Cluster 751834
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· 155 citation events
across 11 courts.
Showing the 47 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
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Sidak v. U.S. International Trade Commission (2023)
Sidak’s “here-and-now injury” of being subjected to a proceeding infected with constitutional error “is impossible to remedy once that proceeding is over.” Axon, 143 S. 15 Ct. at 903; see also Sea-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 648 (“The concrete cost of an additional proceeding is a cognizable Article III injury”).
“The concrete cost of an additional proceeding is a cognizable Article III injury”
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Cochran v. SEC (2021)
See Stolt- Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 , 670 n.2 (2010) (determining that the petitioners had adequately demonstrated hardship where withholding judicial review would have forced them to participate in an arbitration proceeding that they alleged to be “ultra vires”); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.
“The concrete cost of an additional proceeding is a cognizable Article III injury.”
See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94 (“[A]n order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.”); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 646 (D.C.
“An agency action, however permissible as an exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained where it is based not on the agency’s own judgment but on an erroneous view of the law.”
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North American Butterfly Association v. Chad F. Wolf (2020)
Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114 , 118 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Judicial opinions do not create obligations; judgments do. * * * In the event of a conflict between the opinion and the judgment, the judgment controls.”); cf. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 647 (D.C.
“Appellate courts ‘review judgments, not statements in opinions.’”
Cf. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Department of Transp. , 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.
"[M]ere precedential effect within an agency is not, alone, enough to create Article III standing, no matter how foreseeable the future litigation."
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St MI v. EPA (2001)
See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.
"[Chevron] deference comes into play of course, only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency."
Family Life Assurance Co. v. FCC, 129 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting Radiofone, Inc. v. FCC, 759 F.2d 936 , 939 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Scalia, J., sep. op.)); Sea-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 648; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Brock, 778 F.2d 834, 838 (D.C.Cir.1985).
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Swedish American Hospital v. Leavitt (2011)
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 ; Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 137 F.3d at 645.
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SWEDISH AMERICAN HOSPITAL v. Sebelius (2011)
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 137 F.3d at 645.
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Affinity Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Sebelius (2010)
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1); Sear-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 645 (observing that “[Chevron ] deference comes into play ... only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency”).
observing that “[Chevron ] deference comes into play ... only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency”
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Affinity Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Sebelius (2010)
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1); Sea-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 645 (observing that “[Chevron] deference comes into play . . . only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency”).
observing that “[Chevron] deference comes into play . . . only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency”
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Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sebelius (2010)
The strongest support for such a principle would be Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640, 648 (D.C.Cir.1998), in which we rejected a pre-enforcement challenge to an agency interpretation born of an adjudication, noting that a policy’s “mere precedential effect within an agency is not, alone, enough to create Article III standing, no matter how foreseeable the future litigation” involving the plaintiff.
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Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc v. Kathleen Sebelius (2010)
The strongest support for such a principle would be Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640, 648 (D.C.
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Select Specialty Hospital of Atlanta v. Thompson (2003)
Select contends that when an agency acts pursuant to a misconception of the law, the agency action must be vacated, relying on Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94 , 63 S.Ct. 454 ; Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640, 646 (D.C.Cir.1998); Prill, 755 F.2d 941, 942; Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795, 797 (D.C.Cir.1983); and EEX Corp. v. U.S. Department of Interior, 111 F.Supp.2d 24, 32 (D.D.C.2000).
Sea-Land, 137 F.3d at 648.
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AL Muni Distr Grp v. FERC (2002)
Sea-Land, 137 F.3d at 648.
In addition, because there is no longer an Article III case or controversy, the primary benefit of meeting this requirement --review on the merits of the adverse collateral order--is unavailable to Pacific Lumber. 13 Finally, a prevailing party will meet the prudential standing requirement "[i]f the adverse [collateral ] ruling can serve as the basis for collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation." Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir. 1999); see al…
Finally, a prevailing party will meet the prudential standing requirement “[i]f the adverse [collateral] ruling can serve as the basis for collateral estoppel in subsequent litigation.” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir.1999); see also O’Brien v. Vermont, 184 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir.1999); Sear-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 648-49; HCA Health Servs. of Virginia v. Metro.
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Jacoby v. National Labor Relations Board (2000)
“An agency action, however permissible as an exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained ‘where it is based not on the agency’s own judgment but on an erroneous view of the law.’” Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640, 646 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 947 (D.C.Cir.1985)).
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Airtouch Paging v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America, Us West, Inc., Bell Atlant… (2000)
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 Even if the Commission were to view footnote 700 as binding in future proceedings, we would have no jurisdiction to consider the issue unless and until such future proceedings result in a cognizable injury to AirTouch. "[M]ere precedential effect within an agency is not, alone, enough to create Article III standing, no matter how forseeable the future litigation." Sea-Land Service, Inc., 137 F.3d at 648 (collect…
collecting cases
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AirTouch Paging v. Federal Communications Commission (2000)
Even if the Commission were to view footnote 700 as binding in future proceedings, we would have no jurisdiction to consider the issue unless and until such future proceedings result in a cognizable injury to AirTouch. “[M]ere precedential effect within an agency is not, alone, enough to create Article III standing, no matter how forseeable the future litigation.” Sea Land Service, Inc., 137 F.3d at 648 (collecting cases).
collecting cases
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Panm Sat Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission and United States of America, Bellsouth Wireless, I… (1999)
“An agency action, however permissible as an exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained “where it is based not on the agency’s own judgment but on an erroneous view of the law.’” Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640, 646 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 947 (D.C.Cir.1985)).
