Cluster 661773

Similarly, in Phelps, we held “that the district court did not err by dismissing the ‘unknown defendants’ without prejudice[.]” Phelps, 15 F.3d at 739.

Gov’t, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 1994).

In a majority of the Eighth Circuit cases involving inmate complaints concerning “legal mail” that was opened outside their presence, the mail at issue was correspondence from an attorney or a “jailhouse lawyer.” See Bear v. Kautzky, 305 F.3d 802 , (8th Cir.2002) (correspondence from an inmate’s “jailhouse lawyer” deemed “legal mail” for purposes of a preliminary injunction); Cody v. Weber 256 F.3d 764 , *988 767(8th Cir.2002) (legal papers and letters from his attorneys); G…

In a majority of the Eighth Circuit cases involving inmate complaints that their “legal mail” was opened outside their presence, the mail at issue was correspondence from an attorney or a “jailhouse lawyer.” See Bear v. Kautzky, 305 F.3d 802 , (8th Cir.2002) (correspondence from an inmate’s “jailhouse lawyer” deemed “legal mail” for purposes of a preliminary injunction); Cody v. Weber 256 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir.2001) (legal papers and letters from his attorneys); Gardner v. …

See Phelps v. United States, 15 F.3d 735 , 739 (8th Cir. 1994).

See Phelps v. United States, 15 F.3d 735 , 738-39 (8th Cir. 1994).

See Phelps v. United States, 15 F.3d 735 , 738-39 (8th Cir. 1994).

See Phelps v. United States, 15 F.3d 735 , 739 (8th Cir. 1994) (generally, fictitious parties may not be named as defendants in a civil action); Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 1985) (an action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint makes sufficiently specific allegations to permit identification of the party after reasonable discovery).

See Phelps v. United States, 15 F.3d 735 , 738-39 (8th Cir. 1994).

See Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998) (“It is well settled that a Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States and its agencies because of sovereign immunity”), see also Phelps v. U.S. Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 1994).

See Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1998) (“It is well settled that a Bivens action cannot be prosecuted against the United States and its agencies because of sovereign immunity”), see also Phelps v. U.S. Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 1994).

See Phelps v. United States Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735 , 739 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that, even though the district court granted summary judgment improperly because (1) it failed to notify the habeas petitioner of its intention to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, (2) it failed to give the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the motion, and (3) the record did not support summary judgment, any error was harmless because the petitioner faile…

See Phelps v. United States Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735 , 739 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that, even though the district court granted summary judgment improperly because (1) it failed to notify the habeas petitioner of its intention to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, (2) it failed to give the petitioner an opportunity to respond to the motion, and (3) the record did not support summary judgment, any error was harmless because the petitioner faile…

See Phelps, 15 F.3d at 738 (competence of petitioner indicated by capability to argue issues in earlier habeas petitions).

Of Justice, 239 F.3d 366 (Sth Cir.2000) (per curium, unpublished); see also Phelps v. U.S. Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735, 737-38 (8th Cir.1994) (affirming district court's application of pre-AEDPA version of § 2244 to find an abuse of the writ in a successive § 2241 petition).

See, e.g., Phelps v. United States, 15 F.3d 735 , 737 (8th Cir.1994) (finding fact that petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to federal medical facility was “merely a factor to be considered when determining if appointment of counsel [would] benefit the litigant and the court”).

See also Phelps v. U.S. Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir.1994) (district court in a habeas corpus case treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment was required to notify petitioner and give him an opportunity to respond to the motion).

See, e.g., Phelps v. U.S. Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir.1994).

The court concluded, “Due process does not always require an adversarial hearing.”M Similarly, the appointment of counsel to an insanity acquittee is not required because “[providing continuous representation by counsel ... is another way to inject an adversarial element into the process.” United States v. LaFromboise, 836 F.2d 1149, 1152 (8th Cir.1988) (citing Hickey); see also Phelps v. U.S. Federal Government, 15 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir.1994) (finding that the district cou…