Cluster 9428012

But see People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 89 (a defendant’s status as a felon is irrelevant to the first step of the Bruen test). ¶ 63 So, the question is whether possessing a firearm while having a felony conviction falls within the scope of the second amendment, which protects the right of “law-abiding citizens” to possess firearms.

But see People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435 , ¶ 79 n.11 (rejecting request to bypass Bruen due to Bruen’s discussion of licensing schemes and applying Bruen test to AHC statute).

In colonial America, for example, legislatures “ ‘disarm[ed] individuals whose status indicated that they could not be trusted to obey the law.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 30-31 (quoting People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 94). ¶ 22 The Supreme Court has not distinguished between bans on firearm possession for violent and non-violent felons.

See People v. Welch, 2025 IL App (1st) 231116, ¶ 60 (holding the unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon statute constitutional, as applied to the defendant); Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 37 (holding the AHC statute constitutional, as applied to the defendant); Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 100 (holding the AHC constitutional, as applied to the defendant, even though his prior felonies were nonviolent because the defendant was “not a law-abiding citizen…

Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 57 (citing People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37 ).

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-36 ). ¶ 14 Here, defendant claims that the conduct prohibited by the UUWF statute is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and therefore is presumptively protected.

See, e.g., People v. Stephens, 2024 IL App (5th) 220828 , ¶¶ 37-39 (rejecting facial challenge to unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) statute under the second prong of Bruen); Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105 (rejecting as-applied challenge to the armed habitual criminal (AHC) statute).

See People v. Macias, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, ¶¶ 29-34 (discussing founding- era laws that authorized capital punishment and estate forfeiture for persons convicted of felonies); Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 30 (“The government has historically promoted public safety -6- No. 1-24-0617 by protecting society from persons it deems to be dangerous.”); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105 (“[T]here is a historical tradition of legislatures exercising thei…

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35 ).

See People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 33 (concluding that the “AHC and UUWF statutes are consistent with this nation’s history of preventing potentially dangerous individuals from exercising the right to bear arms, and their effects on law-abiding citizens’ right to self-defense are minimal”); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 100 (finding that “both the founding-era historical record and Supreme Court precedent support the ability of our legislature t…

See Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 37 (holding that the armed habitual criminal statute is constitutional, as applied to the defendant, “irrespective of the violent or nonviolent nature of [the defendant’s] convictions”); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 100 (holding that the armed habitual criminal statute is constitutional, as applied to the defendant, even though his prior felonies were nonviolent ones because he was still “not a law-abiding citizen”).

See, e.g., Rich, 2025 IL App (1st) 230818, ¶ 66 (rejecting facial and as-applied challenge to AHC statute); People v. Daniels, 2025 IL App (1st) 230823, ¶¶ 36, 39 (rejecting challenge to “AHC statute as applied to individuals with prior nonviolent gun possession convictions”); Gray, 2025 IL App (1st) 191086-B, ¶ 23 (rejecting as-applied challenge to AHC statute); Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 37 (rejecting as-applied and facial challenge to AHC statute); People v. Brook…

Further, he asks that in the event this court finds the record is insufficient, we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his as-applied challenge below. ¶ 41 “Ordinarily, a defendant must present an as-applied constitutional challenge to a statute at trial in order to develop the record as it pertains to the specific facts and circumstances of his claim.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st)…

See Doehring, 2024 IL App (1st) 230384 , ¶ 24 (concluding that the reasoning in Brooks, “which looked to the conduct being proscribed – namely, possession of a firearm instead of the circumstances surrounding that possession*** better comports with the requirements in Bruen”); Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 25 (same); Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 89 (finding that “the first step asks only whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct’ ”…

