Cases pin-citing Castleman · Go Syfert
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Cases pin-citing Castleman

United States v. Castleman  ·  2014  ·  43 pinpoint citations from 25 cases, 22 distinct passages.

Miller v. Thurston County  ·  2024-11-14  ·  W.D. Washington  ·  pin 572 U.S. at 157
“Recognizing that firearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly 14 combination, . . . Congress has forbade the possession of firearms by anyone convicted of a 15 misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
United States v. Davis  ·  2023-07-18  ·  Second Circuit  ·  pin 572 U.S. at 157
“merely reckless [conduct] may not be a ‘use’ of force”
Bird v. United States  ·  2023-06-12  ·  W.D. North Carolina  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 157
“[T]he knowing or intentional application of force is a ‘use’ of force.”
United States v. Harmon  ·  2020-12-24  ·  District of Columbia  ·  pin 572 U.S. at 157
“Given the lack of ambiguity, we have no recourse to the rule of lenity.”
United States v. Gary Ervin  ·  2020-06-18  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  pin 572 U.S. at 157
“[I]n the context of assault statutes, bodily injury entails the use of violent, physical force[.]”
Godwin v. United States of America (INMATE 3)  ·  2020-02-28  ·  M.D. Alabama  ·  pin 572 U.S. at 157
“Leocal reserved the question whether a reckless application of force could constitute ‘use’ of force.”
Thompson v. Barr  ·  2019-05-13  ·  Second Circuit  ·  3 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 157
"It is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense."
United States v. Latroy Burris  ·  2019-04-10  ·  Fifth Circuit  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 1405
"The Ex Post Facto Clause , by its own terms, does not apply to courts."
United States v. Walker  ·  2018-05-17  ·  E.D. New York  ·  5 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 157
"Minor uses of force may not constitute 'violence' in the generic sense. For example, in an opinion that we cited with approval in Johnson, the Seventh Circuit noted that it was hard to describe ... as violence a squeeze of the arm [that] causes a bruise."
United States v. Jarnaro Middleton  ·  2018-02-27  ·  Fourth Circuit  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 1405
“We declined to read the common-law meaning of ‘force’ into ACCA’s definition of ‘violent felony,’ because we found it a ‘comical misfit with the defined term.’”
United States v. Jarnaro Middleton  ·  2018-02-26  ·  Fourth Circuit  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 1405
"We declined to read the common-law meaning of 'force' into ACCA's definition of 'violent felony,' because we found it a 'comical misfit with the defined term.' "
United States v. Fredis Reyes-Contreras  ·  2018-02-06  ·  Fifth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
" Castleman does not disturb this court's precedent regarding the characterization of crimes of violence."
Jose Cornejo-Villagrana v. Jefferson Sessions  ·  2017-09-14  ·  Ninth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does hot matter.”
United States v. Lawrence Johnson  ·  2017-09-12  ·  Sixth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“Minor uses of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in the generic sense.”
United States v. Juan Herrera-Serrano  ·  2017-08-21  ·  Fifth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“‘physical force’ is simply ‘force exerted by and through concrete bodies.’ ”
United States v. Randall Jennings  ·  2017-06-16  ·  Seventh Circuit  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 1405
“The ‘use of force’ in Castle-man’s example is not the act of ‘sprink[ling]’ the poison [into the victim’s drink]; it is the act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause harm.”
United States v. Roof  ·  2017-05-10  ·  D. South Carolina  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“[T]he knowing and intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force.”
Davis v. United States  ·  2017-04-17  ·  E.D. Tennessee  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“But here, the common-law meaning of ‘force’ fits perfectly: the very reasons we gave for rejecting the meaning in defining a “violent felony” are reasons to embrace it in defining a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.’ ”
Umaña v. United States  ·  2017-01-25  ·  W.D. North Carolina  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 1405
“It is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense.”
United States v. Wehunt  ·  2017-01-24  ·  E.D. Tennessee  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“But here, the common-law meaning of ‘force’ fits perfectly: The very reasons we gave for rejecting that meaning in defining a ‘violent felony’ are reasons to embrace it in defining a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.’ ”
United States v. Curtis Howell  ·  2016-09-22  ·  Fifth Circuit  ·  pin 134 S. Ct. at 1405
“[a]ct of employing anything”
United States v. Rogers  ·  2016-04-01  ·  E.D. Wisconsin  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“[A]s we explained in Johnson, ‘physical force’ is simply ‘force exerted by and through concrete bodies,’ as opposed to ‘intellectual force or emotional force.’ And the common-law concept of ‘force’ encompasses even its indirect application.”
United States v. Moncrieffe  ·  2016-03-10  ·  E.D. New York  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“Minor uses of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in the generic sense. For example, in an opinion that we cited with approval in Johnson, the Seventh Circuit noted that it was hard to describe ... as violence a squeeze of the arm [that] causes a bruise.”
United States v. Alexander  ·  2015-09-21  ·  Tenth Circuit  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute, such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended.”
Esperanza Contreras v. United States  ·  2015-08-06  ·  District of Columbia Court of Appeals  ·  2 pin-cites  ·  pin 134 L. Ed. 2d at 426
“Nothing in today’s opinion casts doubt on” holdings in cases such as Velasquez, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 282 , “extending] Johnson’s, requirement of violent force to the context of a ‘crime of violence’ under § 16.”