United States v. Kelvin Lorenzo Harris  ·  2021-08-09  ·  Eleventh Circuit  ·  pin 548 U.S. at 1

“[T]he duress defense requires an objective inquiry into whether a defendant’s conduct, although illegal, represented her only reasonable alternative to serious bodily injury or death.”

United States v. Blair Cook  ·  2020-08-17  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  pin 548 U.S. at 1

“unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense”

United States v. Blair Cook  ·  2020-08-17  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  pin 548 U.S. at 1

“unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense”

United States v. Blair Cook  ·  2020-08-17  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  pin 548 U.S. at 1

“unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense”

United States v. Michael Ortiz  ·  2019-06-19  ·  Fifth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 126 L. Ed. 2d at 1

"[T]here may be crimes where the nature of the mens rea would require the Government to disprove the existence of duress beyond a reasonable doubt."

United States v. Dixon  ·  2018-08-24  ·  Tenth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 126 L. Ed. 2d at 299

"In the context of the firearms offenses at issue-as will usually be the case, given the long-established common-law rule-we presume that Congress intended the petitioner to bear the burden of proving the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence."

United States v. Jeffrey Reichert  ·  2014-03-28  ·  Sixth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 126 L. Ed. 2d at 1

“[T]he term willfully ... requires a defendant to have acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”

People v. Doubleday  ·  2012-08-30  ·  Colorado Court of Appeals  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 126 L. Ed. 2d at 1

"The duress defense ... may excuse conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but the existence of duress normally does not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself."

United States v. Huping Zhou  ·  2012-05-10  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 126 L. Ed. 2d at 1

“[Unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense, not a culpable state of mind or knowledge of the law.”