Cluster 563192
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· 244 citation events
across 31 courts.
Showing the 50 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
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National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association, Inc. v. Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., Secretary, U.S… (1992)
But cf. Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1308 (“[T]he fact that the EPA’s interpretation of CERCLA’s reporting requirement does not include a full-blown inquiry into Congress’s intent does not prevent the preamble passage from being an interpretative rule.”).
“[T]he fact that the EPA’s interpretation of CERCLA’s reporting requirement does not include a full-blown inquiry into Congress’s intent does not prevent the preamble passage from being an interpretative rule.”
Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1250, 1265 (D.C.Cir.2007) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he court has traditionally not vacated the rule if doing so would have serious adverse implications for public health and the environment.”); Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312 (“Because the removal of the EPA’s exemptions may affect the EPA’s ability to respond adequately to serious safety hazards, we are reluctant to remove the exemptions here.”).
“Because the removal of the EPA’s exemptions may affect the EPA’s ability to respond adequately to serious safety hazards, we are reluctant to remove the exemptions here.”
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MAHMOOD v. MAYORKAS (2023)
Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 100 (2015) (“[T]he APA’s notice-and- comment requirement does not apply to interpretative rules.”); Fertilizer Inst. v. U.S. E.P.A., 935 F.2d 1303 , 1308 (D.C.
“[A]n agency can declare tts understanding of what a statute requires without providing notice and comment, but an agency cannot go beyond the text of a statute and exercise its delegated powers without first providing adequate notice and comment.”
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TX Assn of Manufacturers v. CPSC (2021)
EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.
“The fact that some commenters actually submitted comments suggesting the creation of administrative exemptions is of little significance.”
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American Hospital Association (2019)
Cir. 2008) (per curiam))); Shands, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 270 (remanding the Secretary’s rate reduction without vacatur, despite the action’s serious deficiencies); cf. Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.
“[W]hen equity demands, an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be left in place while the agency provides the proper procedural remedy.”
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Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Azar (2019)
Cir. 2008) (per curiam))); Shands , 139 F. Supp. 3d at 270 (remanding the Secretary's rate reduction without vacatur, despite the action's serious deficiencies); cf. Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA , 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.
"[W]hen equity demands, an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be left in place while the agency provides the proper procedural remedy."
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Hispanic Affairs Project v. R. Alexander Acosta (2018)
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fertilizer Institute v. EPA , 935 F.2d 1303 , 1313 (D.C.
"[T]his exhaustion requirement is prudential and must be applied flexibly with an eye toward its underlying purposes."
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National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC (2025)
Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C.
Moreover, contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, had NMFS sought comments on the final TED requirements before adoption, no reason has been presented that doing so would have “provide[d] commentators with their first occasion to offer new and different criticisms which the agency might find convincing.’” UMWA, 626 F.3d at 95 (quoting Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1311).
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Stringfellow Memorial Hospital v. Price (2018)
The plaintiffs discount “[t]he fact that some commenters actually submitted comments” advocating for the ultimately adopted proposal as “of little significance.” Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312.
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NH Hospital Association v. Hargan (2018)
Because the adoption of a substantive policy in a preamble added to a regulation after notice and comment is procedurally improper, cf. Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1393-94 ; Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1307-09, such a policy cannot be the source of an interpretation to which a court defers, see Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) ("Chevron deference is not warranted where the regulation is 'procedurally defective' -- that is, where the agency err…
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Fbme Bank Ltd. v. Lew (2016)
Ass'n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C.Cir.1995) (recognizing "the obvious hardship that vacating the rule would impose on the agency” and declining to vacate a rule despite inadequate notice and opportunity for comment); Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1313 ("We also hold that the EPA provided inadequate notice and comment regarding the creation of administrative exemptions [in its final rule] ....
"We also hold that the EPA provided inadequate notice and comment regarding the creation of administrative exemptions [in its final rule] .... We exercise our equitable discretion, however, and allow those exemptions to remain in place until adequate notice and comment is completed.”
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Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency (2013)
The UARG finally argues that if we remand the SIL regulations, we should not vacate the regulations, based on our holding in Fertilizer Institute v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 (D.C.Cir.1991), where we stated that “when equity demands, an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be left in place while the agency provides the proper procedural remedy.” Id. at 1312.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the “purposes of notice and comment have been adequately served.” Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1311 (citation omitted).
citation omitted
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AFL-CIO v. Chao (2009)
Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 97 -98 (citing Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312).
Sugar Cane Growers, 289 F.3d at 97 -98 (citing Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312).
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Record Buck Farms, Inc. v. Johanns (2007)
“Yet, when equity demands, an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be left in place while the agency provides the proper procedural remedy.” Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312; see United States v. Goodner Bros.
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Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta (2006)
(Id.) NHTSA claims that reliance on these comments is not an attempt to “bootstrap notice from a comment,” as prohibited by Fertilizer Institute, 935 F.2d at 1312, but rather that the comments serve as evidence that the logical outgrowth test as set forth in Northeast Maryland, 358 F.3d at 951-52 , is satisfied because they demonstrate that interested parties were able to anticipate the potential policy change and comment on it by reading the proposed rule.
“An interpretative rule simply states what the administrative agency thinks the statute means, and only reminds affected parties of existing dutie's.” Fertilizer Institute, 935 F.2d at 1307 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
citation and internal quotations omitted
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SBC Comm Inc v. FCC (2005)
“An interpretative rule simply states what the administrative agency thinks the statute means, and only reminds affected parties of existing duties.” Fertilizer Institute, 935 F.2d at 1307 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
citation and internal quotations omitted
So did Fertilizer Institute, 935 F.2d at 1308-09; Air Transp.
