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City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 6× by 6 distinct cases · …e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
97 citation events (96 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Febles v. American Health Reform Solutions, LLC (flmd, 2024-10-16)
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Febles v. American Health Reform Solutions, LLC
M.D. Fla. · 2024 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
an ambiguous term in a contract is to be construed against the drafter.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) 100 LINCOLN RD SB, LLC, etc. v. LOANCORE CAPITAL CREDIT REIT LLC, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
he rule of construction requir courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) RAYMOND ERB v. CHUBB NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Mac Papers, Inc. v. Genesis Press, Inc.
S.C. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
an ambiguous term in a contract is to be construed against the drafter.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) TYR Tactical, LLC v. Protective Products Enterprises, LLC
11th Cir. · 2017 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hirsch v. Jupiter Golf Club LLC
S.D. Fla. · 2017 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Smith v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Smith v. Reverse Mortgage
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Steven Maizes
11th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States of America, for the use and benefit of Timberline Construction Group, LLC v. APTIM Federal Services, LLC, et al.
M.D. La. · 2026 · confidence medium
N.W., 410 So. 3d at 3 (quoting City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NetApp Inc. v. Jon Thorgrimur Stefánsson
M.D. Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
Corp., 647 F. App’x 226, 229 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000)); Hulse v. Orthodontic Educ., Ltd, No. 3:05-CV-594-J-32TEM, 2011 WL 32437 , at *3 (M.D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eduardo Gomez v. CVPort Services, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willoughby v. Government Employees Insurance Company
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
This reading renders, at least in part, the bodily injury provision duplicative and fails to make sense of the entire policy. , 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (applying the rule “requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof”); , 756 So. 2d at 34 “[U]nlimited coverage” for certain medical costs would have the effect in cases like this one of wiping away the applicable bodily injury limits.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) First Financial Northwest, Inc. v. Richard Craig Laver
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000); see also, e.g., Kolter Signature Homes, Inc. v. Shenton, 46 So. 3d 1211, 1216 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (ambiguities in contract language are to be construed against the drafter).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pettway v. Amazon Fulfillment Center
M.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
This Court must “‘read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.’” Holmes v. Fla. A&M Univ., 260 So. 3d 400, 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tru Mobility v. Briggs Auto Group (2×)
10th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (quotations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Merritt Island Woodwerx LLC v. Space Coast Credit Union
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Pointe On Westshore LLC v. Certain Underwriters At Lloyd's Of London Subscribing to Policy Number AMR-65342
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
“When a contract contains apparently conflicting clauses, [courts] must interpret it in a manner that would reconcile the conflicting clauses, if possible.” Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 735 (Fla. lst DCA 2009); City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (articulating the same principle).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CHARLES HERRINGTON v. CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD'S LONDON
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Insured appeals that summary judgment. “[C]ontracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (citing Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So. 2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). “[I]nsurance contracts are interpreted according to the plain language of the policy except ‘when a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning remains after resort to the ordinary rules of construction.’” Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Philippe Calderon v. Sixt Rent a Car, LLC
11th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
Florida courts recognize the familiar rule of contract interpretation that “the meaning of particular terms may be ascertained by reference to other closely associated words.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) It Works Marketing, Inc. v. Melaleuca Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 180–82 (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not 8 contradictory.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DOROTHY ARCHER v. TOWER HILL SIGNATURE INSURANCE COMPANY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
She further argues that the ambiguity should be construed in her favor to provide coverage. “[W]e rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000). “[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all its terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of the contract unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.” Raytheon Subsidiary Support Co. v. Crouch, 548 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) F.H. PASCHEN, S.N. NIELSEN & ASSOCIATES, LLC v. B & B SITE DEVELOPMENT, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) dePombo v. Irinox North America, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Further, courts are to “read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000); see also Lalow v. Codomo, 101 So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 1958) (“The intention of the parties must be determined from an examination of the whole contract and not from the separate phrases or paragraphs.” (citation omitted)). resolved at the election of the party seeking to enforce the Agreement, either by court action, or by binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association under its commerci…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Securities Exchange v. Mutual Benefits Corp
S.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1247 -48 (citing City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (finding that, in a suit between a private utility company and a municipality, where the City’s attorney acknowledged drafting the agreement, any ambiguity would be construed against the City)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Circuitronix, LLC v. Kapoor
S.D. Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Further, courts are to “read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Onewest Bank v. Palmero (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
