Cluster 52834

See Kay, 513 F.3d at 442 (“A man of common intelligence would have understood that.. .bribing foreign officials, was treading close to a reasonably-defined line of illegality.”).

See id. at 456 (“By explaining to the court the substance of the proffered evidence . . . and why the court should admit [the testimony,] . . .

See id. at 456 (“By explaining to the court the substance of the proffered evidence ... and why the court should admit [the testimony,] ...

See id. at 456 (“By explaining to the court the substance of the proffered evidence . . . and why the court should admit [the testimony,] . . .

See id. at 456 (“By explaining to the court the substance of the proffered evidence . . . and why the court should admit [the testimony,] . . .

We “review preserved error in jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard and ask ‘whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.’” 82 Any error is “subject to harmless-error review.” 83 “Even ‘erroneous jury instructions are harmless if a court, after a thorough examination of the record, is able to conclude beyond…

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2007).

We also “review[] de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 460 (5th Cir. 2007).

In those “complex” cases, namely tax cases, we have held that failure to instruct on an advice-of-counsel defense is reversible error 202 See United States v Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 648 (5th Cir. 2019) (defining “willfulness” in a nearly identical fashion). 203 See Frame, 236 F. App’x at 16 n.1, 18 (affirming conviction under nearly identical willfulness definition despite omitting good-faith instruction); Davis, 132 F.3d at 1094 (affirming nearly identical definitions in AKS …

Further, a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 2007) (same).

Further, a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 2007) (same).

Additionally, as Valas did not propose an instruction, the plain error consideration would have been limited to whether the district court’s “charge, as a whole, [was] a correct statement of the law clearly instruct[ing] the jurors.” Spalding, 894 F.3d at 187 (quoting United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir. 2007)). 11 Case: 20-50830 Document: 00516387883 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/08/2022 No. 20-50830 case was duplicitous and the instructions given to the jury did not…

“This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2007).

The enhancement is appropriate if (1) “the defendant occupies a position of trust” and (2) “the defendant abused her position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 447 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 455 (5th Cir. 2007); Fed.

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2007).

Examining the charge “in the full context of trial including the final arguments of counsel”—as we must—it is clear that Thompson’s contention that she was unaware that her actions were criminal was “fully and completely developed for the jury.” 42 “A central purpose of the charge is to provide the framework for the argument by counsel.” 43 The district court’s instructions did just that: the jury was instructed on each of the crimes charged, including the requirement that t…

The essence of the offense is the taking of money or property accompanied by intentional, intimidating behavior on the part of the defendant. 3 Case: 17-10915 Document: 00514666005 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/02/2018 No. 17-10915 charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and . . . clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Spalding, 894 F.3d 173, 187 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United Stat…

“This court applies a two-part test to determine whether there has been an abuse of trust: ‘(1) whether the defendant occupies a position of trust and (2) whether the defendant abused her position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.’” United States v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir. 2007)).

A. The court generally reviews jury instructions for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir. 2007), but where a challenge to an instruction rests on grounds of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo, United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 828 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 453 , 196 L.Ed.2d 330 (2016).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 457 (5th Cir. 2007).

We have explained that “corruptly” in the context of § 1505 means “knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th Cir. 2007).

We have explained that “corruptly” in the context of § 1505 means “knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th Cir. 2007).

Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 209 (5th Cir.2013); Miller, 607 F.3d at 149 ; United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459-61 (5th Cir.2007); Buck, 324 *613 F.3d at 795; United States v. Gieger, 190 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir.1999); United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 647, 655-56 (5th Cir.1997).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 449 (5th Cir.2007).

That language is similar to the definition employed by several federal appellate courts—that to act “corruptly” means to act “knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.” See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) 22 A pending investigation is just one of several events that qualifies as an “official proceeding” within the …

That language is similar to the definition employed by several federal appellate courts — that to act “corruptly” means to act “knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.” See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir.2013) (defining “corruptly” as “with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly -with the…

Ollison, 555 F.3d at 165 (citing United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir.2007)).

This court applies a two-part test to determine whether there has been an abuse of trust: “(1) whether the defendant occupies a position of trust and (2) whether the defendant abused her position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 460 (5th Cir.2007). 50 .

United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 , 1201 n. 65 (11th Cir.2010) (mail fraud); United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454 (5th Cir.2007) (obstruction); United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 947 (D.C.Cir.1985) (filing false statements).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 452 (5th Cir.2007).

See United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 256 (5th Cir.2009); United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir.2007).

In determining whether a defendant abused his position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense for purposes of Miller part two, we look to whether a defendant occupies “a superior position, relative to all people in a position to commit the offense, as a result of [his] job.” Miller, 607 F.3d at 150 (citing United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir. 2007)).

United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 449 (5th Cir.2007). .

Our dissenting colleague argues that Shell should be protected by the absolute privilege because “it can face criminal liability for failure to adequately comply and cooperate with the DOJ's investigation," citing United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 454-55 (5th Cir.2007).

See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (criminalizing, in relevant part, anyone 1 Kay, a criminal case, does not discuss whether an absolute privilege applies to statements made during the SEC investigation. 12 who, “with the intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance . . . with any civil investigative demand . . . , willfully withholds . . . any documentary material, answers to written interrogatories, or oral testament, which is the subject of such demand”); Kay, 513 F.3d at 45…

Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194-95 , 118 S.Ct. 1939 (refusing to apply Cheek/Ratzlaf standard to Firearms Owners’ Protection Act); U.S. v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 211-12 (3rd Cir.2009) (same; involving transmission of falsified airmonitoring reports in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a), backpedaling from the circuit’s previous application of the standard in the campaign finance context in U.S. v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir.1994)); Kay, 513 F.3d at 450-51 (refusing to apply the standa…

Under this standard, we consider “whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 697 (5th Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir.2007)).

Defendants cite United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448-49 (5th Cir.2007) ("Kay II") for their definition of “corruptly.” In Kay II, the trial court had instructed the jury that a “corrupt” act is one that is “done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.” Id. at 446 .

In reviewing an abuse-of-trust determination, we determine whether the defendant occupied a position of trust and whether he abused his position “in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir.2007) (defining “significant facilitation” as “whether the defendant occupied a superi- or position, relative to all people in a position to commit the offense, as a result,of [his] job”) (citat…

We review “preserved error in jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard and ask whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable to the factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th Cir.2007) (quotation and footnote omitted).

We define significant facilitation by considering “whether the defendant occupied a superior position, relative to all people in a position to commit the offense, as a result of her job.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

See infra note 15. [6] Similarly, to conclude that a payment was received "as compensation for" something, one must determine the intent of the recipient. [7] Accord OLC, Application of 18 U.S.C. § 209 to Employee-Inventors Who Receive Outside Royalty Payments (Sept. 7, 2000), 2000 WL 33952879 , at *3 (concluding that § 209 does not bar government employee-inventors from receiving outside royalties because there is "no intentional, direct link between an employee-inventor's …

This court applies a two-part test to determine whether there has been an abuse of trust: "(1) whether the defendant occupies a position of trust and (2) whether the defendant abused her position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense." United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to determine “whether a rational *522 juror could have found the elements of the offense[s] proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 452 (5th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 42 , 172 L.Ed.2d 21 (2008).