Cluster 776757

Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (making clear that we are “not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties”). 4 See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 983 (9th Cir. 2004), superseded by United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 , 514–15 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2002).

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2002).

United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2002). 4 conspiracy is responsible for the crime and other acts committed by the other members.” App. at 494.

The government argues that its position on a sentencing jury is supported by opinions of the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, and one district court, in which those courts approved the use of sentencing juries to remedy sentencing errors after Apprendi The government cites United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir.2004), aff'd, 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir.2002) (conviction based …

See United States v. Montiel-Sanchez, 171 Fed.Appx. 599, 600 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2004), superceded by United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005) {en banc) (addressing intervening decision in Booker); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 514 (7th Cir.2004), aff'd, 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir.2002); United States v. Cooney, 26 Fed.Appx…

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Accordingly, an error is harmless if “it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted).

E.g., United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.2003) ("An Apprendi error is not a 'defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ but, rather, ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ”) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 127-28 (2d Cir.2002) (subjecting an alleged Apprendi error to harmless error review); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 24…

Ed. 2d 243 (2002); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 739-42 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying harmless-error principles in the context of plain-error review and concluding that “any Apprendi error is harmless”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850 , 154 L.

See United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377, 384 (6th Cir.2002) (finding no violation of Apprendi where defendant “pled guilty to an indictment that specified the amount of drugs”); United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir.2002) (“[A]s Doe’s indictment did not properly charge drug quantity, the fact of his plea alone cannot be construed to convey an admission of drug quantity.”); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir.2002) (suggesting that facts admitted by …

P. 52(b). 4 v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 248 (3d Cir. 2002) (suggesting that facts admitted by defendant during plea colloquy may be used to determine sentence without offending rule of Apprendi); United States v. Lujan, 268 F.3d 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying Apprendi, stating: “[t]he indictment here did allege possession of a quantity sufficient for the mandatory minimum sentence that was imposed, and by pleading guilty to Count 1 of the indictment Mr. Lujan of course waiv…

E.g., United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.2003) ("An Apprendi error is not a `defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds,' but, rather, `simply an error in the trial process itself.'") (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ); United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 127-28 (2d Cir.2002) (subjecting an alleged Apprendi error to harmless error review); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir.2002) ("[A]n Apprendi e…

Here, given the stipulation and conviction, Spencer was responsible for 25 grams of crack cocaine at the very least Cf. id. at 250-51 (finding that, where drug identity was not submitted to the jury, the maximum sentence permitted by the jury’s verdict was one year under the catch-all provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841 ).

See United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 104-05 (3d Cir. 2001); United 3 States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding the statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(D) is sixty months).

See United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 104-05 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.2002) (finding the statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(D) is sixty months).

Constitutional harmless error analysis requires us to ask “whether it *739 appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 459 (3d Cir.2001)).

United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir.2002).

United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2002). _________________________________________________________________ 3.

See United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2002).

See United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that Apprendi requires jury to decide drug quantity where quantity affects statutory maximum sentence).

See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 252-53 (3d Cir.2002) (vacating sentence that exceeded lowest statutory maximum because sentencing court’s determination of drug identity by a preponderance of the evidence violated Apprendi); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1100 (11th Cir.2002) (“There is constitutional error under Apprendi ... only if the sentencing judge’s factual finding actually increased the defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum ..., an…

See, e.g., U.S. v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that jury can be convened for sole purpose of deciding facts that will determine sentence following Apprendi error at trial); State v. Schofield, 895 A.2d 927 (Me.2005) (holding that court had “inherent judicial power” to impanel sentencing jury in response to Blakely); Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (Ind.2005) (holding that to meet Blakely requirements, jury may be convened to consider sentencing factors…

See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); see also United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.2002) (harmless error analysis appropriate when defendant objects at trial); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a).

See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); see also United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2002) (harmless error analysis appropriate when defendant objects at trial); Fed.

See also United States v. Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 246-48 (3d Cir.2002) (explaining progression of Apprendi doctrine in Vazquez and Barbosa).