To that end, courts are required to “read provisions of a contract harmoniously.”20 City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000) (citations omitted). i. The note prevails As a predicate, the majority finds Smith, 200 So. 3d 221 , and Edwards v. Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc., 187 So. 3d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), to be controlling.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Standard Jury Instructions in Contract and Business Cases - 2018 Report
Fla. · 2019 · confidence medium
“An ambiguous term in a contract is to be construed against the drafter.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosen v. Harborside Suites
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
As always with contracts, we construe them “according to their plain language,” Dirico v. Redland Estates, Inc., 154 So. 3d 355, 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (quotations and citations omitted), “read[ing] provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Earl Holmes v. Florida A&M University, by and through etc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The law is also well-settled that courts are required “to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000); see also Speegle Const. Co. v. District Bd. of Trs. of Nw.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Scott Cleveland and Stephanie Cleveland v. Crown Financial, LLC (4×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“An ambiguous term in a contract is to be construed against the drafter.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Modis, Inc v. Net Matrix Solutions, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000); Sch.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marcum v. Marcum (In re Marcum)
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 85 (Fla.2000); Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract & Business Cases (2×)
Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
“We rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Berkovich v. Casa Paradiso North, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
And, third, “courts [are] to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hussein-Scott v. Scott
Alaska · 2013 · confidence medium
See Copacabana Records, Inc. v. WEA Latina, Inc., 791 So.2d 1179, 1180 (Fla.Dist.App.2001) (citations omitted) (applying the rule that an earlier clause prevails over a later one); McIlmoil v. McIlmoil, 784 So.2d 557, 562 (Fla.Dist.App.2001) (citing City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000)) (construing a marriage settlement agreement against its drafter). [16] 16. 11 Williston & Lord, supra note 12 (citations omitted); see also Kochan v. Am.
cited Cited as authority (rule) BKD Twenty-One Management Co. v. Delsordo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Speegle Construction, Co. v. District Board of Trustees of Northwest Florida State College
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
In City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000), the supreme court reiterated that “any ambiguity in the terms [of a contract] should be resolved in favor of upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Here, although it is entirely possible that Appellee intended to avoid all prospects of contractually-mandated arbitration, at the parties’ insistence, the trial court considered only the four corners of the document when interpreting it; consequently, any inquiry into Appellee’s intent beyond those *362 confine…
examined Cited as authority (rule) MDS (Canada), Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
S.D. Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000); Syverson v. Jones, 10 So.3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lowe v. Winter Park Condominium Ltd. Partnership
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
The rule of construction relating to contractual terms requires “courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000); Davis v. Ivey, 984 So.2d 571, 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Paladyne Corp. v. Weindruch, 867 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) S&B/BIBB Hines PB 3 Joint Venture v. Progress Energy Florida, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Under Florida law, a “contract should be considered as a whole in determining the intention of the parties to the instrument,” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000), and we “give effect to the plain language of contracts when that language is clear and unambiguous.” Equity Lifestyle Props., 556 F.3d at 1242 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ross v. Ross
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Applying the principle of statutory construction that the meaning of particular terms of a statute may be ascertained by reference to the words associated with it in the statute, see City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla. 2000), we conclude that the insurance plans or programs referred to in the statute are those which are intended to create value as an asset, such as whole life insurance involving cash surrender value purchased for retirement planning.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Ocean Blue Leasehold Property LLC
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 2008 · confidence medium
See, Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions); Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)(“stating ‘All the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each.’ ”). 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Ivey
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla. 2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sensormatic Security Corporation v. Sensormatic Electronics Corporation
D. Maryland · 2006 · confidence medium
Ambiguous terms “should be resolved in favor of upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement.” City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Terminix International Co. LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. Partnership
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
E.g., City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
To hold that FIGA is not responsible for interest accruing under the instant scenario would impermissibly negate that portion of the contract, see City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000) (stating that contracts must be interpreted to give effect to all portions), and undermine the *456 section of the FIGA Act which provides that the Association assumes the obligations of the insurer as if that insurer had not become insolvent.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bailey v. Monaco Coach Corp.
N.D. Ga. · 2004 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Waksman Enterprises, Inc. v. Oregon Properties, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
We are also guided by the "rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof." City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000) (citing Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., Inc. v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flynn v. Sarasota County Public Hospital Board
M.D. Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
City of Homestead v. Johnson, 760 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.2000). 8 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
CITY OF HOMESTEAD, Appellant,
v.
Julia L. JOHNSON, etc., et al., Appellees.
SC91820.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Mar 16, 2000.
760 So. 2d 80
Quince.
Cited by 78 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 93%
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (1)

