Cases pin-citing Warden · Go Syfert
Search » Famous passages » Cases pin-citing Warden

Cases pin-citing Warden

Warden v. Marrero  ·  1974  ·  32 pinpoint citations from 12 cases, 10 distinct passages.

United States v. Broxmeyer  ·  2012-08-28  ·  Second Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“Punishment for federal crimes is a matter for Congress, subject to judicial veto only when the legislative judgment oversteps constitutional bounds.”
United States v. Dixon  ·  2011-08-09  ·  Third Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“But only if [the repealing statute] can be said by fair implication or expressly to conflict with [the Saving Statute] would there be reason to hold that [the repealing statute] superseded [the Saving Statute].”
United States v. Powell  ·  2011-07-13  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“Punishment for federal crimes is a matter for Congress, subject to judicial veto only when the legislative judgment oversteps constitutional bounds.”
United States v. Carmelina Vera Rojas  ·  2011-07-06  ·  Eleventh Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“[0]nly if [the repealing statute] can be said by fair implication or expressly to conflict with § 109 would there be reason to hold that [the *1239 repealing statute] superseded § 109.”
United States v. Carmelina Vera Rojas  ·  2011-06-24  ·  Eleventh Circuit  ·  pin 417 U.S. at 653
“[O]nly if [the repealing statute] can be said by fair implication or expressly to conflict with § 109 would there be reason to hold that [the repealing statute] superseded § 109.”
United States v. Hager  ·  2008-01-09  ·  E.D. Virginia  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
"[T]he general savings clause does not ordinarily preserve discarded remedies or procedures."
Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo  ·  2000-12-19  ·  Office of Legal Counsel  ·  pin 417 U.S. at 653
“ [0]nly if [the subsequently enacted statute] can be said by fair implication or expressly to conflict with [the previously enacted saving clause] would there be reason to hold that [the subse­ quently enacted statute] superseded [the saving clause].”
United States v. Joseph J. Pavlico  ·  1992-03-23  ·  Fourth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“... it could' not be seriously argued that sentencing decisions are made without regard to the period of time a defendant must spend in prison before becoming eligible for parole....”
John Richard Skowronek v. Edward G. Brennan, David Olushina John v. Edward G. Brennan  ·  1990-02-22  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
"Since ... an offender becomes eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence ... parole eligibility is a function of the length of the sentence fixed by the district judge."
Charles Denton Watson v. Wayne Estelle  ·  1988-10-06  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
"a repealer of parole eligibility ... would clearly present [a] serious question under the ex post facto clause"
United States v. Richard T. Neyens  ·  1987-09-16  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“parole eligibility can be properly viewed as being determined — and deliberately so — by the sentence of the district judge”
United States of America Ex Rel. Robert Graham v. The United States Parole Commission  ·  1980-11-03  ·  Fifth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 41 L. Ed. 2d at 383
“a repealer of parole eligibility previously available to imprisoned offenders would clearly present [a] serious question under the ex post facto clause of .... the Constitution.”