Cluster 789041

See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] plaintiff cannot create federal jurisdiction . . . simply by alleging a federal claim where in reality none exists.

Federal Question Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “Federal question jurisdiction exists where a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Perpetual Sec., In…

See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136 , 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (“a plaintiff cannot create federal jurisdiction under § 1331 simply by alleging a federal claim where in reality none exists.

Mindful that federal courts “have no warrant to expand Congress’ jurisdictional grant ‘by judicial decree,’ ” id. at 696 , the Court found “no cause to displace state law, much less to lodge this case in federal court” because “Empire [did] not demonstrate[] a ‘significant conflict . . . between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of state law.’ ” Id. at 693 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 150 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sack,…

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “[t]wo independent conditions must be satisfied in order to trigger preemption under § 8902(m)(1).” Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 677 (2006).

The majority agreed with the Second Circuit’s ruling that Empire HealthChoice had not demonstrated a “significant conflict…between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of state law.” Id. (quoting Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 150 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sack, J., concurring)).

The concurring judge below said as much—in an opinion that the Supreme Court approvingly cited three times. “[A] future litigant in a similar action may, unlike Empire here, be able to point to specific ways in which the operation of state contract law, or indeed of other laws of general application, would conflict materially with the federal policies underlying FEHBA in the circum- stances presented.” Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 150 (2d Cir…

Neither McCollum nor Premera points to any legislative history material that directly 59 (...continued) plan is ‘maintained pursuant to [that] written instrument’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (a)(1))). 60 Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005). -29- 7631 explains the intent of the “federal program” exception.

Thus, in the typical case courts can only create federal common law where the operation of state law would “significantly conflict” with “uniquely federal interests.” Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

Subject matter jurisdiction will lie only where the court determines that the substance of the plaintiff’s allegations raises a federal question.” Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks omitted); accord Li v. Ali Baba Grp.

Subject matter jurisdiction will lie only where the court determines that the substance of the plaintiff’s allegations raises a federal question.” Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks omitted); accord Li v. Ali Baba Grp.

Subject matter jurisdiction will lie only where the court determines that the substance of the plaintiff’s allegations raises a federal question.” Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration marks omitted), aff’d, 547 U.S. 677 (2006).

In finding that the matter lacked federal jurisdiction because federal preemption was not triggered, then-Judge Sotomayor noted a “peculiar feature” of the Benefits Act relevant here: 5 USC § 8902 (m) (1), which provides that certain types of contract terms would “supersede and preempt” state laws (396 F3d at 143).

According to Plaintiffs, “the doctrine applies only to rates filed pursuant to statutory filing requirements,” and the “Second Circuit has recognized that because the rates in FEH-BA' contracts are privately negotiated between OPM and private carriers, they are not tariffs, meaning they are not ‘filed rates,’ and thus the filed rate doctrine does not apply.” (Id. at 17 (citing Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005), aff'd on other gr…

See McVeigh, 396 F.3d at 144-45 (Sotomayor, *1205 J.); id. at 155-56 (Raggi, J., dissenting).

Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 145 (2d Cir.2005), aff'd, 547 U.S. 677 , 126 S.Ct. 2121 (2006) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8902 (m)(1)). 45 .

Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir.2005), Brazil quotes then-judge Sotomayor as noting that it was “highly problematic, and probably unconstitutional,” that the preemption provision allows for contract terms, rather than actual federal laws, to preempt state laws.

There, then-Judge Sotomayor noted that, even though 12 federal courts (like the majority opinion in this case) “generally decide FEHBA cases as if § 8902(m)(1) were a preemption provision like any other, the provision is in fact quite unusual, because it provides that certain types of contract terms will ‘supersede and preempt’ state laws in a particular field.” McVeigh, 396 F.3d at 143 (emphasis in original).

DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 , 108 S.Ct. 1392 , 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988); Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.2005).

Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 142 (2nd Cir.2005).

Ct. 817; Empire HealthChoice, 396 F.3d at 144; JetBlue, 379 F.Supp.2d at 316-18 . 29 Fellows’ breach of contract claim is not preempted by the HPA.

