Cluster 7307559

Instead of relying on clinical findings, the ALJ noted that NP Hackney relied “quite heavily on [Plaintiff’s] subjective reports.” Id.; see Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Subjective symptomatology by itself cannot be the basis for a finding of disability.”).

“Before assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1 (S.S.A.

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 151-152 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Leach v. Barnhart, No. 02-CV-3561, 2004 WL 99935 , at *9 (S.D.N.Y.

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 154 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 , 416.971 (stating that even though part-time work does not constitute substantial gainful activity, it may show that a claimant is able to do more work than actually performed)) (“[T]he ALJ’s consideration of [the p]laintiff’s part-time work was entirely proper and supported his decision to discount [the p]laintiff's credibility.”).

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 151-52 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); accord 20 C.F.R. §404.1527 (f).

“Before assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1 (S.S.A.

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F. 3d 307 , 313–14 (2d Cir. 1995)) (some alterations in original). 3.

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F. 3d 307 , 313–14 (2d Cir. 1995)) (some alterations in original). 3.

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F. 3d 307 , 313–14 (2d Cir. 1995)) (some alterations in original). 3 The current version of these regulations (applicable to cases filed after March 27, 2017) no longer differentiates between “acceptable” and “other” medical sources.

The ALJ’s strong reliance on Bernadeau’s ability to complete some basic life tasks was misplaced.2 “[I]t is well-settled that ‘[s]uch activities do not by themselves contradict allegations of disability,’ as people should not be penalized for enduring the pain of their disability in order to care for themselves.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

Rivera’s ability to perform the most basic tasks of daily living does not imply that she can maintain a full-time job, and the ALJ should not “penalize” Rivera for “enduring the pain of her disability in order to care for [herself].” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Woodford v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 521, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

“Before assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1 (S.S.A.

“Before assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1 (S.S.A.

“Before assessing the claimant's RFC, the ALJ must consider the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1 (S.S.A.

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Although the record clearly demonstrates consistent complaints of pain and other limitations, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s RFC assessment.’’). 2) Subjective Symptoms “ Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and credit his subjective symptoms of disabling pain.

Although an ALJ is required to consider a | Plaintiff's activities of daily living, “[s]uch activities do not by themselves contradict allegations of disability[.]” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); see Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (“a [plaintif] need not be an invalid to be found disabled”).

“Before assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a | function-by-function basis.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *1 (S.S.A.

LEXIS 49535 at *39 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), “it is well-settled that [s]uch activities do not by themselves contradict allegations of disability, as people should not be penalized for enduring the pain of their disability in order to care for themselves.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Woodford v. Apfel, 93 F. Supp. 2d 521, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

This means that “the ALJ must make a function[-]by[-]function assessment of the claimant’s ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, push, pull, reach, handle, stoop, or crouch, based on medical reports from acceptable medical sources that include the sources’ opinions as to the claimant’s ability to perform each activity.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 (c)(1), 404.1569a(a), 416.913(c)(1), 416.969a(a).

Mar. 21, 2013)). “[T]he ALJ must make a function by function assessment of the claimant’s ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, push, pull, reach, handle, stoop, or crouch, based on medical reports from acceptable medical sources that include the sources’ opinions as to the claimant’s ability to perform each activity.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 (c)(1), 404.1569a(a), 416.969a(a); Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. …

Sec., 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 151 (N.D.N.Y.

Mar. 30, 2018) citing Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F. Supp. 2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).

In addition, the hearing officer must explain her rea sons “ ‘with sufficient specificity to enable [the Court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F.Supp.2d 59, 68 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (Mordue, J.) (quoting Lewis v. Apfel, 62 F.Supp.2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)).

If this limitation reduces [claimant's] ability to find meaningful employment, the Commissioner should obtain testimony from a vocational expert to determine whether, given a non-negligible reaching impairment, [claimant] is nonetheless able to perform other jobs existing in the national economy.”); Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F.Supp.2d 59, 70 (N.D.N.Y.2012) ("[T]he [hearing officer’s] reliance on the [g]rids was based upon his RFC determination, which was flawed for the reasons…

(Tr. 44, 152-54, 160, 253, 279, 355). “[I]t is well-settled that ‘[s]ueh activities do not by themselves contradict allegations of disability,’ as people should not be penalized for enduring the pain of their disability in order to care for themselves.” Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F.Supp.2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Woodford v. Apfel, 93 F.Supp.2d 521, 529 (S.D.N.Y.2000)).

See Knighton v. Astrue 861 F.Supp.2d 59, 66 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (“The courts are divided as to whether the failure to provide a function-by-function analysis is per se grounds for remand or whether it may constitute harmless error.”); Drennen v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-6007MAT, 2012 WL 42496 , at *4 (W.D.N.Y.

See, e.g., House v. Commissioner, 32 F. Supp. 3d 138, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (ALJ’s finding that hidradenitis suppurativa was not a severe impairment was not error where “no [medical] provider identified any impact on Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities[]” and plaintiff continued to work on a part-time basis); Hunt v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-888C, 2014 WL 585302 , at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y.

Mar. 28, 2013) (Irizarry, J.) (ALJ credibility analysis was incorrect where “Plaintiffs complaints of his debilitating and constant pain were supported by objective medical examinations[.]”); see also Knighton v. Astrue, 861 F.Supp.2d 59, 69 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (Mordue, J.) (incorporated from Magistrate Judge Bianchini’s Report and Recommendation) (remand appropriate where “Plaintiffs credibility will need to be assessed in light of the medical opinion evidence referenced above, …