Cluster 787952

See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 281–82 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding removal of speaker who refused to follow meeting rules); Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183 , 197–200 (3d Cir. 2008).

See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 287 (“It may be very unlikely that a claim that fails the substantive due process test will survive under an equal protection approach.”).

See Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (“What is clear is that this [substantive due process] test is designed to avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals.”); Trotta v. Borough of Bogota, No. 12-2654, 2016 WL 3265689 , at *7 (D.N.J.

Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 , 176 n.6 (1976) (“Plainly, public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter[.]”); Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 281 (“As we have observed, speech at a citizen’s forum may be limited according to its germaneness to the purpose of the meeting.”).

Establishing different treatment “in particular imposes a high burden,” and requires the plaintiff to show that the differing treatment “‘is irrational and wholly arbitrary.’” Highway Materials, Inc. v. Whitemarsh Twp., 386 F. App’x 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (brackets omitted)); see Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286 (“The Supreme Court has held that a ‘class of one’ can attack intentionally different treatment…

Establishing different treatment “in particular imposes a high burden,” and requires the plaintiff to show that the differing treatment “‘is irrational and wholly arbitrary.’” Highway Materials, Inc. v. Whitemarsh Twp., 386 F. App’x 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (brackets omitted)); see Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286 (“The Supreme Court has held that a ‘class of one’ can attack intentionally different treatment…

See Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) (“All speech is protected by the First Amendment except narrow categories that are entitled to no protection, including obscenity and ‘fighting words.’”); Torres v. Clark, 522 F. App’x. 103, 105- 06 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a statement in a letter written by a prisoner that somebody was going to break an officer’s jaw if he kept acting like he is above the law was not constitutionally protected be…

See Eiehenlaub, 385 F.3d at 284 (“The rationale for a public/private concern distinction that applies to public employees simply does not apply to citizens outside the employment context.”).

Cf Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 285 (“The local officials are not accused of seeking to hamper development in order to interfere with otherwise constitutionally protected activity at the project site or because of some bias against an ethnic group.”).

Of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 283 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile government employers . . . have the authority to mange their works–including the authority to restrict various kinds of expression–the First Amendment imposes limits on that authority when the employees are speaking about matters of public concern.”) When determining whether an individual speaks as a public employee versus a private citizen, the “‘critical question’ is ‘whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily w…

See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) (“All speech is protected by the First Amendment except narrow categories that are entitled to no protection, including obscenity and ‘fighting words.’”).

See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) (“All speech is protected by the First Amendment except narrow categories that are entitled to no protection, including obscenity and ‘fighting words.’”).

The court repeatedly focused on Mr. Mashaud’s course of conduct intended to cause serious alarm to Mr. Boone by taking steps to 2 See also, e.g., Klen v. City of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498, 509 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[P]laintiffs’ speech was not robbed of constitutional protection even if it involved only matters of private concern.”); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009) (“While there are different rung[s in] the hierarchy of First Amendment values, . . . we conclu…

See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Mandamus will issue to compel a government agency’s performance of a ministerial act when the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the remedy, the defendant has a duty, and there is no other equitable or appropriate remedy.”).

Accordingly, any content-based restrictions will receive strict scrutiny.71 66 See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[E]xcept for certain narrow categories deemed unworthy of full First Amendment protection—such as obscenity, ‘fighting words’ and libel—all speech is protected by the First Amendment.”). 67 NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has grouped public properties along a spec…

Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (“We are unable to agree that private expression of one’s views is beyond constitutional protection . . . .”); Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]hile speech on topics of public concern may stand on the ‘highest rung’ on the ladder of the First Amendment, private speech (unless obscene or fighting words or the like) is still protected on the First Amendment ladder.”).

See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Ind. , 385 F.3d 274 , 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[E]xcept for certain narrow categories deemed unworthy of full First Amendment protection - such as obscenity, 'fighting words' and libel - all speech is protected by the First Amendment."); Clifton v. Borough of Eddystone , 824 F.Supp.2d 617 , 623-24 (E.D.

Pa. 2016) (finding a female student's complaints concerning the failure to eradicate discrimination in the school were entitled to First Amendment protection) (citing Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana , 385 F.3d 274 , 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We begin with the proposition that, except for certain narrow categories deemed unworthy of full First Amendment protection-such as obscenity, fighting words and libel-all speech is protected by the First Amendment.") (quotation marks omitte…

See id. (“The District Court properly held ... that whether a zoning official’s actions or inactions violate due process is determined by utilizing a shocks the conscience’ test.”).

Id. (“Thus matters presented at a citizen’s forum may be limited to issues germane to town government.”) Regardless of the type of forum designation, the court held that restricting “repetitive and truculent” behavior by a citizen who repeatedly interrupted the chairman was “the sort of time, place, and manner regulation that passes muster under the most stringent scrutiny for a public forum.” Id.

Beyond those limited extensions, applying “the public concern test outside the public employment setting would require us to rend it from its animating rationale and original context.” Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1156-57 ; see also Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (“To expand this public concern limitation into the broader context of all citizen speech would wrench it from its original rationale and curtail a significant body of free expression th…

Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286 (standard not met by actions such as “unnecessary inspection and enforcement” and “delay[ing] certain permits and approvals”).