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Maryland Port v. FMC (1998)
"It is precisely in answering questions of this sort that the expertise and political accountability of administrative agencies com- mand judicial deference." Sea-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 645.
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Reif v. U.S. Department of Labor (2026)
See Sea-Land Serv., 137 F.3d at 646 (explaining that an agency decision “cannot be sustained ‘where it is based . . . on an erroneous view of the law’” (cleaned up)).
explaining that an agency decision “cannot be sustained ‘where it is based . . . on an erroneous view of the law’” (cleaned up)
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Center for Biological Diversity v. Lee Zeldin (2026)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 649 (D.C.
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Nat'l Ass'n v. Trump (2018)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp. , 137 F.3d 640 , 646 (D.C.
"An agency action, however permissible as an exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained 'where it is based not on the agency's own judgment but on an erroneous view of the law.' " (citation omitted)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 646 (D.C.
“An agency action, however permissible as an exercise of discretion, cannot be sustained ‘where it is based not on the agency’s own judgment but on an erroneous view of the law.’” (citation omitted)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 647 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“Appellate courts ‘review[ ] judgments, not statements in opinions[,]’ ” (quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 , 107 S.Ct. 2852 , 97 L.Ed.2d 258 (1987) (first alteration in original))).
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Wyoming v. United States Department of the Interior (2015)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998).
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United States Department of Commerce, Patent & Trademark Office v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (2012)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.Cir.1998); Alabama Mun.
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NetCoalition v. Securities & Exchange Commission (2010)
Because the Congress delegated authority to the Commission to determine whether an SRO’s rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and because the statute is silent as to whether a market-based approach is consistent with the same, under Chevron step two we uphold the SEC’s action if it is based on a “permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Chevron ] defer…
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Netcoalition v. Securities & Exchange Commission (2010)
Because the Congress delegated authority to the Commission to determine whether an SRO’s rule change is consistent with the Exchange Act and because the statute is silent as to whether a market-based approach is consistent with the same, under Chevron step two we uphold the SEC’s action if it is based on a “permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Chevron ] defer…
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Orion Reserves Ltd. Partnership v. Salazar (2009)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 649 (D.C.Cir.1998) (recognizing this circuit’s willingness to entertain an otherwise prevailing party’s conditional cross-appeal seeking affirmance on alternative grounds).
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Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc. Ex Rel. Orix Capital Markets,… (2007)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 649-50 (D.C.Cir.1998) (citing cases).
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.Cir.1998); see also N.Y.
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Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency (2001)
See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Chev ron,| deference comes into play of course, only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency.”) (emphasis added); City of Kansas City, Mo. v. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 192-93 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“implicit delegation of interpretive authority,” as well as ambiguity, are required before C…
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MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. FMC (2025)
See 46 U.S.C. § 40102 (7) (defining common carriers); id. § 40501(a)-(b) (describing tariff system); see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 642 (D.C.
discussing the statute’s regulation of common carriers
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United States v. Harmon (2020)
Cir. 2005)); see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.
Chevron “deference comes into play . . . only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency”
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Cornell v. Federal Maritime Commission (2015)
See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. DOT, 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998).
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Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research (2014)
Daim- lerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975); see also Sea- Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 , 126 S.Ct. 1854 , 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.Cir.1998); cf. also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2012) (holding various plaintiffs lacked standing in declaratory judgment action because alleged injuries were too specula…
Mere ambiguity in a statute is not evidence of congressional delegation of authority.” ABA, 430 F.3d at 469 ; see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.
Chevron “deference comes into play . . . only as a consequence of statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency”
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Berge v. United States (2012)
See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“[Chevron ] deference comes into play ... if the revievong court finds an implicit delegation of authority to the agency.”); City of Kansas City, Mo. v. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 192-93 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“[I]mplicit delegation of interpretive authority,” in absence of explicit delegation, is required for Chevron deference to apply).
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 29 F.3d at 671 ; see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 645 (D.C.Cir.1998).
Group v. FERC, 312 F.3d 470, 473-74 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 648 (D.C.Cir.1998) (discuss *1200 ing but not resolving whether a potential collateral estoppel effect can confer standing).
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H.R. Technologies, Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc. (2002)
Co., 865 F.2d 119 (7th Cir.1988); see also Sea-Land Serv. v. Dep’t of Transp., 137 F.3d 640 , 647 n. 4 (D.C.Cir. 1998); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086 , 1095 n. 10 (11th Cir.1996); but see Ryan v. Comm’r, 680 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1982) (following Parr in a civil context).
See, e.g., Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 137 F.3d 640 , 647- 49 (D.C.Cir.1998).