qualify, categorically, as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc), and in light of the Supreme Court’s later invalidation of the residual language in 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(3)(B), United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), Wilson asks us to vacat…

That is, we “look to whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

That is, we “look to whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

Id. at 199-200 ; see also United States v. Simmons, 11 F.4th 239, 253-61 (4th Cir. 2021) (concluding that generic and aggravated RICO conspiracy are not crimes of violence); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (holding that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence); United States v. McCollum, 885 F.3d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering is not categorically a crime …

The predicate is significant because we have determined that, while conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c), see United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019), substantive Hobbs Act robbery is unequivocally a “crime of violence.” United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019).

The predicate is significant because we have determined that, while conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c), see United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019), substantive Hobbs Act robbery is unequivocally a “crime of violence.” United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019).

And of course, “we cannot adopt a reading of [a regulation] that renders part of [it] superfluous over one that gives effect to its ‘every clause and word.’” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 , 538–39 (1955)).

But “we cannot adopt a reading of [CRREA] that renders part of [it] superfluous over one that gives effect to its 35 every clause and word.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 304 (2019) (cleaned up).

Such an agreement does not invariably require the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force.” U.S. v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019). “[P]roof of a predicate offense is an essential element of a § 924(c) violation.” U.S. v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 205 (4th Cir. 1999).

Thompson correctly argues that the same facts also satisfy the elements of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, see United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 925 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing elements of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery), 3 which is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

But “we cannot adopt a reading of [CRREA] that renders part of [it] superfluous over one that gives effect to its 35 every clause and word.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 304 (2019) (cleaned up).

United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 251 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 29 “Determination of a waiver of the right to counsel is a question of law, which we review de novo.” United States v. Owen, 407 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2005). 58 for a clear and unequivocal waiver both protects defendants against an inadvertent waiver by “occasional musings on the benefits of self-representation” and prevents defendants from “taking advantage of and manipulating the mutual exclusivity of t…

Under that approach, we ask “whether the statutory elements of the offense necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

Landmark also cites to United States v. Sims where the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt a reading of a statute that “directly conflict[ed] with how courts and the United States itself” had interpreted it. 914 F.3d 229, 252 (4th Cir. 2019).

United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 233, 236 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 304 (2019); see also United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019) (reaching the same conclusion as to the residual clause’s definition of crime of violence).