Cluster 560373

But see, Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086 , 1091-92 and n. 3 (5th Cir.1991)(rejeeting federal district court opinions in which it was held that, because a retaliatory discharge action was judicially and not statutorily created, it was not a part of the workers’ compensation laws and thus removable and holding, in lieu thereof: “whether a state has codified a statute as part of its workers’ compensation chapter does not determine whether a claim filed under that …

Cal. 2003) (citing Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (Sth Cir. 1991) (“Because Congress intended that all cases arising under a state’s workers’ compensation scheme remain in state court, we believe that we should read section 1445(c) broadly to further that purpose.”); Hines v Marriott Int’l, Inc., 246 F. Supp.2d 815, 819 (N.D.

The Fifth Circuit has generally stated that courts should interpret the "arising under" standard expressed in § 1445(c) broadly, "in order to further Congressional intent toward maintaining state court jurisdiction over worker's compensation cases filed in state court." Sherrod , 132 F.3d at 1118 (citing Jones , 931 F.2d at 1092 ); see Patin v. Allied Signal, Inc. , 77 F.3d 782 , 787 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Jones , 931 F.2d at 1092 ) ("We begin by reiterating a basic rule of…

See Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hether a state has codified a statute as part of its workers’ compensation chapter does not determine whether a claim filed under that statute is one ‘arising under the workers’ [sic] compensation laws’ for the purpose of section 1445(c).”); cf. Patin v. Allied Signal, Inc., 77 F.3d 782, 789 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that claims for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against worker’…

See, e.g., Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (“Because Congress intended that all cases arising under a state’s workers’ compensation scheme remain in state court, we believe that we should read section 1445(c) broadly to further that purpose.”).

See Thomas, 39 F.3d at 620 (“application of state law is preempted by the LMRA only if such application depends upon the meaning of a CBA”); Jones I, 931 F.2d at 1090 (“[T]he basic issue in this case is whether a retaliatory discharge occurred.

Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (“[WJhether a state has codified a statute as part of its workers’ compensation chapter does not determine whether a claim filed under that statute is one ‘arising under the workers’ compensation laws’ for the purpose of section 1445(c).”).

Co., 802 F.Supp. at 1477 -79 12 Id. at 1477 (quoting Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 ("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.")) 13 Id. at 1479 14 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1991) 15 See also Haines, 812 F.Supp. at 95 n. 1; Bastian, 784 F.Supp. at 1256-57 (distinguishing Jones and retaliatory discharge claims); Jones, 931 F.2d at 1091 -92 & n. 3 16 See Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex.1988) (disapproving of a number of prior appellate de…

The majority's cramped and stingy reading of the word "laws", which insists that if you can't find the words "good faith and fair dealing" in the text of the workers' compensation statute then the cause of action does not arise under the "workers' compensation laws," is clearly inconsistent with Supreme Court cases, the Congressional policy reflected in Sec. 1445(c) and our own precedent in Jones v. Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1092 ("whether a state has codified a statute a…

Co., 802 F.Supp. 1477 -79. 12 Id. at 1477 (quoting Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 ("A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.")). 13 Id. at 1479. 9 Express, Inc.14 from the circumstances in the good faith and fair dealing cases that reliedSQerroneously, according to TravelersSQon Jones.

Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (“were it not for the workers’ compensation laws, article 8307c would not exist”).

See, e.g., Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (“Because Congress intended that all cases arising under a state’s workers’ compensation scheme remain in state court, we believe that we should read section 1445(c) broadly to further that purpose”); Kay v. Home Indem.

See Roadway I, 931 F.2d at 1092 (“Because Congress intended that all cases arising under a state’s workers’ compensation scheme remain in state court, we believe that we should read section 1445(c) broadly to further that purpose.”).

Tex. Nov. 17, 2020) (citing Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991)).

“Federal law governs the construction of removal statutes.” Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff is correct that for “the federal courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over claims like [Plaintiff’s] ‘does not require that the CBA be irrelevant to the dispute; either party may still use the CBA to support the credibility of its claims.’” Carmona, 536 F.3d at 349 (cleaned up) (quoting Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1991)).

Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991).

See Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 , 1061 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Section 25–5–11.1 [pursuant to which retaliatory discharge claims are brought] is an integral part of Alabama’s workers’ compensation regime.”); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1245-47 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Under the plain meaning of the statute, where a state legislature enacts a provision within its workers’ compensation laws and creates a specific right of action, a civil action brought to enforce that r…

See Harper v. 4 AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2004) (equating “arising under” in 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1331 to “arising under” in 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c)); Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 , 1059 (11th 6 Cir. 2000) (same); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1246 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); 7 Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Jones v. Roadway 8 Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991) (same).

