Cluster 542058

We have held “[w]hen a separate and independent jurisdictional basis exists a federal court has the discretion to treat an intervention as a separate action, and may adjudicate it despite dismissal of the main demand if failure to do so might result in unnecessary delay or other prejudice.” Arkoma Assocs. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); see also Harris v. Amoco Prod.

The Court acknowledges that where intervention occurs before dismissal, “a federal court has the discretion to treat an intervention as a separate action, and may adjudicate it despite dismissal of the main demand if failure to do so might result in unnecessary delay or other prejudice” and if “a separate and independent jurisdictional basis exists.” Arkoma Assocs. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

In cases in which intervention occurs before dismissal, “a federal court has the discretion to treat an intervention as a separate action, and may adjudicate it despite dismissal of the main demand if failure to do so might result in unnecessary delay or other prejudice” and if “a separate and independent jurisdictional basis exists.” Arkoma Assocs. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Similarly, an upward 3 adjustment could be justified if the recovery is “too small . . . in light of the hours devoted to the 4 case or other relevant factors.” Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 5 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 Here, plaintiffs’ counsel seeks an award of $79,500.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs.

Co. v. Moore, 193 F.3d 838, 840 (4th Cir.1999); Arkoma Assocs. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990); Hofheimer v. McIntee, 179 F.2d 789, 792 (7th Cir.1950); Porter v. Knickrehm, 457 F.3d 794, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2006); Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir.1994); Nat'l Ass'n of State Util.

I would submit that the Doe opinion simply “cannot be read to mean” anything other than that pleural thickening, of which a plaintiff has knowledge, “is a per se statute-triggering ... injury.” See: Howell v. Celotex Corporation, supra, 904 F.2d at 5.

See 904 F.2d at 5 1309. 6 a.

By allowing the suit to continue with respect to the intervening party, the court can avoid the senseless 'delay and expense of a new suit, which at long last will merely bring the parties to the point where they now are.' 22 (citation omitted) (quoting Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir.1941) (emphasis added)); accord Arkoma, 904 F.2d at 7; Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 472 F.2d at 896; Atkins, 418 F.2d at 876. 23 This approach, permitting the inter…

By allowing the suit to continue with respect to the intervening party, the court can avoid the senseless ‘delay and expense of a new suit, which at long last will merely bring the parties to the point where they now are.’ (citation omitted) (quoting Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir.1941) (emphasis added)); accord Arkoma, 904 F.2d at 7; Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 472 F.2d at 896; Atkins, 418 F.2d at 876.

“The good faith provision of section 877 mandates that the 3 courts review agreements purportedly made under its aegis to insure that such settlements 4 appropriately balance the contribution statute’s dual objectives.” Id.; see also Butler, 904 F.2d at 5 511 (“The obvious purpose of this statute is to determine at an early state what effect, if any, a 6 settlement has on the setoff against other defendants and on contribution rights.”). 7 The good faith requirement, “which …

See, e.g., Arkoma Assoc. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990); Horn v. Eltra Corp., 686 F.2d 439, 440 (6th Cir. 1982); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965).

See, e.g., Arkoma Assoc. v. Carden, 904 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1990); Horn v. Eltra Corp., 686 F.2d 439, 440 (6th Cir. 1982); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1965).