[*81] L. Lee Williams, Jr. of Williams & Gautier, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant.

Robert D. Vandiver, General Counsel, and Diana W. Caldwell, Associate General Counsel, Florida Public Service Commission, Tallahassee, Florida; Mark K. Logan of Smith, Ballard & Logan, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; and Wilton R. Miller of Bryant, Miller & Olive, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellees.

QUINCE, J.

We have on appeal a decision by the Public Service Commission (PSC) relating to the interpretation of a territorial agreement for electrical service. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const. We affirm the PSC's decision which gives Florida Power & Light Company the right to provide electrical service to the disputed territory because the industrial park is not a "city-owned facility" within the meaning of the territorial agreement

In 1967 Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) entered into a territorial agreement (the agreement) with the City of Homestead (the City). The purpose of the agreement was to prevent FPL and the City from duplicating efforts to provide electricity to the City and surrounding areas. The agreement essentially allowed the City to service all the areas located within the City's boundaries as they were defined in the agreement and allowed FPL to service all the surrounding areas. Paragraph 6 of the agreement provided the City and FPL's service areas would remain the same, notwithstanding any growth in the City's boundaries. Paragraph 8[1] contained one exception which allowed the City to furnish service to "city-owned facilities" and facilities owned by agencies which derive their power through and from the City. In the thirty years that have passed since FPL and the City entered into the agreement, the City has almost doubled in size and has vastly grown beyond the boundaries as defined at the time of the agreement. In addition, the parties and others affected by the territorial agreement have been before this Court on four prior occasions.[2]

[*82] The present dispute between FPL and the City revolves around an industrial park situated on land owned by the City but located within FPL's service area. The City entered into a long-term lease of unimproved real property within the industrial park with several entities including Contender Boats, Inc.[3] The fifty-year lease allows the lessee to renew for an additional fifty years and grants the lessee an option to purchase the property at a discounted rate. The lessee has constructed a permanent building on the property to conduct business.

The City argues the building is a permanent fixture and, therefore, has become annexed to the property. See Burbridge v. Therrell, 110 Fla. 6, 148 So. 204 (1933)(holding permanent fixtures annexed, actually or constructively, become part of the freehold estate); Greenwald v. Graham, 100 Fla. 818, 130 So. 608 (1930)(same). Thus, the City opines the building is owned by the City, is a "city-owned facility," and falls under the exception in the agreement which allows the City to service "city-owned facilities." FPL argues the City has engaged in a sham lease to avoid the agreement because it has become dissatisfied with its limited service area. FPL contends the plain language of the agreement provides a limited exception for "city-owned facilities," meaning facilities with municipal or governmental functions.

FPL filed a petition with the PSC to enforce the commission's order approving the territorial agreement between FPL and the City. The PSC granted the relief sought by FPL by entering a notice of proposed agency action. The notice indicated the action taken would become final unless a request for a hearing was filed.[4] The City did not request a hearing; therefore, the notice became final on October 20, 1997. The City now challenges the agency action and alleges the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for final summary judgment should have been granted because the industrial park is a "city-owned facility."

In earlier litigation between these parties we said the PSC has authority over[*83] these territorial agreements. In Public Service Commission v. Fuller, 551 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1989), we stated:

[U]nder chapter 89-292, section 2, Laws of Florida (to be codified at section 366.04(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1989)[[5]]), the .OPSC has the power "[t]o resolve, upon petition of a utility or on its own motion, any territorial dispute involving service areas between and among rural electric cooperatives, municipal electric utilities, and other electric utilities under its jurisdiction." We note that the City of Homestead has expressly acknowledged that the PSC has jurisdiction over this territorial agreement, and it has sought enforcement of the agreement under section 366.04(2). See Accursio v. Florida Power and Light Co.