Congress enacted § 1445(c) “to stop the removal of [workers’] compensation cases which were increasing the already overburdened docket of the federal courts.” Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff cites Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cir. 1991) for the proposition that Plaintiff has elected his remedies and so the case should remain in state court.

Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991).

Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991); Lomeli v. HD Supply, Inc., No. 15-07759 SJO (SHx); 2015 WL 6775919 , at *4 (C.D.Cal.

See Harper v. AutoAlIiance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 202-03 (6th Cir.2004); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1245-46 (8th Cir.1995); Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir.1994); Jones v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991); cf. Gunn v. Minton, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064 , 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (explaining that *[l]inguistic consistency* counsels for applying § 1331 precedents to another statutory use of the term ‘arisin…

Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that an action for retaliatory discharge in anticipation of filing a workers’ compensation claim could not be removed under § 1445(c)).

Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991)).

See also Johnson, 159 F.3d at 1116 (§ 1445(c) prevents removal of cases “arising under” state workers’ compensation law even where there is diversity of citizenship between the parties); Sherrod, 132 F.3d at 1119 (same); Humphrey, 58 F.3d at 1245 (same); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.1991) (same); Goble, 491 F.Supp.2d at 724 (same).

Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 17 Id. at 579 . 18 Norris, 512 U.S. at 264-65 . 19 Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991). 20 Consol.

Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1991). 20 .

Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1088 (5th Cir. 1991). . 90 F.3d 1080 , 1085 n. 5 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Boyce Iron Works v. S.W.

Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955 , 115 S.Ct. 377 , 130 L.Ed.2d 328 (1994) (observing that “[e]ven a case containing a federal claim may not be removed if it also arises under state workers’ compensation law”); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.1991) (same as to diversity).

See Trevino v. Ramos, 197 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir.1999) (remand of retaliatory discharge claims to state court required by 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c)); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991) (removal of retaliatory discharge claim to federal court prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c)); Figueroa v. Healthmark Partners, LLC, 125 F.Supp.2d 209, 211 (S.D.Tex.2000) (removal of nonsubscri-ber case barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c)); Dupree v. Valero Energy Corp., 2…

Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 , 1059 (11th Cir.2000); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1245 (8th Cir.1995); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991).

United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 369 , 110 S.Ct. 1904 , 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990); Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 , 105 S.Ct. 1904 , 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); see also Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Thomas v. LTV Corporation, 39 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir.1994); Jone…

See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 , 108 S.Ct. 1877 , 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (holding that the factual questions underly *210 ing the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s compensation claim, including whether the employer had a nonre-taliatory reason for the discharge, would not “required a court to interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement” and would “not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargainin…

Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991).

Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that a claim of retaliatory termination under section 451.001 arises under Texas workers’ compensation laws within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c)); Jones v. Roadway Express, 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991).

See, e.g., Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055 , 1058 (11th Cir.2000); Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1245 (8th Cir.1995); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1991); Farrior v. Sodexho, USA 953 F.Supp. 1301, 1301 (N.D.Ala.1997).

Miller, Federal Practioe & Procedure § 3729 (3d ed.1998); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.1991).

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 58 F.3d 121, 125 (4th Cir.1995); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991).

DuPont de Nemours & Co., 58 F.3d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1991).

Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 705 , 92 S.Ct. 1344 ; Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir.1991); Brown v. Demco, 792 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir.1986).

See, e.g., Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1246 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that Missouri’s cause of action for retaliation does “arise under” its workers’ compensation laws); Spearman v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 16 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir.) (holding that Illinois’ cause of action for retaliation does not “arise under” its workers’ compensation laws), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955 , 115 S.Ct. 377 , 130 L.Ed.2d 328 (1994); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1092 (…

See Parham v. Carrier Corp., 9 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir.1993); Pope v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 265 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 916 , 112 S.Ct. 1956 , 118 L.Ed.2d 558 (1992); Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1991).

Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (emphasis supplied).

Although this Court has been unable to locate an Eleventh Circuit case regarding the nonremovability of a retaliatory discharge case, the Court takes special notice of the widely cited Fifth Circuit case of Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (5th Cir.1991).

Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 589-90 (5th Cir.1995); Parham v. Carrier Corporation, 9 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1991)); Texas Department of Human Services of the State of Texas v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 636-37 (Tex.1995) (citing Hughes Tool Company v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 , 102 S.Ct.…

LMRA preemption can occur even though 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (c) provides that “[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of 'the United States.” See Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1089-91 (“Roadway I ”), reh’g denied, 936 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1991) (“Roadway II”).

Jones, 931 F.2d at 1092 (emphasis supplied).

Parham v. Carrier Corp., 9 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir.1993); Swearingen, 968 F.2d at 562 ; Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.1991).