Cluster 771052

See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 896 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 15 2018)(“In the context of criminal law, ‘intentionally’ can be synonymous with ‘purposely . . . .’”); United States v. Gracidas- Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000)(“In general, ‘purpose’ corresponds to the concept of specific intent . . . .”). 4.

See Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d at 1196 (“In general, ‘purpose’ corresponds to the concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ corresponds to general intent.”).

See United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In general, ‘purpose’ corresponds to the concept of specific intent . . .”) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Jury Instruction 52 defines willfully as an act done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say with a purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. . . .”) (internal…

See United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In general, ‘purpose’ corresponds to the concept of specific intent . . .”) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Meredith, 685 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Jury Instruction 52 defines willfully as an act done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say with a purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. . . .”) (internal…

The use of the word “attempt[]” in a criminal statute implicates specific intent “even when the statute did not contain an explicit intent requirement.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

We have held that “Congress’ use of the term ‘attempts’ in a criminal statute manifested a requirement of specific intent to commit the crime attempted, even when the statute did not contain an explicit intent requirement.” United States v. Gracidas- Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

To establish attempted illegal reentry, the prosecution had to prove that Sanchez “had the purpose, i.e., conscious desire, to reenter the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General.” United States v. Gracidas- Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Stat. 5/9-1; United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Cf. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (explaining that attempted illegal reentry is a specific intent crime under common law principles of attempt).

Here, the district court instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that “the defendant had the specific intent to enter the United States free from official restraint.” This was an error because our case law establishes that the jury was also required to find that the defendant had the specific intent to enter “without consent.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Attempted illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a crime of specific intent “requir[ing] a finding that the defendant consciously desired to reenter the United States without consent.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (emphasis added).

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir. 2000).

For an individual to be found guilty of attempted illegal reentry, the 2 18-50386 government must show “’(1) the defendant had the purpose, i.e., conscious desire, to reenter the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General; (2) the defendant committed an overt act that was a substantial step towards reentering without that consent; (3) the defendant was not a citizen of the United States; (4) the defendant had previously been lawfully denied admission, …

(See, e.g., United States v. Bailey , supra , 444 U.S. at p. 405 , 100 S.Ct. 624 [explaining that "inchoate offenses such as attempt" *70 require a "heightened mental state" as compared to completed offenses]; U.S. v. Gracidas-Ulibarry , supra , 231 F.3d at p. 1192 [similar].) The additional intent element required both for attempted escape and for attempted kidnapping underscores why we decided Bailey the way we did.

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (addressing common law attempt generally).

Having determined that the jury instructions were in error, we cannot affirm unless it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).

The Code lists four mental states—purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently—and we have explained that, as a general matter, “‘purpose’ corresponds to the concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ corresponds to general intent.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

And importantly, “[t]he practical difference between these two levels of mental culpability is that certain defenses, such as voluntary intoxication and subjective mistake of fact, can negate culpability only for specific intent crimes.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000).

There, he told Officer Moreno that he was traveling to Chula Vista, even though he had no entry documents and hoped “they wouldn’t stop him.” The .jury could also reasonably have found that Rosales had the specific intent to enter “without the express consent of the Attorney General.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). 1 In early 2013, Rosales received written notice advising him that he was “inadmissible,” and that “before comm…

The elements of the crime of attempted illegal reentry under § 1326 are: “(1) the defendant had the purpose, i.e., conscious desire, to reenter the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General; (2) the defendant committed an overt act that was a substantial step towards reentering without that consent; (3) the defendant was not a citizen of the United States; (4) the defendant had previously been lawfully denied admission, excluded, deported or removed f…

In view of the effect all of this evidence would have on the jury, any error here was harmless, meaning that it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). 4 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the memorandum holding that the district court’s denial …

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).

A conviction for attempted illegal reentry under § 1326 requires proof that "the defendant had the purpose, i.e., conscious desire, to reenter the United States without the express consent of the Attorney General.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). 2 .

Instead, he must only show that he had a ‘plausible’ ground for relief from deportation.” United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2 Because, in my view, Valdez-Novoa had not “previously been lawfully . . . removed,” I would likewise hold that the fourth element of the crime of illegal reentry here was not satisfied, United States v. Gracidas- Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), for purposes of the corpus delicti rule. 44 UNITED ST…

Instead, he must only show that he had a ‘plausible’ ground for relief from deportation.” United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2 Because, in my view, Valdez-Novoa had not “previously been lawfully . . . removed,” I would likewise hold that the fourth element of the crime of illegal reentry here was not satisfied, United States v. Gracidas- Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), for purposes of the corpus delicti rule. 44 UNITED ST…

We do the same here. “[E]ven though bank robbery itself is a general intent crime,” we have explained, “attempted bank robbery requires the specific intent to rob a bank within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a).” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (citing United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir.1988)).

