Cluster 688746

Id.; see also Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216 (“Without [findings that a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law], parties can only agree to that which they have the power to do outside of litigation.”). ¶25 We find Neighborhood Advocates’ reasoning persuasive.

See, e.g., Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995) (“While parties can settle their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree to „disregard valid state laws . . . .”); St.

Cf. Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216 (“Once a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory violation, however, a state law cannot prevent a necessary remedy.”).

See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that state officials “could not agree to terms which would exceed their authority and supplant state law”); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995) (“ ‘Some rules of law are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders . . . .

See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir.1997) (consent decree could not be interpreted to supplant California law because the state agency would not have had the authority to agree to such a decree); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212 , 216 (7th Cir. 1995)("While parties can settle their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree `to disregard valid state laws,' . . . and cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individua…

A consent decree is “a judicial act,” Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995), and court rulings “are not statements of a party,” Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 06-3229, 2008 WL 5234318 , at *6 (E.D.

Sheriff's Dep’t, 924 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2019); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1995).

Charles Tower, Inc. v. Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 268 (8th Cir. 2011) (“While parties can settle their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree to ‘disregard valid state laws.’” (quoting Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995))).

No. 205, 961 F.2d 1335, 1337 (7th Cir. 1992) (parties to consent decree “may not alter collective bargaining agreements without the union’s assent” or “agree to disregard valid state laws”); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 668 , 672–73 (7th Cir. 1993) (“A consent decree entered by a federal court, like any other injunction, can have adverse consequences on third parties w…

Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995).

See also Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir.2000) ("The district court's plan suffers from the same procedural flaw as did the consent decree when it was first presented to this court: the court's plan modifies the election methods set forth in the Illinois Municipal Code without either going through the statutorily required procedures for making such changes to electoral methods or making a judicial finding that it was necessary to make these chan…

“While parties can settle their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree to ‘disregard valid state laws.’ ” Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ.

Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995); see also Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir.1986) (“Some rules of law are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders.”).

See Continental Training Services, Inc. v. Cavazos , 893 F.2d 877 , 881 n.5 (7 th Cir. 1990); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights , 47 F.3d 212, 218 (7 th Cir. 1995).

See Continental Training Services, Inc. v. Cavazos, 893 F.2d 877 , 881 n.5 (7th Cir. 1990); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 218 (7th Cir. 1995).

This court found merit in their challenge and held that the district court should not have approved a consent decree that overrides state law without making "properly supported findings that such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law." Id. at 216 (emphasis removed).

This court found merit, in their challenge and held that the district court should not have approved a consent decree that overrides state law without making “properly supported findings that such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law.” Id. at 216 (emphasis removed).

Without such findings, however, parties can only agree to that which they have the power to do outside of litigation.” Id. at 216.

Cf. Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir.1997) (parties to consent decree “could not agree to terms which would exceed their authority and supplant state law”); Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995) (same).

Because the parties to a consent decree "cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually," Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995), the consent decree does not even potentially inject a federal law issue into this case. 7 14 Federal question jurisdiction also exists over a state law claim if the claim is "really" one of federal law.

Because the parties to a consent decree “cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually,” Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995), the consent decree does not even potentially inject a federal law issue into this case. 7 Federal question jurisdiction also exists over a state law claim if the claim is “really” one of federal law.

See Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights , 47 F.3d 212 , 217 (7th Cir. 1995).

See, e.g., Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995) (“While parties can settle their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree to ‘disregard valid state laws’.... ”); St.

See also Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216-17 (7th Cir.1995) (vacating consent decree that disregarded state law); Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir.1964) (holding parties cannot limit third-party access to existing evidence through consent decree).

See also Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216-17 (7th Cir.1995) (vacating consent decree that disregarded state law); Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir.1964) (holding parties cannot limit third-party access to existing evidence through consent decree). 12 We note two other matters.

See Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that "the contract underlying the consent decree was void to the extent that it exceeded defendants' authority"); see also Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that parties to a consent decree "cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually"); Kasper v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 814 F.2d 332 , 341 (7th Cir.1987) ("A consent decree…

See Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that “the contract underlying the consent decree was void to the extent that it exceeded defendants’ authority”); see also Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212 , 216 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that parties to a consent decree “cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually”); Kasper v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 814 F.2d 332 , 341 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A consent decr…

See also, e. g., Perkins v. Chicago Heights, 47 F. 3d 212 , 216 (CA7 1995).

See, e.g., Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th Cir.1995) (“While parties can settle their litigation with consent decrees, they cannot agree to ‘disregard valid state laws,’ and cannot consent to do something together that they lack the power to do individually.”) (citations omitted); People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education, 961 F.2d 1335, 1337 (7th Cir.1992) (“When the parties to a decree seek to enlarge their legal entitlements — to grant thems…