The Court noted that while the Second Circuit “acknowledged that the case involved distinctly federal interests,” it found that “Empire had not identified ‘specific ways in which the operation of state contract law, or indeed of other laws of general application, would conflict materially with the federal policies underlying FEHBA in the circumstances presented.’ ” Id. (citing 396 F.3d at 150 (Sack, J., concurring) (“Empire has made a substantial showing that the first part …

Principles of statutory construction teach that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, we may construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of [the Legislature].” Field Day, LLC v. County of Suffolk, 463 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.2005)) (quoting Edward J.

Id. "`[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,' we may `construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of [the Legislature].'" Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Edward J.

R. & Regs, tit. 10, § 7-1.1, no such “adequacy” conditions are explicitly placed on the catch-all provision — “other matters as may be appropriate for security of life or health.” Given the concern that the lack of an objective standard might render the catchall provision unconstitutional, and this Court’s duty to interpret the statute, if possible, to avoid such concerns, see Empire HeatthChoice Assur., 396 F.3d at 144-45, it is possible to interpret the catch-all provision…

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that "Empire's clai[m] arise[s] under state law." Id., at 150.

Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 , 103 S.Ct. 2841 , 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)); see also, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 , 124 S.Ct 2488, 2494 , 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004); Empire Health-Choice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.2005); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ., 368 F.3d 108 , 113 (2d Cir.2004). .

Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 , 103 S.Ct. 2841 , 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)); see also, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 , 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2494 , 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004); Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.2005); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ., 368 F.3d 108 , 113 (2d Cir.2004). 13 "Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement `in restraint of trade,' th[e Supreme] Court has long recognized that Congres…

Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 , 103 S.Ct. 2841 , 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)); see also, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 , 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2494 , 159 L.Ed.2d 312 (2004); Empire Health-Choice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.2005); Bracey v. Bd. of Educ., 368 F.3d 108 , 113 (2d Cir.2004). .

See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136 , 152 Qd Cir.2005)} (Congress is understood to legislate against the preexisting backdrop of the common law.’), aff'd, 547 U.S. 677 ... . (2006).

See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136 , 140–41 (2d Cir. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 677 (2006); Woodward Governor Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Flight Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is beyond dispute that if federal common law governs a case, that case presents a federal question within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, just as if the case were governed by a federal statute.”); Provident Life & Acc. Ins.

See Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir.2005) (Sotomayor, J.) (“We recognize the possibility that at a later stage in the proceedings, a significant conflict might arise between New York state law and the federal interests underlying FEHBA, such that the dispute would satisfy both prongs of Boyle .

See Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc., 396 F.3d at 157.

See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir.2005).

See Empire HeatthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir.2005) (“[T]he plaintiff is generally the master of the complaint .... [and] [t]he existence of a federal question must be determined solely by reference to the plaintiffs own claim ....”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

See Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir.2005) (finding no reason to displace state law where "Empire's briefs on appeal fail to mention a single state law or state-imposed duty that runs contrary to the federal interests asserted in this case"), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2121 , 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006).

See Empire HealthChoice As surance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir.2005) (finding no reason to displace state law where “Empire’s briefs on appeal fail to mention a single state law or state-imposed duty that runs contrary to the federal interests asserted in this case”), aff'd, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2121 , 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006).

Id. at 509 ; see also Empire HealthChoice Assu., Inc. v McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[R]egardless of the strength or importance of the federal interests at stake, [plaintiff] has failed to demonstrate that the operation of New York state law creates ‘an actual, significant conflict’ with those interests.” (citation omitted)).

Under the statutory language, two conditions must be met to trigger preemption: (1) the FEHBA contract terms at issue “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payment with respect to benefits)” and (2) the state or local law “relates to health insurance or plans.” See 5 U.S.C. § 8902 (m)(l); see also Empire Health-Choice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 145 (2d Cir.2005) aff'd, 547 U.S. 677 , 126 S.Ct. 2121 , 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006).