Cluster 768708

See Castillo-Perez, 212 F.3d at 525 (“[A] failure to comply with Lozada requirements is not necessarily fatal to a motion to reopen[.]”).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Lozada is intended to ensure both that an adequate factual basis exists in the record for an ineffectiveness complaint and that the complaint is a legitimate and substantial one.”).

For example, we have said that the need to file a disciplinary complaint with regulatory authorities “is not an absolute requirement,” and we have further “stressed] that the failure to file a complaint is not fatal if a petitioner provides a reasonable explanation for his or her decision.” Lu, 259 F.3d at 134 ; see also Castillo-Perez, 212 F.3d at 526 (“while the requirements of Lozada are generally reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their purpose is fully …

See Jian Yun Zheng v. Ashcroft, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[R]eview on the merits may be con- ditioned on substantial compliance with the reasonable requirements set forth in Lozada."); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269 , 1272 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) ("A petitioner claiming ineffective assis- tance of counsel in an immigration proceeding must demonstrate sub- stantial compliance with the Lozada requirements . . . ."); Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 133 (3d C…

See, e.g., Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) ("While the requirements of Lozada are generally reasonable, they need not be rigidly enforced where their purpose is fully served by other means."); Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999) (excusing the lack of a bar complaint against "a notary posing as an attorney"); Esposito, 987 F.2d at 111 (excusing bar complaint requirement where petitioner mistakenly believed that attorney had already been …

But Lozada’s requirements “are not sacrosanct.” Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 588 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000)).

When the “facts are plain on the face of the administrative record, the requirements of Lozada are not dispositive[.]” Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Claims of due process violations in deportation proceedings are reviewed de novo . . . .” Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000).

Contra Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting claim because petitioner’s “lawyer failed, without any reason, to timely file the application in spite of having told [petitioner] that he did file it, and that [petitioner] would have been prima facie eligible had the application been filed”); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (granting claim because petitioners’ representative “missed the deadline for filing the applicati…

We have not required strict compliance with Lozada when “[t]he face of the record shows a clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Escobar-Grijalva v. INS, 206 F.3d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Cf. Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

Generally, “the BIA does not abuse its discretion when it denies a motion to remand or reopen based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel where the petitioner fails to meet the requirements of Lozada.” Castillo- Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo- Perez, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

While we have recognized that the Lozada requirements “need not be rigidly enforced where their purpose is fully served by other means,” Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000), and thus we have excused the reporting requirement in some cases, “we have never excused a petitioner’s failure to provide an affidavit where, as here, the facts underlying the petitioner’s claim were not ‘plain on the face of the administrative record.’” Reyes, 358 F.3d at 597 (q…

Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021); Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000).

See, e.g., Correa-Rivera v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1128, 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (counsel did not act for months after informing the IJ that he would submit an application for cancellation of removal); Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182 , 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2004) (counsel “did not attempt to file a brief until nearly twenty months after the filing deadline”); Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000) (similar).

Other jurisdictions have excused bar complaints when the alien believed that his attorney had already been suspended from the practice of law, Esposito v. I.N.S., 987 F.2d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993), or when the fully developed evidentiary record “show[ed] a clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance of counsel,” Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).4 4 Onyekonwu also contends that she need not follow the Lozada requirements because the “face of the record shows a clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

Id. (citing Lopez v. INS, 184 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999); Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000).

Nunc pro tunc translates from Latin to English as “now for then.” In the context of immigration, nunc pro tunc relief has been used “to return aliens to the position in which they would have been, but for a significant error in their immigration proceedings.” Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1993)); Castillo- Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 528 (9th Cir. 2000).

The BIA did not err in rejecting Singh’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because Singh failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and his counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance was not “clear” from the record, see Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000).

The BIA did not unreasonably conclude that Parra failed to make the prima facie showing of “legitimate and substantial” ineffective assistance, Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000), needed to excuse failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff'd, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).

As to Lopez-Garcia’s contentions regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the. agency did not err in denying Lopez-Garcia’s motion to reopen where he failed to comply with the requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and any ineffective assistance was not plain on the face of the record, see Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Reyes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 592, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel cl…

While strict compliance with the Losada procedural prerequisites is not necessary, Castillo-Peres v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000) the Board’s consideration of petitioners’ noncompliance was not an abuse of discretion, given that the record does not show “a clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance.” See Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Castillo-Perez, 212 F.3d at 526 ).

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Prieto-Cortez’s untimely motion to reopen that alleges ineffective assistance by the attorney who represented him before the IJ, where Prieto-Cortez failed to comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the alleged ineffective assistance is not “plain on the face of the administrative record,” see Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000). hozada requires a petitioner seeking to reopen based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to: 1) submit an affidavit explaining his agreement with former counsel regarding his legal representation, 2) present evidence that prior counsel has been informed of the allegations against her and given an opportunity to respond, [and] 3) either show that a complaint against prior counsel was filed with the proper di…

See, e.g., Lo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir.2003) ("[W]e have been flexible in applying the Lozada requirements."); Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir.2000) (granting petition despite petitioner's failure to comply with "formal requirements of Matter of Lozada "). 3 .

Cf. Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir.2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir.2000).

See Rodriguez-Lariz v. I.N.S., 282 F.3d 1218, 1226-27 (9th Cir.2002); Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir.2000).

See Rodriguez‐Lariz v. I.N.S., 282 F.3d 1218 , 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2002); Castillo‐Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir. 2000).

The agency also did not abuse its discretion in denying Mancia’s motion to reopen based on the alleged ineffective assistance of her two former attorneys where she failed to comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of hozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and she does not contend that the alleged ineffective assistance was “plain on the face of the administrative record.” See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez’s motion to reopen where he failed to comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the alleged ineffective assistance was not “plain on the face of the administrative record.” See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

See Rodriguez-Lariz v. I.N.S., 282 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that where the record “itself demonstrates the legitimacy of petitioners’ ineffective assistance of counsel!,]” there is no “need technically to comply with Lozada ”); Ontiveros-Lopez v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the BIA “may not impose the Lozada requirements arbitrarily” and that failure to comply may be excused where “diligent efforts to obtain materials necessary for…

The agency also did not abuse its discretion in denying Velasquez-Cifuente’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel where she failed to comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the alleged ineffective assistance was not “plain on the face of the administrative record.” See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000).

See id.; Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Santos’ motion to reopen alleging ineffective assistance by the attorney who represented him before the IJ, where he failed to comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the alleged ineffective assistance was not “plain on the face of the administrative record.” See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir.2000).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Carreon-Borjas’ motion to reopen alleging ineffective assistance by the attorney who represented her before the agency, where she failed to comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and the alleged ineffective assistance was not “plain on the face of the administrative record.” See Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 526 (9th Cir.2000).

Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000). 2 Here, as the BIA noted, Dol has “not satisfied any of the requirements of Matter of Lozada ... nor even substantially complied with them.” Likewise, we are unpersuaded by Dol’s assertion that he had Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depressive disorders, which affected his memory during the application process and caused him to file the false application.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Kingoo’s motion to reopen because Kingoo did not comply with the threshold requirements of Matter of Lazada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), at the time he filed his motion with the IJ, and the alleged ineffective assistance was not “plain on the face of the administrative record.” Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir.2000).