State v. Bell, 382 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). · Go Syfert
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State v. Bell, 382 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
30 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Christian Cruz v. State of Florida (fla, 2021-07-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1980 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Christian Cruz v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
To this list may be added, the factor of flight.” (quoting State v. Bell, 382 So. 2d 119, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) H.L. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 249 (Fla.1995); Hernandez v. State, 784 So.2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 119-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Rodriguez v. State, 948 So.2d 912, 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Byndloss v. State (2×)
Md. · 2006 · confidence medium
However, once the computer checks confirm that the driver has produced a valid license and proof of entitlement to operate the car, the driver must be permitted to proceed on his way, without further delay by police for additional questioning.') (internal citations omitted); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 , 1535 n. 6 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop is authorized to conduct a computer check); State v. Holman, 221 Neb. 730, 732-33 , 380 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1986) (check of driver's history, registration, and for outstanding warrants is part of the norm…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Byndloss v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
However, once the computer checks confirm that the driver has produced a valid license and proof of entitlement to operate the car, the driver must be *305 permitted to proceed on his way, without further delay by police for additional questioning.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 , 1535 n. 6 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop is authorized to conduct a computer check); State v. Holman, 221 Neb. 730, 732-33 , 380 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1986) (check of driver’s history, registration, and for outstanding warrants is part of…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilkes v. State
Md. · 2001 · confidence medium
However, once the computer checks confirm that the driver has produced a valid license and proof of entitlement to operate the car, the driver must be permitted to proceed on his way, without further delay by police for additional questioning.”) (internal citations omitted); 19 United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 , 1535 n. 6 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that an officer conducting a routine traffic stop is authorized to conduct a computer check); State v. Holman, 221 Neb. 730, 732-33 , 380 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1986) (check of driver’s history, registration, and for outstanding warrants is part of t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilkes v. State
Md. · 2001 · confidence medium
However, once the computer checks confirm that the driver has produced a valid license and proof of entitlement to operate the car, the driver must be permitted to proceed on his way, without further delay by police for additional questioning.") (internal citations omitted); [19] United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528 , 1535 n. 6 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that an officer conducting a routine traffic *435 stop is authorized to conduct a computer check); State v. Holman, 221 Neb. 730, 732-33 , 380 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1986) (check of driver's history, registration, and for outstanding warrants is part o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Silva (2×)
Haw. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo.1997) (since officers had reasonable suspicion that car was stolen, they had basis for stopping and questioning car's occupants and detaining them in order to check for outstanding arrest warrants; "[s]uch detention is brief and minimally intrusive"); State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (during lawful Terry stop, police officers were authorized to ascertain if there was an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest); Biggers v. State, 162 Ga.App. 163 , 290 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1982) ( Terry stop of two men in car parked in church parking lot was p…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Cf. United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding that although court is “reluctant” to hold that noncontemporaneous criminal background checks during routine traffic stops are always reasonable, additional developments during stop in this case supported prolonged detention for warrants check); People v. H.J., 931 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo.1997) (en banc) (insufficient proof of registration of vehicle provided reasonable suspicion that vehicle might be stolen, and authorized investigatory detention of occupants for suspected involvement in car theft; occupants were ther…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dimascio v. Municipality of Anchorage
Alaska Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.1987); State v. Stinnett, 104 Nev. 398 , 760 P.2d 124, 127 (1988); Commonwealth v. Moore, 300 Pa.Super. 488 , 446 A.2d 960, 962 (1982); and State v. Bell, 382 So.2d 119, 120 (Fla.App.1980).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Andre Dole BELL, Appellee.
79-1613.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Apr 1, 1980.
382 So. 2d 119
Nesbitt and Baskin, Jj., and Charles A. Carroll (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

Janet Reno, State's Atty., and Milton Robbins, Asst. State's Atty., for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Before NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ., and CHARLES A. CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

NESBITT, Judge.

The state appeals from an order suppressing tangible evidence. We find that the questioned evidence was improvidently suppressed and reverse.

The testimony before the trial court was uncontradicted and unrefuted. It showed that police officers of the City of Miami observed the defendant at 4:30 a.m. peering into the first floor window of an apartment from an alley. The residential neighborhood in which he was observed was known by the police officers as a high crime area. No other persons were present in the area. The police left their vehicle and approached the defendant. No verbal communication passed. The defendant turned and ran. The officers pursued and ultimately found him hiding behind some trash containers. Officers detained the defendant and asked him his name. He complied and, with the identification obtained, the officers learned by radio that there was an outstanding bench warrant for his arrest. The defendant was then taken to police headquarters where he was arrested. A search of his person produced cocaine. This is the tangible evidence ordered suppressed by the trial court.

The state contends the officers had articulable founded suspicion to stop and detain the defendant. Some of the factors enumerated by the court in State v. Stevens, 354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) which may be evaluated by police officers to reasonably suggest a suspect's possible commission, the existence, or imminence, of a crime are:

The time; the day of the week; the location; the physical appearance of the suspect; the behavior of the suspect; the appearance and manner of operation of any vehicle involved; anything incongruous or unusual in the situation as interpreted in the light of the officer's knowledge.

354 So.2d at 1247. To this list may be added, the factor of flight. Flight from[*120] police evidences guilt. Gibson v. State, 368 So.2d 667 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Monnette v. United States, 299 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.1962). "Flight invites pursuit and colors conduct which hitherto has appeared innocent." United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir.1977).

In this case, the conduct of the defendant at the time and place, an area known for its high crime rate, coupled with his flight, afforded the officers their articulable founded suspicion necessary to stop and detain him as contemplated under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The police officers were authorized during the stop and detention of the defendant to ascertain if there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Coney v. State, 341 So.2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The disclosure of a bench warrant authorized the police to arrest the defendant. Wigfall v. State, 323 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Based on a valid arrest, a search of his person was lawful. § 901.21, Fla. Stat. (1979). Contraband seized from a search of his person at police headquarters is clearly admissible in evidence. Dolan v. State, 185 So.2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.