Cluster 616615

Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C30, 375 F. Supp. 3d 441, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he presence of a phrase applicable to one factor makes clear that the phrase’s omission elsewhere was deliberate.”); Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he presence of that provision applicable to one type of pension makes clear that the omission of that provision in the part of the Plan governing another type of plan was deliberate.”).

Pa. Feb. 24, 2011); see also Novella, 661 F.3d at 147 (“[S]imply receiving a lower pension payment is not enough to put a pensioner on notice of a miscalculation.”).

Cf. Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 2011) (“the presumption of consistent usage and sentence where sentencing judge “chose not to increase [defendant’s] term of imprisonment, but opted instead to increase the fine; punishing the perpetrator with a correlate of his own crime”). 16 meaningful variation, and the textual cannon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius” suggest that “the presence of [a phrase] applicable to one [factor] makes clear that t…

Cf. Novella v. Westchester Cnty. , 661 F.3d 128 , 142 (2d Cir. 2011) ("the presumption of consistent usage and meaningful variation, and the textual cannon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius " suggest that "the presence of [a phrase] applicable to one [factor] makes clear that the [phrase's] omission" elsewhere "was deliberate").

“Otherwise, courts review plan administrators' determinations de novo.” Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011).

Minn. 2014) (quoting Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128, 146 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Cir. 2012) (noting the issue required 3 17 “apply[ing] complex law to complex facts” and “it makes no sense to ask the participants to 18 || navigate the complexity of ERISA’s anti-backloading provision immediately upon receipt of their 19 first benefits payment”); Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 146 (2d Cir. 2011). 20 CONCLUSION 21 Summary judgment is granted in favor of AT&T on Count IV of the TAC for breach of 22 || fiduciary duty.

Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 143 (2d Cir. 2011). 3 Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted. 4 “Where jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship, a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.” Thea v. Kleinhandler, 807 F.3d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 2015).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); accord Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001).

Novella v. Westchester Cnty, 661 F.3d 128, 149 (2d Cir. 2011).

Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128, 146 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 147 (2d Cir. 2011).

Under this standard, “a court may overturn a plan administrator’s decision only if the decision was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence, or erroneous as a matter of law.” Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (brackets, ellipsis, and citation omitted).

When parties cross- move for summary judgment, a court analyzes the motions separately, “in each case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)). “[A] district court must review de novo an agency’s determination to withhold information requested under FOIA.” Florez v. Cent.

Indeed, the Second Circuit “has recognized the firmly established policy favoring exhaustion of administrative remedies in ERISA cases.” See e.g., Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2011).

When, as in this case, parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court analyzes the motions separately “in each case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011).

When, as in this case, parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court analyzes the motions separately “in each case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted).

When a plan's language is ambiguous and "both the [administrator] of [the plan] and a 26 20-3225 McCutcheon v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. rejected applicant offer rational, though conflicting, interpretations of plan provisions, the [administrator's] interpretation must be allowed to control." Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted). �e Court is not required to resolve the case on summary judgment merely because all parties move for summary judgment.

By comparison, Guideline § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (the neighboring provision for the acts of others) does contain a scienter requirement, as “acts and omissions of others” must be “reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” We have interpreted this language to require a sentencing court to “make findings as to [a 23 defendant’s] knowledge and [the] foreseeability” of “the full quantity” and “different types of narcotics” involved in jointly undertaken crimina…

Where, however, “both the trustees of [an ERISA plan] and a rejected applicant offer rational, though conflicting, interpretations of plan provisions, the trustees’ interpretation must be allowed to control.” Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Miles v. N.Y.

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted).

Id. 5 1 Under Wallace’s disability benefits plan, Hartford retained “full discretion and authority 2 to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of [t]he 3 [Benefits] Policy.” Joint App’x at 59. “[P]lans investing the administrator with broad 4 discretionary authority to determine eligibility are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious 5 standard.” Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation om…

Additionally, the presumption of consistent usage and meaningful variation “suggest[s] that the presence of [a phrase] applicable to one [term] makes clear that the [phrase’s] omission elsewhere was deliberate.” United States v. Zuckerman, 897 F.3d 423, 431 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 2011)).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”).

Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted).

Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although the practicality of joinder “depends on all the circumstances surrounding a case, not on mere numbers,” the Second Circuit has stated that “courts are likely to conclude that the numerosity requirement is satisfied when the class comprises 40 or more members.” Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest.

A district court reviewing a final benefits determination under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard may disturb that determination only if the determination “was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence, or erroneous as a matter of law.” Novella, 661 F.3d at 140 (alteration omitted).

Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549, 560 (2014) (“[I]f parties to a contract omit terms—particularly, terms that are readily found in other, similar contracts—the inescapable conclusion is that the parties intended the omission.”); Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 277 (2011) (“[C]ourts should be extremely reluctant to interpret an agreement as impliedly stating something which the parties have neglected to specifically include.” (int…

Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Depending on the particular circumstances, the miscalculation may be “apparent from the face of a payment check” or “readily ... discoverable from information furnished to pensioners by the pension plan.” Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted).

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (citation omitted).

There was no contractual limitation provision at issue in Novella; rather, the question the Second Circuit resolved was merely when plaintiff’s miscalculation claim accrued to trigger New York’s six-year statute of limitations. 661 F.3d at 144 (“The parties dispute, however, the time at which a pensioner can be 5 It was undisputed that the six-year statute of limitations applied to the Novella plaintiff’s miscalculation claim.

Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325 , 330 (8th Cir. 1998); 7 Daill v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Loc. 73 Pension Fund, 100 F.3d 62, 66 (7th Cir. 1996); 8 Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128, 147 (2d Cir. 2011))).

When parties cross-move for summary judgment, a court analyzes the motions separately, "in each case construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 30 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011). "[A] district court must review de novo an agency's determination to withhold information requested under FOIA." Florez, 829 F.3d at 182 .

Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011); accord Jarosz, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 175 .

The decision to reach or avoid an unnecessary issue falls within the court’s discretion, see Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 149 (2d Cir. 2011), and courts regularly decline to consider additional constitutional theories of relief when doing so is unnecessary to award the requested relief.

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cnty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” (citation omitted)).

Novella v. Westchester County, 661 F.3d 128, 144 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011); accord Jarosz, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 175 .

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” (citation omitted)).

Co., 744 F.3d 241, 247 (1st Cir. 2014) (same, citing Miller); Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2011) (same, citing Miller). which he is entitled.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ʺWe review a district courtʹs decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non‐moving party.ʺ Mudge v. Zugalla, 939 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2019). ʺSummary judgment is appropriate where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.ʺ Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2…

Sept. 10, 2013) (quoting Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2011)); see also Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[e]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.”) (Citation omitted).

Novella v. Westchester Cty., 661 F.3d 128, 147 (2d Cir. 2011).