See, e.g., People v. Gray, 2025 IL App (1st) 191086-B, ¶¶ 16-23 (rejecting facial and as-applied challenges to the AHC statute); People v. Daniels, 2025 IL App (1st) 230823, ¶¶ 36-45 (rejecting an as-applied challenge to the AHC statute); People v. Kelley, 2024 IL App (1st) 230569, ¶¶ 8-22, 30 (rejecting facial challenge to the AHC statute); People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 20-37 (rejecting facial and as-applied challenges to the AHC statute); People v. Brooks, …

See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (identifying “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” as one example of a presumptively constitutional regulation); see also People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 27-33 (affirming constitutionality of section 24-1.7 based on “a history and tradition dating back to the founding era of identifying dangerous individuals and disarming them”); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st)…

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35 ). ¶ 11 A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute “carr[ies] the heavy burden of successfully rebutting the strong judicial presumption that statutes are constitutional.” (Internal -3- No. 1-23-1113 quotation marks omitted.) People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 23 .

See, e.g., People v. Leonard, 2024 IL App (4th) 230413-U, ¶ 15 (“[D]efendant’s previous felony convictions make him not a law-abiding citizen and, therefore, not protected by the second amendment.” (Emphases in original.)) (citing People v. Boyce, 2023 IL App (4th) 221113-U, ¶ 14 ; People v. Langston, 2023 IL App (4th) 230162-U, ¶ 19 ); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 105 (holding the AHC statute is constitutional as applied to the defendant because it is consi…

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35 ). ¶ 11 Defendant first argues that the UUWF statute is facially unconstitutional under the second amendment.

As we have noted previously, “our supreme court has held that where ‘[a]ll the facts and circumstances to decide the defendant’s claim *** are already in the record’ the claim may be raised and reviewed on appeal for the first time even absent a prior evidentiary hearing.” People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 57 (quoting People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 32 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 ).

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35 ). ¶ 15 Here, defendant claims that the conduct prohibited by the UUWF statute is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and therefore is presumptively protected.

Moreover, this court has thoroughly examined—and rejected—this precise argument, concluding that “founding-era historical record and Supreme Court precedent support the ability of our legislature to prohibit firearm possession by people who have demonstrated disrespect for legal norms of society.” (Internal quotation marks removed.) People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 92-100 (subsequently rejecting the defendant’s as-applied challenge on the armed habitual crimina…

People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (4th) 240315-U, ¶ 23 ; People v. McNeal, 2024 IL App (1st) 231051-U, ¶¶ 20-23 ; People v. Kelley, 2024 IL App (1st) 230569, ¶¶ 16-17, 22 ; People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 100, 105 .

“Knowledge may be demonstrated by evidence of the defendant’s “ ‘acts[, declarations,] or conduct, from which it can be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found.’ ” People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 40 (quoting People v. McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817, ¶ 24 ).

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 68 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17).

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 68 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 ).

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 68 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 ).

See -5- Nos. 1-22-1921 & 1-23-0620 (consolidated) United States v. Calhoun, 2024 WL 36977 , *5 (noting the “flurry of filings across the country” challenging the federal statute); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 79 (noting that “various jurisdictions have grappled with this issue”).

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35). ¶ 14 Initially, the State responds that in this case we need not reach the analytical framework that Bruen provided.

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35 ). ¶ 15 Initially, the State responds that in this case we need not reach the analytical framework that Bruen provided.

People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 70 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 27, 34-35 ). ¶ 14 Here, defendant claims that the conduct prohibited by the UUWF statute, possessing a firearm, is covered by the plain text of the second amendment and therefore presumptively protected.

Sept. 28, 2022) (unlawful users of controlled substances fall outside the second amendment’s protection as they are not law-abiding). ¶ 56 One panel of this court has suggested that “possession of a firearm is ‘presumptively constitutional’ ” regardless of whether one is “law-abiding.” See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 88-89 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___ , 142 S. Ct. at 2126 ).

