Cluster 778447

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]ndividual capacity suits do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment's protections[.]”); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1009 (permitting familial integrity claim against state officials in their individual capacities). 5.

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (“lawsuit[s] against a state official in his or her individual capacity . . . do not seek to conform the State’s conduct to federal law; rather, such suits seek recovery from the defendant personally.”).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]ndividual capacity suits do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment’s protections, making an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity obviously unnecessary.”); Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1009 (permitting familial integrity claim against state officials in their individual capacities). * * * As explained above, accepting as true the allegations of the complaint, Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim that (a) the DCFS …

It is well-established that “a case may proceed under the Young exception only when a state official is sued in his official capacity.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002).

Ind. 2014) (citing Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Deida v. City of Milwaukee, 192 F. Supp. 2d 899, 915 (E.D.

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2002).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7t Cir. 2002).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original); see also MSA Realty Corp. v. State of Ill., 990 F.2d 288, 295 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief because a favorable ruling would require “direct payments by the state from its treasury for the indirect benefit of a specific entity” and the claim for declaratory relief because it “would have [had] much the same effect as a …

In Ameritech Corporation v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had “helped define precisely when the Ex Parte Young exception applies . . .” before quoting the straightforward inquiry from Verizon.

In some cases, a suit against a state or its officials may proceed despite the Eleventh Amendment’s proscription.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002).

States are also im- mune from suits by their own citizens, Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002), brought under federal and state law claims, Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002) (setting forth limited exceptions to a state's sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.E.2d 662 (1974)).

The Eleventh Amendment poses no bar to personal capacity claims. “[I]ndividual capacity suits do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment’s protections.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002).

As such, the Court need not separately address the Clerk’s admittedly related Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense. 7 The Eleventh Amendment generally does not bar individual capacity suits against state officials because such suits seek recovery from the defendant personally and accordingly “do not seek to conform the State’s conduct to federal law.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002).

It therefore concluded that the twin goals served by the exception in Ex parte Young to 11th Amendment immunity— vindicating federal rights and holding state officials respon- sible to federal law—cannot be achieved by a lawsuit against a state official in his or her individual capacity.51 Among courts that have reached this issue, the trend and weight of authority is that injunctive relief is not available against officials sued in their individual capacities.52 In the inst…

See Greenawalt v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 587, 589 (7th Cir. 2005); Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002); Luder v. Endicott, 253 F.3d 1020, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 2001); Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[I]njunctive relief against a state official may be recovered only in an official capacity suit[.]").

It is well established that “there is no basis for suing a government official for declaratory and injunctive relief in his or her individual or personal capacity.” Hatfill v. Gonzales, 519 F.Supp.2d 13, 19 (D.D.C.2007); accord Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that a declaration that the challenged policy was unconstitutional and an injunction barring the défendants from implementing the policy in the future “can be obtained only from the defendants in…

Under that doctrine, “a private party can sue a state officer in his or her official capacity to enjoin- prospective action that would violate federal law.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir.1999)).

Under that doctrine, “a private party can sue a state officer in his or her official capacity to enjoin prospective action that would violate federal law.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir.1999)).

Under that doctrine, “a private party can sue a state officer in his or her official capacity to enjoin prospective action that would violate federal law.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir.2002)(quoting Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir.1999)).

See also, Cmty. Mental Health Servs. of Belmont v. Mental Health and Recovery Bd. Serving Belmont, Harrison & Monroe Counties, 150 Fed.Appx. 389 (6th Cir.2005); Ameri-tech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002); Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1327 (2nd Cir.1993); Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir.1987). “[0]nly by acting as a government official (not as an individual acting personally), can a public official’s compliance with a court decree remedy the…

However, under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), “a private party can sue a state officer in his or her official capacity to enjoin prospective action that would violate federal law.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.2002).

The ECPA, which amended the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seg., was designed to “protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 583 (7th Cir.2002).

The purpose of the ECPA is to “protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic communications.” Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 583 (7th Cir.2002) (citation omitted).

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir.2002).