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.2000).

In contrast, here, as the district court found, Mr. Hernandez proffered “no evidence” that he had a good faith belief that the documents he presented had “any force or effect on his ability to enter the United States.” Because the jury instructions given adequately covered specific intent as required by United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc), Hernandez-Ramirez was not entitled to any additional “good faith” jury instruction.

Gonzalez maintains that Leos-Maldonado did not consider whether the substantial act could have resulted in a crime if carried to completion, contending that under the common law principles of attempt incorporated into § 1326 by U.S. v. Graci-das-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192-94 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc), there can be no attempt if completion of the crime is not possible.

Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251-52 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ; United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir.2000) (“When the defendant’s conduct does not constitute a completed criminal act, ... a heightened intent requirement is *1053 necessary to ensure that the conduct is truly culpable.”); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1940) (Learned Hand, J.) (proof of criminal intent is required to prevent a “drag-net of conspiracy” from sweeping up innocent …

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)).

United States v. Meza-Soria, 935 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir.1991); see also Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d at 921 ; United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc); United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 24 F.3d 53, 55 (9th Cir.1994).

See United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir.2009) (noting that "in the criminal context, a 'willful' act is 'one undertaken with a bad purpose' ”) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 , 118 S.Ct. 1939 , 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998)); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.2000) (explaining that a " 'purpose' corresponds to the concept of specific intent”) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 *1091 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62…

Harmless Error The district court’s failure to instruct the jury on the proximate cause element of “resulting in death” is harmless “if we conclude that it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’ ” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Heder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)); see also United States v. Smith, 56…

It must be “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).

It must be “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty *1164 absent the error.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.2000).

Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 686 , 64 S.Ct. 1233 , 88 L.Ed. 1534 (1944); United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1118 (D.C.Cir.2009); Pierre v. Attorney Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir.2008); United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Puckett, 405 F.3d 589, 596 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 390 (2d Cir.2004); United States v. De Le…

A jury instruction error is harmless if it is “ ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’ ” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)).

UNITED STATES v. ANCHRUM 16857 A jury instruction error is harmless if it is “ ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’ ” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). [3] The model jury instruction at issue in this case provides that an object is “a dangerous or deadly weapon” under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (b) “if it is used in a w…

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). [3] The district court properly treated these statements by Gutierrez as establishing a conviction under the illegal alien presence provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for the purposes of cal- culating Gutierrez’ Guidelines recommended sentence.

On the other hand, the error is harmless if the indepen- dent evidence of guilt is strong enough to sustain the defen- UNITED STATES v. CARDENAS-MENDOZA 11815 dant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, Carrasco, 537 F.2d at 377 , and the defendant’s explanation for what hap- pened is “contradicted by overwhelming evidence.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Smith, 561 F.3d 934, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2009). [13] He…

On the other hand, the error is harmless if the independent evidence of guilt is strong enough to sustain the defendant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, Carrasco, 537 F.2d at 377 , and the defendant’s explanation for what happened is “contradicted by overwhelming evidence.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. *1033 2000); see also United States v. Smith, 561 F.8d 934, 938-39 (9th Cir.2009).

Although we hold there was a “reasonable likelihood” the trial judge’s instructions “misled” the jury to think they did not have to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a dangerous weapon, see Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam), we nevertheless affirm Smith’s conviction because we “conclude that it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’ ” United States v.…

Although we hold there was a “reasonable likelihood” the trial judge’s instructions “misled” the jury to think they did not have to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used a dangerous weapon, see Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 , 124 S.Ct. 1830 , 158 L.Ed.2d 701 (2004) (per curiam), we nevertheless affirm Smith’s conviction because we “conclude that it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty ab…

Although we hold there was a “reasonable likelihood” the trial judge’s instructions “misled” the jury to think they did not have to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the 3740 UNITED STATES v. SMITH defendant used a dangerous weapon, see Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam), we nevertheless affirm Smith’s conviction because we “conclude that it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent th…

United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1190 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).

See United States v. Salazar-Gonzales, 458 F.3d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Gracidas- Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).

We have found jury-instruction errors to be harmless where the erroneous instruction went to an element which was “uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc).

See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (a)(1); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196-97 (9th Cir.2000).