Cases pin-citing Albernaz · Go Syfert
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Cases pin-citing Albernaz

Albernaz v. United States  ·  1981  ·  105 pinpoint citations from 32 cases, 26 distinct passages.

Salt Lake City v. Josephson  ·  2019-01-29  ·  Utah Supreme Court  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"Thus, the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the [legislature] intended to be imposed."
Commonwealth v. Gregg  ·  2018-04-05  ·  Supreme Court of Virginia  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"[T]he question whether punishments imposed by a court after a defendant's conviction upon criminal charges are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized."
Benson, Yusulf Shaheed  ·  2015-04-15  ·  Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas  ·  pin 450 U.S. at 333
“Congress has in effect determined that a conspiracy to import drugs and to distribute them is twice as serious as a conspiracy to do either object singly.”
Morris Jackson v. Keith Smith  ·  2014-03-07  ·  Sixth Circuit  ·  4 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“The question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.”
Ivan Lee Sweets, Sr. v. The State of Wyoming  ·  2013-08-14  ·  Wyoming Supreme Court  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"[The question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed."
United States v. David Yepez  ·  2012-12-20  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”
Sherman v. Securities & Exchange Commission  ·  2011-09-19  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction which may arise.”
Sherman v. Securities & Exchange Commission (In Re Sherman)  ·  2011-09-19  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  6 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction which may arise."
Ex Parte Watson  ·  2009-12-16  ·  Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"[T]he Court's application of the [ Blockburger ] test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense"
United States v. Rigas  ·  2009-10-21  ·  Third Circuit  ·  6 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"The conclusion we reach today regarding the intent of Congress [to create distinct statutory offenses] is reinforced by the fact that the two conspiracy statutes are directed to separate evils presented by drug trafficking."
United States v. Bobb  ·  2009-08-06  ·  Eleventh Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“The Blockburger test is a ‘rule of statutory construction,’ and because it serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.”
Ex Parte Anthony Charles Graves  ·  2008-11-05  ·  Court of Appeals of Texas  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“the decisional law in the area [of Double Jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator”
Ex Parte Graves  ·  2008-11-05  ·  Court of Appeals of Texas  ·  6 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"the decisional law in the area [of Double Jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator"
State v. Armendariz  ·  2006-08-28  ·  New Mexico Supreme Court  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“[I]f anything is to be assumed from the congressional silence on this point, it is that Congress was aware of the Blockburger rule and legislated with it in mind.”
United States v. Arnett  ·  2006-05-22  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“Lenity ... serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.”
Mateo v. United States  ·  2003-08-12  ·  D. Massachusetts  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“[The] policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”
United States v. Rodney White  ·  2000-07-25  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible [under the Double Jeopardy Clause] is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.”
Richardson v. State  ·  1999-10-01  ·  Indiana Supreme Court  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 S. Ct. at 333
"[T]he decisional law in the [double jeopardy] area is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."
United States v. Oxx  ·  1997-10-31  ·  Tenth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“Where Congress has manifested its intention, we may not manufacture ambiguity in order to defeat that intent.”
State v. Hill  ·  1996-05-21  ·  Supreme Court of Connecticut  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed”
United States v. Anderson  ·  1994-10-18  ·  D.C. Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“Lenity ... serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one”
People v. Vaughn  ·  1994-08-31  ·  Michigan Supreme Court  ·  pin 67 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed"
United States v. Darryl Pernell Camps  ·  1994-08-11  ·  Fourth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”
United States v. Torres  ·  1994-07-08  ·  D. Puerto Rico  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.”
United States v. Eric v. Johnson  ·  1994-04-22  ·  Sixth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution."
United States v. Lawrence Restell Allen, A/K/A Larry Allen  ·  1993-12-21  ·  Fourth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“It is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.”
United States v. Manuel Concepcion, Roberto Aponte, and Nelson Frias  ·  1993-03-25  ·  Second Circuit  ·  6 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution."
Williams v. State  ·  1989-10-25  ·  Court of Appeals of Texas  ·  6 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
"It is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct of fenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause"
Kenneth Fitzgerald v. United States  ·  1983-10-25  ·  Tenth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“The very size of a narcotics cache can be sufficient to show intent to distribute under Section 841”
United States v. Allen  ·  1982-07-28  ·  C.D. California  ·  pin 450 U.S. at 333
“because it [Blockburger] serves as a means of discerning congressional purpose the rule should not be controlling, where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent”
Gimmy v. People  ·  1982-03-29  ·  Supreme Court of Colorado  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 101 L. Ed. 2d at 275
“[T]he ‘touchstone’ of the rule of lenity ‘is statutory ambiguity.’ . . . Lenity . .. serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.”
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