Id. at 1212. Again, in the present litigation, the PSC was asked to determine the boundaries of the territorial agreement and to determine which utility would service customers in a particular area. Thus, the PSC properly determined it had jurisdiction over the matter.

We agree with the PSC's determination that the agreement must be interpreted in light of its stated purpose and that the term "city-owned facility" must be viewed in relation to the other terms and provisions contained within the agreement. Additionally, any ambiguity in the terms should be resolved in favor of upholding the purpose of the agreement and giving effect to every term in the agreement. See Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So.2d 234 (1944).

The purpose of the agreement was and is to end duplicate efforts and expenses in supplying electricity to the City and surrounding area. See City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So.2d 450 (Fla.1982). With this in mind, the PSC found the exceptions contained in paragraph 8 should be narrowly interpreted so that the City and FPL would not duplicate efforts.

There is no question that the land upon which the industrial park was built is owned by the City. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the land is located in the area serviced by FPL. FPL has facilities that are located immediately adjacent to the industrial park. Yet, the City has constructed extensions to its own electrical facilities in order to service this industrial park. From these facts the PSC concluded:

[A]n assessment of the evil to be prevented in entering into the Agreement aids in clarification of the phrase. Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So.2d 234 (1944). The purpose of the Agreement was to end the unsatisfactory effects of expensive, competitive activity between the parties. City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So.2d at 454. If the service area exception were read to allow the City to encroach upon FPL's service territory any time it purchases real property for any purpose, it would only promote expensive, competitive activity, a race to serve, and uneconomic duplication. This result is clearly contrary to the purpose of the Agreement and our mandate, pursuant to Section 366.04, Florida Statutes, to minimize uneconomic duplication.

[*84] The mere fact that the City owns the land and a structure has been erected on the land does not necessarily make the building or the business conducted therein a "city-owned facility," i.e., a facility with a municipal or governmental function.

Secondly, as the PSC pointed out, we should look to the terms specifically mentioned in the agreement for guidance in determining the intent of the parties in using the term "city-owned facility." The Homestead Housing Authority Labor Camp (the Labor Camp) is specifically named in paragraph 8 as a "city-owned facility" that is to be serviced by the City, notwithstanding its location in FPL's territory. The Labor Camp serves as an example of the type of "city-owned facility" contemplated by the agreement. Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,[6] paragraph 8 has a limited application to exclude from FPL's service area "city-owned facilities" similar to the Labor Camp, i.e., facilities that serve a municipal/governmental function. Had the City also intended to exclude from FPL's service area city-owned land not associated with the provision of municipal-type services from the agreement, it could have easily so stated by using the term city-owned property.

Additionally, application of the rule of construction that the meaning of particular terms may be ascertained by reference to other closely associated words in the agreement yields the same conclusion. General and specific words that are capable of analogous meanings when associated together take color from each other. See 49 Fla. Jur.2d Statutes § 127 (1984). Thus, the general phrase "city-owned facilities" is restricted to the narrower meaning of a "city-owned facility" with a municipal or governmental function by its close relationship to the other sentences in paragraph 8. See Orange County Audubon Soc'y v. Hold, 276 So.2d 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Specifically, paragraph 8 refers to the Labor Camp as a city-owned facility with a municipal/governmental function.

Finally, we rely upon the rule of construction requiring courts to read provisions of a contract harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof. See Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida, Inc., v. Pinnock, 735 So.2d 530, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions); Paddock v. Bay Concrete Indus., Inc., 154 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)(stating "All the various provisions of a contract must be so construed, if it can reasonably be done, as to give effect to each."). If the City were allowed to service any business or facility located on city-owned property, the City could circumvent the agreement by buying property and negotiating leases with any entrepreneur. Such a practice would negate the operation of paragraph 6, which states that the service territories will remain the same regardless of whether the City's boundaries grew. The PSC's interpretation of the agreement creates harmony between paragraphs 6 and 8 and gives effect to the purpose of the agreement.

The PSC's order relies upon well-settled principles of contractual construction. In addition, we note the City's attorney during oral argument acknowledged the City was the primary drafter of the agreement. An ambiguous term in a contract is to be construed against the drafter. See Planck v. Traders Diversified, Inc., 387 So.2d 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). To the extent that this agreement is ambiguous, we construe it against the City.

