Cluster 76404

See Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Of course, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from using a facially neutral law to intentionally discriminate on the basis of race.”); see also Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 407 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We need not engage in a lengthy discussion of the patently obvi- ous illegality of racial discrimination in public employment at the time the appellants voted to replace Smith.”).

Hunter was expressly different from Abbott because the Texas legislature, rather than simply adopting an earlier legislative redistricting plan, had largely modelled a plan 15 See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1223 (“[W]e are concerned here with the validity of the 1968 provision, not the 1868 provision and the plaintiffs conceded that the 1968 provision was not enacted with discriminatory intent”); Hayden, 594 F.3d at 162 (plaintiffs’ failure to allege “this invidious purpose motiva…

Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 , 403–04 (1991) (voter dilution case discussing the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the VRA which removed the proof of intent requirement); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act so that a plaintiff could establish a violation without providing discriminatory intent.”).

Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 , 403–04 (1991) (voter dilution case discussing the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the VRA which removed the proof of intent requirement); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act so that a plaintiff could establish a violation without providing discriminatory intent.”).

After reviewing the congressional record accompanying amendments to the VRA, it reasoned, "Congress never intended the [VRA] to reach felon disenfranchisement provisions." Id. at 1232 ; see also id. at 1234 ("Congress has expressed its intent to exclude felon disenfranchisement provisions from Voting Rights Act scrutiny.").

See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228 (“Despite its broad language, Section 2 does not prohibit all voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect.”); see also id. at 1237-38 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring, joined by Pryor, J.); Osburn, 369 F.3d at 1289 ; Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1515 . 14 Moreover, as previously noted, present-day “vote denial” cases are uncommon, and as such, courts have yet to develop a clear analytical framework for this type of case, unlike …

See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265 ; Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hunter v. Under- wood, 471 U.S. 222 , 227–28 (1985)).

But it need hardly be said that a City official using the permit process to intentionally discriminate based on race violates clearly established law.” (first citing Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005); and then citing Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 407 (11th Cir. 1995))).

Id. at 1224.

These laws are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and are a punitive device stemming from criminal law.” □□□□□ Johnson v. Gov. of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005).

Ex. at 2 ("SSVF provided PBFF with 30 days . . . to submit a written response to the OBO audit findings, along with all documentation and information that PBFF contended would validate the 'Questioned Costs,' refute the findings of the OBO audit, or otherwise show that PBFF was not materially failing to comply with the terms and conditions of the SSVF grant agreements and 38 C.F.R. part 62."). 171 See Mot. at 13. 172 See 2 C.F.R. § 200.339 ; 38 C.F.R. § 62.80 (b), (c). 173 M…

To start with, “[a] state’s decision to permanently disenfranchise con- victed felons does not, in itself, constitute an Equal Protection vio- lation.” Johnson v. Gov. of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 , 53–55, 94 S. Ct. 2655 , 2670–71 (1974)).

Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005).

“This includes a criminal disenfranchisement law enacted with the intent to deprive one racial group of its tight to participate in the political process.” Jobnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005).

A law that is facially neutral “violates the Equal Protection Clause if adopted with the intent to discriminate against a racial group.” Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).

“A state’s decision to permanently disenfranchise convicted felons does not, in itself, constitute an Equal Protection violation.” Johnson v. Governor of State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005)(en banc)(citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 , 53–55 (1974)).

See id. at 41–55. 62 Case: 20-12003 Date Filed: 09/11/2020 Page: 63 of 200 convicted of felonies could be disenfranchised.” Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

See id. at 41–55. 62 Case: 20-12003 Date Filed: 09/11/2020 Page: 63 of 200 convicted of felonies could be disenfranchised.” Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

The Eleventh Circuit has cautioned, though, that “[d]espite its broad language, Section 2 does not prohibit all voting restrictions that may have a racially disproportionate effect.” Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

L.J. 851 , 852–53 (2005) (“The first disenfranchisement laws in America appeared in the 1600s . . . and were present from the earliest times of the Republic.”); see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974) (noting that, in 1868, 29 states had constitutional provisions authorizing the disenfranchisement of felons); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Florida’s policy of criminal disenfranchisement has a long history . . . .”…

Indeed, just as we do not “add words” to a constitutional provision, we are similarly “not at liberty to . . . ignore words that were expressly placed there at the time of adoption of the provision.” Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla. 2009). - 18 - In the end, Amendment 4 was not drafted to require completion of “the term of sentence including parole or probation.” Nor was it drafted to require completion of “all terms of . . . incarceration, probation, and parole.” Jo…

Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005).

We found no “contemporaneous evidence showing that racial discrimination motivated” the initial disenfranchisement provision, but even assuming that it had been so motivated, we held that “Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provision is constitutional because it was substantively altered and reenacted in 1968 in the absence of any evidence of racial bias.” Id. at 1223, 1225 .

