Cluster 687312

Stat. 5/3-6017 (sheriff has "custody and care" of jail's operations); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to the control of the county.").

See Indiana Code 3-8-1-16 and 3-8-1-19; Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is plain that the county was properly dismissed; Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to the control of the county.”) Likewise, the County of Kosciusco is not responsible for the actions of a sheriff or employees of the Kosciusko County Sheriff’s Department.

The Sheriff argues that under-staffing cannot be a basis for liability under § 1983, that there is no causal link between under-staffing and Smith’s death, and that the Sheriff has limited control of the budget so any fault lies with Cook County. (...continued) Cir. 1998) (“the lack of identity between the county sheriff’s department and the general county government indicates that § 1983 suits against sheriffs in their official capacities are in reality suits against the co…

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It is plain that the county was properly dismissed; Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to the control of the county.”); Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1188 (affirming summary judgment grant in favor of county because they could not be found liable for violations of Section 1983).

The court answered in the negative, and in citing the teachings of Ryan v. Cnty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995), and Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 929 (1990), stated, Franklin, 150 F.3d at 685 (emphasis added): “[The sheriff’s] argument overlooks a crucial third possibility that we have found to be dispositive in other cases—namely, that the sheriff is an agent of the county sheriff’s department, an independently…

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Bereguist v. Milaxzo, 2020 WL. 757902 at *5 (N.D.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Collins and McPhillips were acting as agents of Defendant County, and at all relevant times to this action, Defendant County was responsible for the actions of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. [1, at P 5.] Defendant County submits that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are similar to those in cases such as Thompson v. Duke, 882 F. 2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989), and Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7…

However, as Defendants point out, the Norton case has been distinguished by the Seventh Circuit in Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1094 (1995), which held that existing statutes are “hard facts” on which people must be allowed to rely in making decisions and in shaping their conduct.

Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., Ill., 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009); Ryan v. Cty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995).

Ryan v. Cty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995); Potochney v. Doe, No. 02 C 1484, 2002 WL 31628214 , at *2 n.3 (N.D.

Stat. 5/26-1), In addi tion, physical resistance to the lawful order of a peace officer constitutes a violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1 (resisting or obstructing a peace officer), Ryan v. County of Du-Page, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1995).

And even if respondeat superior liability were possible, Cook County could not be held liable as the Sheriffs employer, because Illinois sheriffs are independently elected constitutional officers not subject to the control of the county regarding management of the county jail. 2 Riley v. County of Cook, 682 F.Supp.2d 856, 860 (N.D.Ill.2010) (citing Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995)). *1091 Here, Plaintiff alleges no Cook County policy or custom that…

VII,. § 4(c); DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973 , 977 n. 2 (7th Cir.2000), citing Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995).

VII, § 4(c)); see also Franklin v. Zamba, 150 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir.1998) ("the lack of identity between the county sheriff’s department and the general county government indicates that § 1983 suits against sheriffs in their official capacities are in reality suits against the county sheriff's department rather than the county board.”); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995) ("Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to the cont…

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995); DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir.2000) (“Illinois sheriffs have final policymaking authority over jail operations.”).

VII, § 4(c)); see also Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir.1998) ("the lack of identity between the county sheriff’s department and the general county government indicates that § 1983 suits against sheriffs in their official capacities are in reality suits against the county sheriff's department rather than the county board."); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995) ("Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to the con…

Refusal to obey a lawful order may also give rise to a disorderly conduct charge (Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir.1995)).

E.g., Morfin, 349 F.3d at 1005-06; Ryan v. County of DuPage 45 F.3d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir.1995).

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995) (Sheriff); Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir.1998) (Courts).

Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995).

Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995).

See Carver II, 272 Ill.Dec. 312 , 787 N.E.2d at 136 -37 (citing Moy, 203 Ill.Dec. 776 , 640 N.E.2d at 929 ; Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682 , 686 n. 4 (7th Cir.1998); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995); and Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir.1989), in discussing county sheriffs particular place in Illinois law).

Patterson concedes that the Illinois Supreme Court has held state’s attorneys to be state officials, Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill.2d 364 , 140 Ill.Dec. 397 , 549 N.E.2d 1269, 1271 (1990), and that the Seventh Circuit has applied Ingemunson in subsequent Monell cases to find counties not liable for misconduct arising out of county state’s attorney’s offices, see, e.g., Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995).

Although advocacy of jury nullification could no more be flatly forbidden than advocacy of Marxism, nudism, or Satanism, we cannot think of a more reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech than to forbid its advocacy in a courthouse. 5 "A State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 , 85 S.Ct. 476 , 13 L.Ed.2…

Although advocacy of jury nullification could no more be flatly forbidden than advocacy of Marxism, nudism, or Satanism, we cannot think of a more reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech than to forbid its advocacy in a courthouse. 4 No. 02-4143 “A State may adopt safeguards necessary and appropriate to assure that the administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence.” Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965); see al…

The Seventh Circuit has explicitly ruled that Illinois counties are not liable for their sheriffs’ actions under Monell , stating that “Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to the control of the county.” Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995); see also Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir.1989) (finding no Monell liability).

