Cluster 780903

One may infer that equipment acquired to accomplish a crime will be µept for some period of time.' (internal quotation marµs omitted)); Leasure, 319 F.3d at 1099 ('Agents had observed the property in January and March of 1998 and seen objects consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine.').

Even assuming that the district court erred in its Guidelines calculations, any error was harmless because “the district court ‘would have imposed the same sentence absent the errors.’” United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)); see United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d 1028 , 1030 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Cir. 2009) (placing burden of proof on government) and United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096-98 (9th Cir. 2003) (same), with United States v. Dickerson, 195 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (placing burden of proof on defendant).

See Farmer, 370 F.3d at 439 (denying staleness argument because it was unlikely that Farmer’s large-scale counterfeiting operation would have been suddenly abandoned); United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003) (“When an affidavit ‘establish[es] the existence of a widespread, firmly entrenched, and ongoing narcotics operation. ... staleness arguments lose much of *134 their force.’ ”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

United States v. Leaswre, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003).

See id. at 788 (9th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092,1099 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted) (“[Bjecause the district conducted a thorough inquiry in a post-trial proceeding, we find the record ... sufficiently developed to permit review”).

“Generally, we do not consider ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, as collateral review provided by the writ of habeas corpus offers the appropriate forum to fully develop the record of counsel’s performance.” United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003).

United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1278 (9th Cir.2006). “ ‘[Wjhether the district court misapprehended the law with respect to the acceptance of responsibility reduction’ [under the Guidelines] is reviewed de novo,” Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d at 1130 (quoting United States v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir.2002)), as are attacks on the constitutionality of a provision of the Sen- *1113 fencing Guidelines, United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2003).

United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1278 (9th Cir. 2006). “ ‘[W]hether the district court misapprehended the law with respect to the acceptance of responsibility reduction’ [under the Guidelines] is reviewed de novo,” Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d at 1130 (quoting United States v. Cortes, 229 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002)), as are attacks on the constitutionality of a provision of the Sentenc- ing Guidelines, United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2003). .

United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2003).

See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1099 (11th Cir.2002) (review of constitutionality of statute), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1484 , 155 L.Ed.2d 231 (2003); United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2003) (review of constitutionality of sentencing guidelines).

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A sentencing error is harmless if the district court ‘would have imposed the same sentence absent the errors.’” (quoting United States v. Matsumaru, 244 F.3d 1092, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Ali, 620 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2010) (“When an ‘alleged error is harmless [it is] not a ground for resentencing.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1169 (…

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir.2003) (“A sentencing error is harmless if the district court “would have imposed the same sentence absent the errors.’ ” (citation omitted)).

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003).

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003).

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir.2003) ("[B]ecause the purpose of § 2D1.8 is to establish a defendant's base offense level, the government must prove the fact of participation[.]").

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2003).

See United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2003).

Compare United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir.2003) (placing the burden on the government), with United States v. Dickerson, 195 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (10th Cir.1999) (placing the burden on the defendant).

See, e.g., United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003) (over six months); United States v. Smith, 266 F.3d 902, 904-05 (8th Cir. 2001) (four months); United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1269 (10th Cir. 2001) (four months); United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 1999) (three months); United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1997) (five months); United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir. 1991) (twoyears); see State v. Grim…

Compare United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003).

See also, e.g., United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003) (finding six months old information not stale, in part because narcotics operation was elaborate and ongoing); United States v. Spry, 190 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir.1999) (given evidence of "ongoing continuous criminal activity,” information that was nine months old was not stale). 28 .

See, e.g., United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir.2003) (six months old information not stale, in part because narcotics operation was elaborate and ongoing); United States v. Spry, 190 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir.1999) (nine months old information not stale given evidence of “ongoing continuous criminal activity”) (internal quotation omitted).

See, e.g., United States v. Leasure, 319 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003) (six months old information not stale, in part because narcotics operation was elaborate and ongoing); United States v. Spry, 190 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 1999) (nine months old information not stale given evidence of "ongoing continuous criminal activity") (internal quotation omitted).