We found no “contemporaneous evidence showing that racial discrimination motivated” the initial disenfranchisement provision, but even assuming that it had been so motivated, we held that “Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provision is constitutional because it was substantively altered and reenacted in 1968 in the absence of any evidence of racial bias.” Id. at 1223, 1225 .

Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005).

To the contrary, the record establishes that the reasonable impediment exception amendment does not so fundamentally alter the photo ID requirement as to eradicate its impact or otherwise “eliminate the taint from a law that was originally enacted with discriminatory intent.” Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 74 For example, the record shows that under the reasonable impediment exception, if an in-person voter cannot present a quali…

When the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . judicial inquiry is complete.” (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The first step in statutory interpretation requires that courts apply the plain meaning of the statutory language . . . .”).

In undertaking such a review, the court “view[s] the record and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1217.

Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.2005), in which the Eleventh Circuit held that the Voting Rights Act does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws, is easily distinguishable because the court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment in fact permits such laws and that the “Senate and House reports” for the Voting Rights Act “strongly suggest ... that Congress did not intend Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to cover felon disenfranchisement provisio…

See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 , 61 S.Ct. 102 , 85 L.Ed. 40 (1940) (concluding that “all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law,” and thus that “[t]he later act can therefore be regarded as a legislative interpretation of the earlier act in the sense that it aids in ascertaining the meaning of the words as used in their contemporary setting” (internal citations omitted)); cf. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1230 (concluding that Section 2 …

Id. at 1234; 42 U.S.C. § 1973 .

Id. at 1234; 42 U.S.C. § 1973 .

The plaintiffs contended that “racial animus motivated the adoption of Florida’s criminal disenfranchisement provision in 1868 and this animus remains legally operative today, notwithstanding the fact that Florida altered and reenacted the provision in 1968.” Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1217.

The plaintiffs contended that “racial animus motivated the 13 adoption of Florida’s criminal disenfranchisement provision in 1868 and this animus remains 14 legally operative today, notwithstanding the fact that Florida altered and reenacted the provision 15 in 1968.” Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1217.

See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 343-62 (Parker, J., dissenting, joined by Calabresi, Pooler, and Sotomayor, JJ.); id. at 362-67 (Calabresi, J., dissenting); id. at 367-68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 368-69 (Katz- mann, J., dissenting); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239-44 (Wilson, J., dissenting in relevant part); id. at 1247-51 (Barkett, J., dis- senting).16 Thus, even if we assume that Farrakhan I was erroneous, such error was hardly “clear,” given the vigorous dissenting opinions…

See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 343-62 (Parker, J., dissenting, joined by Calabresi, Pooler, and Sotomayor, JJ.); id. at 362-67 (Calabresi, J., dissenting); id. at 367-68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 368-69 (Katzmann, J., dissenting); Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239-44 (Wilson, J., dissenting in relevant part); id. at 1247-51 (Barkett, J., dissenting). [16] Thus, even if we assume that Farrakhan I was erroneous, such error was hardly "clear," given the vigorous dissenting opinions …

Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1243 (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335 , 86 S.Ct. 803 (noting that "Congress knew that some of the States ... had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees" and that "Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers in the futu…

Id. at 1343 (footnotes and citation omitted).

As we have previously stated, “[a] facially-neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause if adopted with the intent to discriminate against a racial group.” Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1222 (2005) (en banc) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 , 96 S.Ct. 2040 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)).

See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316 ; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1218.

See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 , 1230 n. 31 (11th Cir.2005) (en banc); id. at 1241-42 (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1293, 1294-96, 1301-02, 1304-06 (11th Cir.2003) (analyzing the considerable record of statistical evidence and expert reports presented by plaintiffs in support of their claims), vacated by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir.2004).

See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 , 1230 n. 31 (11th Cir.2005) (en banc); id. at 1241-42 (Wilson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1293, 1294-96, 1301-02, 1304-06 (11th Cir.2003) (analyzing the considerable record of statistical evidence and expert reports presented by plaintiffs in support of their claims), vacated by 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir.2004).

As the Su- preme Court has explained, “[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 , 88 S. Ct. 1673, 1683 (1968); accord League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 66 F.4th 905, 939 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[A] statement or inquiry by a single legislator would constitute little evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the legisl…

See Johnson v. Gov. of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“A facially-neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause if adopted with the intent to discriminate against a racial group.”).

See Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 , 1218 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

See id., 405 F.3d at 1216 -17 n.1 (citing Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)).

See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d. 1214 , 1241 (11th Cir.2005) (Wilson, J„ concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing how the Voting Rights Act “reaches conduct for which it may not always be possible to prove purposeful discrimination” by accepting that “discriminatory effects are probative of race bias in electoral schemes and practices”). .

See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The first step in statutory interpretation requires that courts apply the plain meaning of the statutory language unless it is ambiguous.”).

See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The first step in statutory interpretation requires that courts apply the plain meaning of the statutory language unless it is ambiguous.”).