We hereby affirm the PSC's order granting FPL the right to service the industrial park.[7]

It is so ordered.

[*85] HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion.

LEWIS, J., recused.

ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.

While not unsympathetic to the policy implications of the majority opinion, I simply cannot find any ambiguity in the term "City-owned facilities."

1 Paragraph 8 provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 6 hereof, it is agreed that the City shall supply power to and, for purposes of this Agreement, shall consider that the Homestead Housing Authority Labor Camp located on the Easterly side of Tallahassee Road (SW. 137th Avenue) is within the service area of the City, including any additions to or extensions of said facilities of the Homestead Housing Authority. The City's right to furnish service to the City-owned facilities, or those owned by agencies deriving their power through and from the City (including but not limited to the Homestead Housing Authority) may be served by the said City, notwithstanding that the said facilities are located within the service area of [FPL].

2 The prior litigation includes: Storey v. Mayo, 217 So.2d 304 (Fla.1968)(This case was brought by consumers who were transferred from FPL to the City for service.); Accursio v. Mayo, 389 So.2d 1002 (Fla.1980)(Again FPL customers opposed implementation of the agreement.); Public Service Comm'n v. Fuller, 551 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1989)(The PSC filed a petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from conducting proceedings to modify the agreement.); and City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So.2d 450 (Fla.1992)(The City attempted to terminate the agreement by alleging the agreement was terminable at will.)
3 In fact, the City had leased two parcels of the property, one to Silver Eagle Distributors, Ltd. (Silver Eagle) and one to Contender Boats, Inc. The City sold the Silver Eagle property while this case was pending. Therefore, the issue is moot with regard to the Silver Eagle property.
4 There has been some confusion over whether the City waived its right to file an appeal with this Court by failing to request a hearing from the PSC, and whether the City's motion was timely filed. The notice provided:

ORDERED that the provisions of this Order, issued as proposed agency action, shall become final and effective unless an appropriate petition, in the form provided by Rule 25-22.036, Florida Administrative Code, is received by the Director, Division of Records and Reporting, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida XXXXX-XXXX, by the close of business on the date set forth in the Notice of Further Proceedings or Judicial Review attached hereto. It is further

ORDERED that in the event this Order becomes final, this Docket shall be closed.

The Notice of Further Proceedings or Judicial Review stated that notice of proposed agency action would become final on October 20, 1997, if no administrative appeal was filed. However, it also stated: "If this order becomes final and effective on the date described above, any party substantially affected may request judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court." The City never requested a formal administrative hearing. Instead, the City waited until after the order became final and then filed a Notice of Administrative Appeal with this Court on November 17, 1997.

We find the City did not waive its right to appeal the PSC's order to this Court because the Notice of Further Proceedings or Judicial Review specifically stated any party substantially affected by the final order could file an appeal with the Florida Supreme Court. The City was entitled to rely upon the final order's directions for requesting an appeal. We do note, however, that the better practice would be for the PSC to enter a separate final order to avoid this confusion in the future. See United Water Florida, Inc. v. Florida Public Serv. Comm'n., 728 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(holding the PSC could not issue a notice of proposed agency action without a hearing and then allow the notice to become the final order if it went unchallenged).

5 This provision of chapter 366 remains intact and is applicable to these proceedings. Section 366.04(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1999), provides:

[T]he commission shall have power over electric utilities for the following purposes:

. . . .

(e) To resolve, upon petition of a utility or on its own motion, any territorial dispute involving service areas between and among rural electric cooperatives, municipal electric utilities, and other electric utilities under its jurisdiction. In resolving territorial disputes, the commission may consider, but not be limited to the consideration of, the ability of the utilities to expand services within their own capabilities and the nature of the area involved, including population, the degree of urbanization of the area, its proximity to other urban areas, and the present and reasonably foreseeable future requirements of the area for other utility services.

6 Meaning the expression of one term implies the exclusion of other terms not mentioned.
7 The PSC's order reserved jurisdiction to consider awarding attorney's fees. The City has requested the Court review the PSC's authority to issue attorney's fees under section 120.69(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). This issue is not ripe and, therefore, is not considered by the Court in this opinion.