But the 45-day period selected by the City of Gary and made applicable to all permit seekers whether or not any danger of violence is perceived is arbitrary; no effort to justify it has been made; and an incidental effect, but one to which CAKKKK is permitted to point by virtue of the doctrine of Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 , 92 S.Ct. 1103 , 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972); Ryan v. County…

People v. Weathington, 82 Ill.2d 183 , 44 Ill.Dec. 496 , 411 N.E.2d 862, 863-64 (1980); People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392 , 240 N.E.2d 595, 599 (1968); People v. Long, 316 Ill.App.3d 919 , 250 Ill.Dec. 252 , 738 N.E.2d 216, 222 (2000); People v. Martinez, 307 Ill.App.3d 368 , 240 Ill.Dec. 442 , 717 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1999); People v. Hilgenberg, 223 Ill.App.3d 286 , 165 Ill.Dec. 784 , 585 N.E.2d 180, 183 (1991); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir.1995)(collectin…

App. 1991); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1995)(collecting cases).

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1995).

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1995).

In carrying out this responsibility, the judge must ensure “that [the] courthouse is a place in which rational reflection and disinterested judgment will not be disrupted.” Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir.1995)). [¶ 30] A lawyer’s right to exercise free speech does not permit a lawyer appearing in a judicial proceeding in open court to call opposing counsel a liar, to threa…

In carrying out this responsibility, the judge must ensure "that [the] courthouse is a place in which rational reflection and disinterested judgment will not be disrupted." Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir.1995)). [¶ 30] A lawyer's right to exercise free speech does not permit a lawyer appearing in a judicial proceeding in open court to call opposing counsel a liar, to threa…

In carrying out this responsibility, the judge must ensure “that [the] courthouse is a place in which rational reflection and disinterested judgment will not be disrupted.” Berner v. Delahanty , 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (quoting Ryan v. County of DuPage , 45 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1995)). [¶30] A lawyer’s right to exercise free speech does not permit a lawyer appearing in a judicial proceeding in open court to call opposing counsel a liar, to th…

See Martinez v. Hooper, 148 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir.1998); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir.1995).

See Martinez v. Hooper, 148 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1998); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1091 (7th Cir. 1995).

This court, following those cases, has also recognized that "in Illinois the crime of resisting an officer in the performance of his duty requires physical resistance." Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir. 1995).

This court, following those cases, has also recognized that “in Illinois the crime of resisting an officer in the performance of his duty requires physical resistance.” Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1093 (7th Cir.1995).

We have previously held that a sheriff in Illinois has “final policy-making authority,” Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995), and that a “custom or policy” may be established by “an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with ‘final policymak-ing authority.’ ” McTigue, 60 F.3d at 382 .

We have previously held that a sheriff in Illinois has "final policy-making authority," Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995), and that a "custom or policy" may be established by "an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with ’final policymaking authority.’" McTigue, 60 F.3d at 382 .

VII, sec. 4(c); Ryan v. DuPage County, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995); Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1187 .

VII, § 4(c); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995); Thompson, 882 F.2d at 1187 .

The doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under § 1983, Pacelli v. deVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir.1992), and the County cannot be liable under the Tort Immunity Act, Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995) (“It is plain that the county was properly dismissed; Illinois sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to control [by] the county.”).

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 197-99 , 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1468-69 , 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) (recognizing the abandonment of Norton ); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir.1995) (same). [11] Walter Hellerstein et al., Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation After Jefferson Lines, 51 Tax L.Rev. 47 (1995). [12] At oral argument, taxpayers asserted that Reich, Newsweek and Dryden v. Madison County, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1162 , 140 L.Ed.2d 173 (1998), an …

Ed. 2d 151 (1973) (recognizing the abandonment of Norton); Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).

For instance, in Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995), we considered a § 1983 suit against the sheriff (of DuPage County, no less) that attempted to impose municipal liability on the County of DuPage, see Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), for actions undertaken by the sheriff, the purported policymaker for the county.

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995).

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir.1995); Ruehman v. Sheahan, supra, 34 F.3d at 528-30 ; McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1582-83 (11th Cir.1996), aff'd. sub nom.

In carrying out this responsibility, the judge must ensure "that [the] courthouse is a place in which rational reflection and disinterested judgment will not be disrupted." Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th ____ _________________ Cir. 1995).

In carrying out this responsibility, the judge must ensure “that [the] courthouse is a place in which rational reflection and disinterested judgment will not be disrupted.” Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir.1995).