Cluster 743127

The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that the presence of a lump-sum benefit is not dispositive; instead, the Court looks to whether “only a one-time event would trigger the payment.” Siemon, 117 F.3d at 1178-79 (noting Fort Halifax’s distinc- tion between a one-time severance payment for all employees triggered by a plant closure and a one-time benefit payment triggered by death).

Corp., 101 F.3d at 524–25; Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d at 1176 (holding that a mental impairment preventing plaintiff from “working under a few supervisors within the organizational structure of one major corporation . . . is far too narrow to constitute a ‘class of jobs’ ”); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.) (“[A] personality conflict with a supervisor or coworker does not establish a disability within the meaning of the disability law,…

This is the entirety of the plaintiffs proof and argument of a disability for this claim. “[T]o demonstrate that an impairment ‘substantially limits’ the major life activity of working, ... [the plaintiff] must show a ‘significant restriction in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.’ ” Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d at 1176. “ ‘The inabili…

See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 , 109 S.Ct. 948 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989) (holding de novo review inapplicable where plan grants administrator discretion to construe terms of plan); Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (10th Cir.1998); Siemon, 117 F.3d at 1177.

Jan. 9, 2024) (unpublished) (citations omitted); see Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997). 10 As to the first element, to show an actual disability under § 12102(1)(A), a plaintiff must “(1) have a recognized impairment, (2) identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the impairment substantially limits one or more of those activities.” Callahan v. Commc’n Graphics, 2015 WL 5156888 , *5 (N.D.

Substantial Limitation of Major Life Activity of Working ‘With respect to the major life activity of working!,] ... [t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3)(i); see Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1176 (10th Cir.1997).

Substantial Limitation of M ajor Life Activity of W orking “W ith respect to the major life activity of w orking[,] . . . [t]he term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3)(I); see Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1176 (10th Cir. 1997).

See WCI, 170 F.3d at 603 relying on Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1179 (10th Cir.1997) (“an informal plan to provide payments of up to $1,000 to employees for death, sickness, accident, or financial emergencies was held not to be an ERISA plan because the ‘potential benefits [were] too ephemeral and contingent for [the court] to ascertain, what, if anything, AT & T intends an employee to receive.’ ”).

See Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1176 (10th Cir.1997).

See Pack, 166 F.3d at 1302 (citing Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997) and White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 ); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.1998) (citing same).

See 117 F.3d at 1178-79 (noting that focus of Fort Halifax decision was the one-time event that triggered single payment); see also Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 71 F.3d 451, 454 (1st Cir.1995) (stating that “an employee benefit may be considered a plan for purposes of ERISA only if it involves the undertaking of continuing administrative and financial obligations by the employer”) (emphasis added).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) “that she is qualified, that is, she is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation;” and (3) that the employer terminated or took adverse employment action against the plaintiff “under circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination [or other action] wa…

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp. , 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1176 (10th Cir.1997) (finding that working is a major life activity and citing Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942 (10th Cir.1994)).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is qualified, “that is, ... [he] is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation;” and (3) that the employer terminated or took adverse employment action against the plaintiff “under circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination [or other ac…

See Siemon v. AT & T Corp. , 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp. , 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

See Siemon v. AT & T Corp. , 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is qualified, “that is, ... [he] is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation,” and (3) that the employer terminated or took adverse employment action against the plaintiff “under circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination [or other ac…

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1174-1176 (10th Cir.1997) (plaintiff forced to take disability leave because of severe depression and anxiety resulting from personality conflict with antagonistic supervisor held not disabled under ADA); Weiler v. Household Fin.

See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d at 748 , Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d at 1175.

See Siemon , 117 F.3d at 1175 (stating that if plaintiff suffers no “disability” as defined by the statute, employer’s behavior is not actionable under the ADA).

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1177 (10th Cir.1997); Averhart, 46 F.3d at 1484.

See Pack, 166 F.3d at 1302 (citing Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997); White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 ); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.1998) (citing same), petition for cert. filed, 67 USLW 3376 (Nov. 23, 1998) (No. 98-859).

See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 897 (citing Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997); White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 ); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir.1996).

See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 897 (citing Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997); White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 ); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir.1996).

See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 897 (citing Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997); White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 ); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir.1996).

See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir. 1997); White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir.1995)); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir.1996). 6 Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to establish each of these three elements and, thus, summary judgment is appropriate.

See id.

See id.

See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 897 (citing Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997); White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 ); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1996) .

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997); White, 45 F.3d at 360-61 .

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1177 (10th Cir.1997).

See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997).

Corp., 101 F.3d 519 , 524-25 (7th Cir.1996); see also Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1176 (10th Cir.1997) ("Siemon's mental impairment merely prevents him from working un der a few supervisors within the organizational structure of one major corporation.... [T]his is far too narrow to constitute a ‘class of jobs.’ ”); Bouck v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2006 WL 2527426 , at *7 (D.Utah Aug. 28, 2006) ("Bouck admits that a transfer to a different job under a different sup…

See, e.g., Siemon v. AT & T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , 1175 (10th Cir.1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) as basis for failure to accommodate claim); Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1107-09 (10th Cir.1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) as basis for wrongful termination claim).

In Stroman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 966 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C.1997), aff'd without opinion, 333 U.S.App.D.C. 47 , 159 F.3d 637 (1998), the court held, “Plaintiff was not precluded by her claimed disability from working generally ... and her alleged inability to perform a particular job or work for a particular supervisor will not, without more, qualify her as disabled.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original; citation omitted); see, e.g., Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 , …