Cluster 782822

But see Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188-91 (9th Cir. *859 2003) (declining to apply "Title VII’s burden-shifting or hostile environment frameworks” to plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (b) because the Fair Housing Act served as a better textual analog).

Cir. 2020) (“[S]ection 12203(b) does not operate as a retaliation provision subject to Title VII’s burden-shifting framework.”); Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e cannot affirm the district court’s decision to analyze Brown’s § 503(b) claim under Title VII’s burden-shifting or hostile environment frameworks.”); Gardner v. Kutztown Univ., No. CV 22-1034, 2024 WL 1321068 , at *30 (E.D.

See also Brown, 336 F.3d at 1188 (“Under Ninth Circuit law, circumstantial 27 evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary 28 judgment.”) (cleaned up). - 43 - Case 3:20-cv-08338-DWL Document 64 Filed 09/08/23 Page 44 of 53 1 Here, Plaintiff contends that the “short temporal proximity” between her HR 2 complaint and the PIP and “the added evidence that . . .

See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (“circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgment”) (cleaned up).

See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under Ninth Circuit law, circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgment.”) (emphasis added) (simplified). 2.

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he ADA’s interference provision does not bar ‘any action whatsoever that in any way hinders a member of a protected class.’ ”); see also EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 , 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the agency’s argument that the plaintiffs refusal to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment “waiving] his procedural right to file or litigate a civil suit was protec…

No. 24-1400, 2025 WL 573766 , at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2025); , 872 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2017); , 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiff asserts a plausible claim for retaliation under the ADA. 6 A retaliation claim under the ADA requires the plaintiff to show “(1) involvement in a 7 protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the two.” 8 Coons v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 9 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 42 U.S.C. 11 § 12203, 29 U.S.C. § 794 .

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dean v. Jones, No. 3:09-cv-01102-AC, 2010 WL 1873089 , at *3 (D.

A plaintiff 19 establishes a prima facie case of FHA interference by showing that “(1) [he] was engaged in 20 protected activity; (2) [he] suffered an adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the 21 two.” Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645 , 670 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Brown 22 v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)). 23 Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting 24 framework to both FH…

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 6 12203(a), plaintiff must allege that (1) he has engaged in a protected activity; (2) he was subjected to an 7 adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. 8 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).

A retaliation claim requires that 4 the plaintiff make out a prima facie case by showing (1) involvement in a protected activity, 5 (2) an adverse action, and (3) a “causal link between the two.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 6 336 F.3d 1181, 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).

Place notes that other courts of appeal have interpreted Section 12203(b) the same way as they have interpreted Section 818 of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3617 , which “employs identical language.” Place, 714 F. Supp. 3d. at 482 (citing Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); Frakes v. Peoria Sch.

Circuits have added a limiting principle: the anti-interference provision “cannot be so broad as to prohibit ‘any action whatsoever [that] in any way hinders a member of a protected class.’” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mich. Prot. & Advoc.

The SAC alleges 19 that Defendant: (1) required him to take direction from more than one individual, (2) 20 refused to approve his leave request until his work was “up to date,” (3) failed to timely 21 approve leave requests to attend medical appointments planned the next or same day, (4) 22 23 24 harassment, see Brown v. City of Tuscan, 336 F.3d 1181, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2003), other courts within the 25 Ninth Circuit have allowed cognizable disability harassment claims to pr…

CITY OF COSTA MESA (2) [it] suffered an adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)).

We therefore analyze Plaintiff’s claim for sex-discrimination under both “Title VII’s burden-shifting [and] hostile environment frameworks.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003). 2 The parties, and we, agree that McDonnell Douglas also governs our analysis of Plaintiff’s AEPA claim. 2 24-487 (“Division”), the sole client that Plaintiff served in Arizona.

Section 3617 is 4 implicated where “the fundamental inequity of a discriminatory housing practice is 5 compounded by coercion, intimidation, threat or interference.” Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 6 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975). 7 The Ninth Circuit applies “the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to 8 FHA-interference claims and first ‘requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by 9 showing that (1) he was engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adver…

Sheriff's Office, 942 F.3d 839 , 24 852 (7th Cir. 2019) (surveying cases), the Ninth Circuit has only ever assumed that such a 25 claim exists, see Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003); Denning 26 v. Cty. of Washoe, 799 F. App’x 547 (9th Cir. 2020); Mulligan v. Lipnic, 734 F. App’x 397 , 27 7 The District objects that this letter is unauthenticated and hearsay.

Retaliation 21 To plead a claim for retaliation under the ADA, an employee must allege 22 facts showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an 23 adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two. 24 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2003).

Sheriff's Office, 942 F.3d 839 , 14 852 (7th Cir. 2019) (surveying cases), the Ninth Circuit has only ever assumed that such a claim exists, see Brown v. City 15 of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003); Denning v. Cty. of Washoe, 799 F. App’x 547 (9th Cir. 2020); Mulligan v. 16 Lipnic, 734 F. App’x 397 , 400 (9th Cir. 2018).