However, “[i]f history proved inconclusive or suggested that the regulated activity was not ‘categorically unprotected’ courts proceeded to the second step, whereupon they conducted a means-ends analysis, employing either strict or intermediate -4- No. 1-22-1455 scrutiny and weighing the severity of the regulation against the ends the government sought to achieve.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 67 (citing Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2023)). ¶ 12 …

However, “[i]f history proved inconclusive or suggested that the regulated activity was not ‘categorically unprotected’ courts proceeded to the second step, whereupon they conducted a means-ends analysis, employing either strict or intermediate scrutiny and weighing the severity of the regulation against the ends the government sought to achieve.” Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 67 (citing Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2023)). ¶ 13 Recently, in Bruen…

See also Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 2 ; People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 68 (“in Bruen, the Supreme Court announced a new analytical framework for evaluating the constitutionality of firearm regulations”).

See People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (rejecting as-applied challenge to unlawful-use-of-a-weapon-by-a-felon statute; holding that Bruen test applies only to law-abiding citizens, not felons like the defendant); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 84-100 (rejecting as-applied challenge to armed-habitual-criminal statute, where the defendant had been convicted of two prior nonviolent felonies—manufacture or delivery of “other amount of narcotics Sched…

“Throughout the twentieth century the prevailing understanding of the second amendment, at least in some way, related to militia service.” People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 66 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).

See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 100 (holding that “both the founding-era historical record and Supreme Court precedent support the ability of our legislature to prohibit firearm possession - 37 - by people who have demonstrated disrespect for legal norms of society” (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Macias, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, ¶¶ 31-34 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the armed habitual criminal statute under Bruen’s second step);…

See Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 100 ; Echols, 2024 IL App (2d) 220281-U, ¶ 156 .

See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 56-57 ; People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 122 (2006).

See Bochenek, 2021 IL 125889, ¶ 10 (“A statute will be deemed facially unconstitutional only if there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid.”). -4- 1-24-2030 ¶ 19 Mr. McGowan requests that we instead follow the reasoning in People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 89 , where a different panel of this court found that a defendant’s status as a felon “is more properly evaluated under [Bruen’s] second step’s historical tradition analysis.” Howev…

See Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105 .

See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-98 (noting a historical tradition of legislatures imposing status-based restrictions on persons “who, based on their past conduct, were presumed unwilling to obey the law”); see also People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶ 33 (finding “a history and tradition dating back to the founding era of identifying dangerous individuals and disarming them”).

See Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435 , ¶¶ 88-89. ¶ 68 We have undertaken the historical analysis required by Bruen in several previous cases, and we will not repeat it all here.

See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 99 (observing that Bruen “characterized the holders of second amendment rights as ‘law-abiding citizens’ no fewer than fourteen times”); People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 (noting that Bruen “could not have been more clear that its newly announced test applied only to laws that attempted to regulate the gun possession of ‘law-abiding citizens,’ and not felons like defendant,” and observing that, “[j]ust in case a…

To clear this hurdle, the government must point to “historical precedent from before, during, and even after the founding [that] evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 27 . ¶ 66 This court determined that the statute met the second prong of the Bruen test because there were analogous colonial and founding era laws “categorically disarming groups deemed untrustworthy or dangerous.” People v. Macias, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, …

See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 59-62 (explaining that the evidentiary record below was sufficiently developed for review and the State failed to identify any relevant omitted facts that could have been produced below). ¶ 14 The second amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend.

See Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435 , ¶¶ 84-87 (finding that, for purposes of the armed habitual criminal statute, the “proscribed conduct” was the possession of a firearm, which is encompassed by the plain text of the second amendment (citing 720 ILCS 5/24- 1.7 (West 2016)); Macias, 2025 IL App (1st) 230678, ¶ 28 (same); People v. Doehring, 2024 IL App (1st) 230384 , ¶ 24 (finding that a focus on the conduct being proscribed instead of the circumstances surrounding such po…

See Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶¶ 90-105 .

See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 87 (recognizing that possessory firearms offenses satisfy the first prong of the Bruen analysis).