Appx. 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2017), citing Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286.

The landowners there alleged that the township applied land-use requirements inconsistently, pursued “unannounced and unnec- essary inspection and enforcement actions,” delayed permits and approvals, increased tax assessments, and “maligned and muzzled [them].” Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286.

See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 479 (2010) (“Most of what we say to one another lacks religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); McGraw v. City of Oklahoma City, 973 F.3d 1057, 1066-67 (10th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases); Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2004) …

We find this case inapplicable. 114 ECF 27-3 at 8. 115 Andrews, 2012 WL 610333 , at *1. 116 Id. at *3 . 117 Id. at *8 . 118 Id. 119 Id. at *9 . 120 Id. at *11 . 121 Id. 122 See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286. 123 ECF 24-1 at 13–14. 124 ECF 27-3 at 5. 125 Antonelli v. New Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993)). 126 RP Wynstone, LP v. New Hanover Twp., No. 24-959, 2025 WL 418513 , at *18 (E.D.

Defendants also attempt to rationalize their disparate treatment of Plaintiffs by claiming that they were exercising discretionary decision-making that permits 9 And to be sure, an equal protection claim cannot be used in a land use dispute “as a device to dilute the stringent requirements needed to show a substantive due process violation.” Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 287. 10 Defendants characterize the rescission as “conditional.” [Defs.’ Br. at 36.] The Court finds this to be…

Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004).

In doing so, the Third Circuit noted that this standard “is designed to avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals.” Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004).

Id. at 286.

Thus, “ ‘content-based restraints are permitted, so long as they are designed to confine the forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.’ ” Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2004)).

Instead, “[w]hat ‘shocks the conscience’ is ‘only the most egregious official conduct.’” Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Thus, “‘content-based restraints are permitted, so long as they are designed to confine the forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.’” Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 280 (3d Cir. 2004)).

Pa. Feb. 16, 2017) (“[I]n the land use context, the shocks the conscience standard is sufficiently high ‘to avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals.’” (quoting Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004))).

Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).

Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286-88.

However, these non-binding opinions hardly place the “constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. ejection of a disruptive participant from a municipal meeting did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights); Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the removal of a speaker from a township meeting to prevent “badgering, constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum” did not violate the sp…

“The ‘shocks the conscience’ standard encompasses ‘only the most egregious official conduct,’”283 but the inquiry “depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.”284 Courts may find that governmental conduct shocks the conscience when there are “allegations of corruption, self-dealing, . . . or additional facts that suggest[ ] conscience- shocking behavior.”285 The Complaint sufficiently alleges that the December 16, 2020 decision infringed upon Ogontz Fire’s protected…

Cir. 2011) (regulations that “prohibit disruptive speech regardless of its message” “plainly do not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint”); Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 281 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that “a motive . . . to prevent [] badgering, constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum” is “sustainable and content-neutral.”); see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811 (“The First Amendment does not forbid a viewpoint-neutral exclusion of …

Pa. Sept. 30, 2019). 78 Id. at *1. 79 Id. 80 Id. 81 Id. 82 Id. at *2. 83 Id. 84 Id. 85 Id. at *4. 86 Id. at *6. 87 Id. 88 Id. 89 Id. at *1-2. 90 ECF No. 12 ¶ 166. 91 See id. 92 Id. ¶ 52. 93 Stemler, 2020 WL 1849762 , at *1, 5. 94 Id. at *5. 95 See ECF No. 12. 96 Tomko, 2021 WL 3610038 at *4. 97 Id. at *8. 98 ECF No. 12 ¶ 166. 99 See ECF No. 12. 100 See Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286. 101 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 174-183. 102 Id. ¶¶ 176-180. 103 Id. ¶ 176. 104 ECF No. 14 at 25. 105 Vurimin…

Cf. Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004) (To establish a substantive violation of due process, a plaintiff must satisfy the "shocks the conscience" standard and "only the most egregious official conduct" satisfies this standard) (collecting cases).

“What is clear is that [the shocks-the-conscience] test is designed to avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals.” Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004).

Twp., 463 F.3d 285 , 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003)). 6 Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274 , 282–83 (3d Cir. 2004). 7 Id. at 283. 8 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir. 1997). 75 Id. 76 Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 . 77 Templin, 2020 WL 1028054 , at *3 (citing Cnty of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). 78 Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004). 79 ECF Doc.

Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).

Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004).

Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286-87.

(See id.) Even if supported, Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions are devoid of any allegations of “corruption, self-dealing, intentional interference with constitutionally protected activity, virtual ‘takings,’ or bias against an ethnic group.” Button, 679 F. App’x at 154 (quoting Eichenlaub, 385 F.3d at 286).

What is clear is that this test is designed to avoid converting federal courts into super zoning tribunals.” Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2004).

See Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Inidana, 385 F.3d 274 , 281 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that ejecting a speaker in a designated public forum for “badgering, constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum” was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction); Olasz v. Welsh, 301 F. App’x 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that restricting a speaker’s disruptive behavior consisting of “badgering, constant interruptions, and disregard for the rules of decorum” constit…