United States v. Jorge Torrez  ·  2017-08-28  ·  Fourth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 L. Ed. at 397

“It could hardly be thought that, if a punishment for murder of life imprisonment or death were changed to death alone, the latter penalty could be applied to homicide committed before the change.”

United States v. Zhen Zhou Wu  ·  2013-03-19  ·  First Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 L. Ed. at 397

“The Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.”

Holm v. Iowa District Court for Jones County  ·  2009-07-06  ·  Supreme Court of Iowa  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 S. Ct. at 397

“The Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.”

Jordan Holm, Vs. Iowa District Court For Jones County  ·  2009-06-19  ·  Supreme Court of Iowa  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 S. Ct. at 397

“The Constitution forbids the application of any new 9 punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material disadvantage of the wrongdoer.”

United States v. Dozier  ·  1997-07-18  ·  Third Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 L. Ed. at 397

“[A]n increase in the possible penalty is ex post facto, regardless of the length of the sentence actually imposed, [when] the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier ....”

United States v. Keith Dozier, Also Known as Pete, Also Known as Keith Bashir. Keith Dozier  ·  1997-07-18  ·  Third Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 L. Ed. at 397

"[A]n increase in the possible penalty is ex post facto, regardless of the length of the sentence actually imposed, [when] the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier ...."

William J. Prater v. U.S. Parole Commission, and Thomas Keohane, Warden  ·  1985-06-12  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  6 pin-cites  ·  pin 301 L. Ed. at 397

"It is true that petitioners might have been sentenced to fifteen years under the old statute. But the ex post facto clause looks to the standard of punishment prescribed by a statute, rather than to the sentence actually imposed."