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Ctrl TX Tele Coop v. FCC (2005)
So did Fertilizer Institute, 935 F.2d at 1308-09; Air Transp.
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Mader v. Health Care Auth. (2002)
Corp., 127 Wash.2d 614, 617 , 902 P.2d 1247 (1995); RCW 34.05.558. [36] Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 115 Wash.2d 194, 197 , 796 P.2d 412 (1990). [37] Bowers v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 103 Wash.App. 587, 597 , 13 P.3d 1076 (2000), review denied, 144 Wash.2d 1005 , 29 P.3d 717 (2001) (citing King County v. Wash. State Boundary Review Bd., 122 Wash.2d 648, 670 , 860 P.2d 1024 (1993) (`[T]here must be more than simply a hint or a slight reference to the issue in the …
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First Amer Discount v. CFTR (2000)
The test for a "logical outgrowth," variously phrased, is whether a reasonable commenter "should have anticipated that such a requirement" would be promulgated, id. at 549, or whether the notice was "sufficient to advise interested parties that comments directed to the" controverted aspect of the final rule should have been made, Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312.
The test for a "logical outgrowth," variously phrased, is whether a reasonable commenter "should have anticipated that such a requirement" would be promulgated, id. at 549, or whether the notice was "sufficient to advise interested parties that comments directed to the" controverted aspect of the final rule should have been made, Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1312. 27 In this case, the outcome of that test is a relatively close question.
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Schwalbach v. Commissioner (1998)
Cir. 1994) (quoting Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d at 1311).
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Stephen and Ann Schwalbach v. Commissioner (1998)
Cir. 1994) (quoting Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d at 1311).
However, in unusual circumstances “an unlawfully promulgated regulation can be left in place while an agency provides the proper procedural remedy.” Fertilizer Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C.Cir.1991); Chemical Manufacturers Assoc, v. Environmental Protection Agency, 870 F.2d 177, 236 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied 495 U.S. 910 , 110 S.Ct. 1936 , 109 L.Ed.2d 299 (1990); Western Oil & Gas Assoc. v. Environmental Protection A…
Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1311; see also AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C.Cir.1985).
The Fertilizer Institute court concluded that “the proper focus in determining whether an agency’s act is legislative is the source of the agency’s action, not the implications of that action.” Id. at 1308; see also United Technologies Corp. v. United States EPA, 821 F.2d 714 , 719-20 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
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Northwest Tissue Center v. Shalala (1993)
The EPA argued that the proposed rule provided adequate notice nevertheless because it included a discussion of statutory exemptions to CERCLA. 935 F.2d at 1311.
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American Mining Congress and National Industrial Sand Association v. Mine Safety & Health Administration and … (1993)
In the preamble to a legislative rule exercising its authority to amend the RQs, the EPA also expatiated on the meaning of the statutory term "release"--improperly broadening it, as petitioners claimed and as we ultimately found. 935 F.2d at 1309-10.
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Northwest Tissue Center v. Shalala (1993)
The EPA argued that the proposed rule provided adequate notice nevertheless because it included a discussion of statutory exemptions to CERCLA. 935 F.2d at 1311.
In the preamble to a legislative rule exercising its authority to amend the RQs, the EPA also expatiated on the meaning of the statutory term “release” — improperly broadening it, as petitioners claimed and as we ultimately found. 935 F.2d at 1309-10.
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United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc. (1993)
The regulation defined a release as “placement of a hazardous substance into any unenclosed containment ... wherein the” substance “is exposed to the environment.” Id. at 1307.
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Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Products Corp. (1993)
However, the explanation of the rule in the Federal Register states "EPA expects that the provisions of this regulation will provide appropriate guidance for evaluating the actions of a holder or government entity prior to the effective date of this final rule.” 57 Fed.Reg. 18374 (citing Fertilizer Institute v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C.Cir.1991)).
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Williams v. Walsh (2022)
See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.
“[T]he EPA must itself provide notice of a regulatory proposal. Having failed to do so, it cannot bootstrap notice from a comment.” (cleaned up) (emphasis in original)
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Wright's Crossing, Llc v. Island County (2021)
See Washington State Boundary Review Bd., 122 Wn.2d at 669 (noting that one policy reason behind rules like RCW 35.05.554 is “‘protecting agency autonomy by allowing an agency the first opportunity to apply its expertise, exercise its discretion, and correct its errors’” (quoting Fertilizer Inst. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312–13 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); see Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1313 (D.C.
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Am. Bar Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (2019)
Cir. 1989) ; see Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA , 935 F.2d 1303 , 1313 (D.C.
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Allina Health Services v. Sebelius (2012)
See Fertilizer Inst. v. U.S. E.P.A., 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.Cir.1991) (citing Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force, 705 F.2d at 549); see also Nat’l Ass’n Psych.
However, since the Circuit Court found that the automatic entitlement is required by the Medicare statute itself, id., the Court would find the POMS provisions to be interpretive rules, which are not subject to formal notice and comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(3)(A); see Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1307-08 (D.C.Cir.1991), quoting Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844 , 876 & n. 153 (D.C.Cir.1979) ("An interpretive rule simply states what the administra…
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Friends of Blackwater v. Kenneth Salazar (2012)
See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.
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Friends of Blackwater v. Kenneth Salazar (2012)
See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.Cir.1991).
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Select Specialty Hospital - Akron, LLC v. Sebelius (2011)
See id.
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Alabama v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2011)
See Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1303.
See Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1311; see also Owner-Operator Indep.
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Env Integrity Proj v. EPA (2005)
See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.Cir.1991).
See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.Cir.1991).
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Select Specialty Hospital of Atlanta v. Thompson (2003)
See Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 , 1312 (D.C.Cir.1991).