Accordingly, there is no triable issue of fact on plaintiff’s fifth 26 cause of action under the RA. 27 //// 28 //// 1 F. Sixth Cause of Action: Retaliation 2 A prima facie case of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act “requires a plaintiff to show: 3 ‘(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link 4 between the two.’” Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) 5 (quoting Brown v. City of Tu…

See id.; Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).

To state claim for retaliation under Title I of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) 10 involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link 11 between the two.” Coons v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th 12 Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown v. City of Tuscon, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003)). 13 Plaintiff’s complaint provides insufficient facts concerning the incidents involved to 14 adequately state a…

See Brooks, 229 F.3d 917 (“Where 28 a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive harassment necessary to support a hostile 1 work environment claim, it will be impossible for her to meet the higher standard of constructive 2 discharge: conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would leave the job.”). 3 To state a Title I ADA retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege “(1) involvement in a 4 protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a ca…

We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to FHA-interference claims and first “require[] the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) he was engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Retaliation 27 To make a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must present evidence showing: 28 “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal 1 link between the two.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The statutory term ‘interfere with’ is broader than retaliation, and captures ‘all practices which have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights’ under the ADA.” Id. (citing Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003)). 11 The Fourth Circuit has “not yet interpreted § 12203(b),” but has followed the framework as adopted in Frakes v. Peoria Sch.

To state a 6 prima facie claim for retaliation under the ADA, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) “involvement 7 in a protected activity,” (2) an adverse action, and (3) “a causal link between the two.” Brown v. 8 City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 Asserting one’s rights under the ADA can constitute a protected activity.

But at the very least, a defendant must have done something that has “‘the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights’ under the ADA.” Kelly v. Town of Abingdon, 90 F.4th 158, 171 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003)).

To state a prima facie case for retaliation under Title V, 15 plaintiff must show: “(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse [ ] action, and (3) a 16 causal link between the two.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003) 17 (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000)). 18 Liberally construed, plaintiff alleges that after defendants denied his requests for 19 accommodations, he lodged complaints with both the USDO…

Under the Rehabilitation Act, “[a] prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to show: ‘(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link between the two.’” Coons v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Cf. Brown, 336 F.3d at 1192 (holding that interference requires more than action that “hinders a member of a protected class” (cleaned up)).

But evidence consistent with both Credit One’s proffered 6 reason and the timing of its decision diminishes the significance of this closeness in time. 7 Krutchik was in the process of implementing a number of changes in Shields’s department at the 8 time, which Shields does not dispute.112 This process began before Shields went on leave and 9 continued in her absence.113 The record reflects an ongoing process taking place over the span 10 of months, with two roles being eli…

Brown v. City of Tuscon, 336 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Walker v. City of 22 Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001)). 23 Defendants only contest the second and third elements.

Cir. 2020); Frakes v. Peoria School District No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2017); Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).

Under Ninth Circuit law, “[c]ircumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

In addition, “circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal alteration and citation omitted).

As Brown put it, “it is clear that, given the broad remedial purpose of the ADA6, 7 the plain language . . . clearly prohibits a supervisor from threatening an individual with transfer, 8 demotion, or forced retirement unless the individual foregoes a statutorily protected 9 accommodation . . . [and] [w]e emphasize that conclusory allegations – without more – are 10 insufficient to state a violation . . . [thus] [a]n ADA plaintiff must also demonstrate that she has 11 suffer…

Ariz. 1985). 23 The McDonnell Douglas1 burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims. 24 Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 2003).

Assuming, without deciding, that a hostile work environment cause of action is cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act, see Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003), Anders’s supervisors’ conduct was not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to create a hostile work environment, Pavon v. Swift Transp.

Next, a plaintiff asserting an interference claim under the Rehabilitation Act must also establish that her employer’s actions interfered with her rights, with the caveat that interference should not be read “so broadly that it would ‘prohibit any action whatsoever [that] in any way 8 hinders a member of a protected class.’” Menoken, 975 F.3d at 11 (quoting Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)).

Retaliation under ADA and Rehabilitation Act 3 To establish a prima facie case of disability retaliation, a plaintiff must show: ‘“(1) 4 involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action and (3) a causal link 5 between the two.’” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 6 Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000)).3 The causal link between 7 a protected activity and alleged retaliatory action “can be infer…

Hostile environment and harassment 12 In Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit 13 Court of Appeals explicitly declined to find a basis for a hostile work environment claim 14 in the ADA, specifically in the portion of the statute stating that “[n]o covered entity shall 15 discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job 16 application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employee…

“Under Ninth Circuit law, 21 circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial in order to survive 22 summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003) 23 (cleaned up).

No. 150, 872 F.3d 545, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Because the ADA anti-interference clause is identical to the anti-interference clause found in the FHA... we use the FHA framework to establish the legal standard for an ADA interference claim.”); Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190-93 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the construction and application of the ADA anti-interference provision “ought to be guided by our treatment of the FHA’s interference provision . . . as we…

Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1191-93 (9th Cir. 2003).

Even assuming that such a claim is cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act, see Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), Meyer has nevertheless failed to show that “the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 4 environment,’” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21…