Cluster 772665

See, e.g., Altman , 245 F.3d at 78 ("[T]he Establishment Clause is not transgressed merely because a statement either is in agreement with, or is in disagreement with, a given religious tenet.").

See, e.g., Altman, 245 F.3d at 78 (“[T]he Establishment Clause is not transgressed merely because a statement either is in agreement with, or is in disagreement with, a given religious tenet.”).

Sch. 12 Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tanding to assert an Establishment Clause 13 claim may rest . . . on the plaintiff’s direct exposure to the challenged activity.”). 14 We therefore address only whether the Student‐Plaintiffs have sufficiently 8 The term “direct exposure” arises out of our jurisprudence construing the direct harm theory of standing under the Establishment Clause, and our use of the term “direct exposure” here includes all theories of direct …

Dist., 245 F.3d at 72-74(“[S]tanding to assert an Establishment Clause claim may rest ... on the plaintiffs direct exposure to the challenged activity”).

The First Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of government, not government from its citizens."). 9 Even if dining in the mess hall was truly voluntary, the First Amendment prohibits General Bunting from requiring religious objectors to alienate themselves from the VMI community in order to avoid a religious practice Lee, 505 U.S. at 596 , 112 S.Ct. 2649 . 10 If VMI's administration desires to teach cadets about religion, it is entitled to offer such class…

Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Altman, 245 F.3d at 72 ("[S]tanding to assert an Establishment Clause claim may rest . . . on the plaintiff's direct exposure to the challenged activity."); Murray, 947 F.2d at 151-52 .

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Ifa claim has become moot prior to the entry of final judgment, the district court generally should dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.”).

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tanding doctrine evaluates a litigant’s personal stake as of the outset of litigation.”). “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[S]tanding doctrine evaluates a litigant’s personal stake as of the outset of litigation.”). “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id.

School Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions . . .”) (quoting Church of Scientology of Ca. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)).

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If a claim has become moot prior to the entry of final judgment, the district court generally should dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.”); cf. Beach v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 17-CV-5153, 2018 WL 3996931 (WHP), at *7 (S.D.N.Y.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f the plaintiff loses standing at any time during the pendency of the proceedings in the district court or in the appellate courts, the matter becomes moot, and the court loses jurisdiction.”).

“Actual or imminent” injury may not be “conjectural or hypothetical.” Altman, 245 F.3d at 70 (internal citation omitted).

Altman, 245 F.3d at 74.

Altman, 245 F.3d at 74.

Procedural Due Process Claim Plaintiffs next assert that Congress’s wilderness area designations and the concomitant motor vehicle restrictions violated their procedural due process rights by, among other things, “denying [them] . . . any real input or ability to protect their interests in the decision-making process regarding the designation of wilderness areas.”109 In particular, they allege they were “ridiculed . . . and marginalized” at local public lands council meeting…

Opp. at 9–10.) Standing in an Establishment Clause may also “rest on the plaintiff’s direct exposure to the challenged activity.” Altman, 245 F.3d at 72.

Instead, the Establishment Clause “is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not.” Id. at 222 . “[S]tanding to assert an Establishment Clause claim may rest either on the plaintiff's direct exposure to the challenged activity, or, in certain situations, on the plaintiff's status as a taxpayer[.]” Altman, 245 F.3d at 72 (internal citation omitted).

Dist., 245 F.3d at 73.

In Altman , we reaffirmed the principle that while "standing doctrine evaluates a litigant's personal stake as of the outset of the litigation, the mootness doctrine ensures that the litigant's interest in the outcome continues to exist throughout the life of the lawsuit." 245 F.3d at 70 (internal quotation marks omitted).

If Gollust 6 had been written after the 2014 Lexmark decision, it would surely not have used 7 “standing” in describing the object of its analysis. 8 An infelicitous phrasing in one of this Circuit’s cases adds to the confusion. 9 In Altman, we reaffirmed the principle that while “standing doctrine evaluates a 10 litigant’s personal stake as of the outset of the litigation, the mootness doctrine 11 ensures that the litigant’s interest in the outcome continues to exist throug…

See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9, 83 S.Ct. 1560 ; Altman, 245 F.3d at 72.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 70 (2d Cir.2001) (“If a claim has become moot prior to the entry of final judgment, the district court generally should dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.”); Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that “dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a final judgment” within meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ); Banks v. Sec’y of Ind. Family & Soc.