Notably, in Ameritech Corp v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir.2002), the Seventh Circuit expounded: [defendant] also suggests that [plaintiffs] lawsuit cannot proceed because it impermissibly burdens the state’s sovereign interest in law enforcement.

See, e.g., MSA Realty Corp. v. State of Ill., 990 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir.1993) (providing that “state officials may be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief, although they may not be sued for money damages”) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 , 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304 , 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 , 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099 , 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)); Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th C…

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)).

The defendants rely on Cmty. Mental Health Servs. of Belmont v. Mental Health and Recovery Bd. Serving Belmont, Harrison & Monroe Counties, 150 Fed.Appx. 389 , 2005 WL 2233603 , at *5 (6th Cir.2005); Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002); Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1327 (2nd Cir.1993); Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 858 (7th Cir.1989); and Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir.1987), as support for then-motion.

Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir.2002).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F. 3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Dean Foods Co., v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir 1999)).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2002).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that “a party can sue a state officer in his or her official capacity to enjoin prospective action that would violate federal law”) (internal quotations omitted). 2.

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir.2002) (“[W]hen a state official violates the Constitution or federal law, he acts outside the scope of his authority and is no longer entitled to the State’s immunity from suit.” (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155—56)); Tamiami I, 63 F.3d at 1045 (describing Ex parte Young as “holding that a suit against an individual in his official governmental capacity — claiming that the individual is acting beyond his author…

Although Coeur d'Alene Tribe seemed to introduce a new balancing approach (and new uncertainty) to the application of Ex parte Young, see id. at 278 , 117 S.Ct. 2028 , the Supreme Court then turned away from that balancing approach in Verizon Maryland and returned to the "straightforward" inquiry into "whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." 535 U.S. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753 ; see Ameritech Co…

Although Coeur d’Alene Tribe seemed to introduce a new balancing approach (and new uncertainty) to the application of Ex parte Young, see id. at 278 , 117 S.Ct. 2028 , the Supreme Court then turned away from that balancing approach in Verizon Maryland and returned to the “straightforward” inquiry into “whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” 535 U.S. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753 ; see Ameritech Co…

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586-87 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that an action to hold state officials responsible to federal law cannot be achieved by a lawsuit against a state official in his or her individual capacity because “individual (or personal) capacity suits do not seek to conform the State’s conduct to federal law; rather, such suits seek recovery from the defendant personally”); Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1327 (2nd Cir.1993) (holding that a claim f…

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-88 (7th Cir.2002).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that the critical issue in determining whether an action for declaratory judgment falls under Ex parte Young doctrine is " 'whether the declaratory judgment imposes upon the State a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of defendant state officials' ” (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282 , 117 S.Ct. 2028 , 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997))).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the critical issue in determining whether an action for declaratory judgment falls under Ex parte Young doctrine is “ ‘whether the declaratory judgment imposes upon the State a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of defendant state officials’ ” (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282 (1997))).

See Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that the critical issue in determining whether an action for declaratory judgment falls under Ex parte Young doctrine is "`whether the declaratory judgment imposes upon the State a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of defendant state officials'" (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282 , 117 S.Ct. 2028 , 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997))).

The real party in interest in this case is therefore the state of Indiana, and the individual members are merely nominal defendants.”); see also Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “individual (or personal) capacity suits do not seek to conform the State’s conduct to federal law; rather, such suits seek recovery from the defendant personally”).

See, e.g., Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002).

See, e.g., Ameritech v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir.2002) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 , 192 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1985) (same).

See, e.g., Ameritech v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)); Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 , 192 n.3 (D.C.

The Eleventh Amendment precludes suit for damages only; a suit for prospective relief, including declaratory relief, is permissible when brought against state officials (but not against the state itself). 58 Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 54 (1st Cir.1997); see also Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002) (finding that a declaratory judgment claim is “prospective” and therefore, under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), not su…

Cir.1997); see also Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 297 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir.2002) (finding that a declaratory judgment claim is “prospective” and therefore, under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 , 28 S.Ct. 441 , 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), not subject to the Eleventh Amendment).