That Enfield Public Schools forces students to participate in these acts violates the Establishment Clause’s benchmark that “government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.’ ” Altman, 245 F.3d at 75 (citations omitted).

Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 72 (2d Cir.2001); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 75 (2d Cir.2001) (recog nizing “endorsement” derives from second prong of Lemon). 14 Finally, in reviewing the challenged DOE policy for possible “excessive entanglement” with religion, we are careful to observe the link drawn in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 , 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), between this third prong of Lemon analysis and the second “effect” prong.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 75 (2d Cir.2001) (recognizing "endorsement" derives from second prong of Lemon ). 14 Finally, in reviewing the challenged DOE policy for possible "excessive entanglement" with religion, we are careful to observe the link drawn in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 , 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), between this third prong of Lemon analysis and the second "effect" prong.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.2001), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to exercise taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause claim, because “what was required for the establishment of taxpayer standing to complain of activities at [the schools at issue] was a showing of a measurable appropriation or loss of revenue attributable to the challenged activities at those schools.” Id. at 74.

A matter that has become moot does not present an actual case or controversy, see, e.g., Altman v. Bedford Central School District, 245 F.3d 49, 70-71 (2d Cir.2001); the federal courts “do[] not sit to decide arguments after events have put them to rest,” Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 433 , 72 S.Ct. 394 , 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952).

See, e.g., Ep- person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 , 89 S.Ct. 266 , 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968) ("[S]tudy of religions and of the Bible from a literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment's prohibition.”); Altman, 245 F.3d at 76 ("[T]he Establishment Clause does not prohibit schools from teaching about religion.”). 11 .

Moreover, the finality of graduation means that “in the absence of a class action, the ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception is not available when the issue is students’ rights and the complaining students have graduated from the defendant institution.” Altman, 245 F.3d at 71.

Moreover, the finality of graduation means that "in the absence of a class action, the `capable of repetition, yet evading review' exception is not available when the issue is students' rights and the complaining students have graduated from the defendant institution." Altman, 245 F.3d at 71. 17 In the present case, Colleen has received her IEP diploma from Watervliet High School.

We have no jurisdiction to hear a moot appeal, see generally Altman v. Bedford Central School District, 245 F.3d 49, 69 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3038 (U.S. June 25, 2001) (No. 00-1932), or to grant plaintiffs’ request for affirmance of the district court’s vacated finding of personal jurisdiction.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 71 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see id. (“A narrow exception to the principle that a moot claim is to be dismissed, available only in exceptional situations, is that the court may adjudicate a claim that, though technically moot, is capable of repetition, yet evading review.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

See Altman, 245 F.3d at 71; Montesa, 836 F.3d at 195-96 .

See id. at 182.

See Altman, 245 F.3d at 75.

See Altman, 245 F.3d at 75. 70 For all of the foregoing reasons, we concur with the judgment of the district court that no triable issues exist with respect to The District's alleged Establishment Clause violation.

See Altman, 245 F.3d at 74.

Dist., 245 F.3d 49 , 72 (2d Cir. 2001)); see also Altman, 245 F.3d at 72 (“[T]he party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the [practice] is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”) (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952)) (emphasis suppli…

See, e. g., Altman v. Bedford Central School Dist., 245 F. 3d 49 (CA2 2001) (challenging, among other things, reading of a story of the Hindu deity Ganesha in a fourth-grade classroom); Alvarado v. San Jose, 94 F. 3d 1223 (CA9 1996) (challenge to use of a sculpture of the Aztec deity Quetzalcoatl to commemorate Mexican contributions to city culture); Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School Dist., 37 F. 3d 517 (CA9 1994) (high school biology teacher's challenge to requirement tha…

School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 , 224 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560 , 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963); Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213, 220 (6th Cir.1970); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F.Supp. 133, 145 (E.D.Tenn.1979); see also Altman, 245 F.3d at 72; Doe v. School Bd. of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir.2001); Doe v. Beaumont Ind. Sch.