28 C.F.R. § 2.28

Reopening of cases

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(a) Favorable information or information supporting medical parole or compassionate release. Upon the receipt of new information of substantial significance favorable to the prisoner, including medical information, or other extraordinary and compelling information, a Commissioner may reopen a case, and order a special reconsideration hearing on the next available docket, or modify the previous decision. The advancement of a presumptive release date or a decision to continue to a 15-year reconsideration hearing requires the concurrence of two Commissioners.

(b) Institutional misconduct. Consideration of disciplinary infractions and allegations of new criminal conduct occurring after the setting of a parole date are subject to the provisions of § 2.14 (in the case of a prisoner with a presumptive date) and § 2.34 (in the case of a prisoner with an effective date of parole).

(c) Additional sentences. If a prisoner receives an additional concurrent or consecutive federal sentence following his initial parole consideration, the Regional Commissioner shall reopen his case for a new initial hearing on the next regularly scheduled docket to consider the additional sentence and reevaluate the case. Such action shall void the previous presumptive or effective release date. However, a new initial hearing is not mandatory where the Commission has previously evaluated the new criminal behavior, which led to the additional federal sentence, at a rescission hearing under 28 CFR 2.34; except where the new sentence extends the mandatory release date for a prisoner previously continued to the expiration of his sentence.

(d) Conviction after revocation. Upon receipt of information subsequent to the revocation hearing that a prisoner whose parole has been revoked has sustained a new conviction for conduct while on parole, the Regional Commissioner may reopen the case pursuant to § 2.52(c)(2) for a special reconsideration hearing on the next regularly scheduled docket to consider forfeiture of time spent on parole and such further action as may be appropriate. The entry of a new order shall void any presumptive or effective release date previously established.

(e) Release planning. When an effective date of parole has been set by the Commission, release on that date shall be conditioned upon the completion of a satisfactory plan for parole supervision. The appropriate Regional Commissioner may on his own motion reconsider any case prior to release and may reopen and advance or retard an effective parole date for purposes of release planning. Retardation without a hearing may not exceed 120 days.

(f) New adverse information. Upon receipt of new and significant adverse information that is not covered by paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section, a Commissioner may refer the case to the National Commissioners with his recommendation and vote to schedule the case for a special reconsideration hearing. Such referral shall automatically retard the prisoner's scheduled release date until a final decision is reached in the case. The decision to schedule a case for a special reconsideration hearing shall be based on the concurrence of two Commissioner votes, including the vote of the referring Commissioner. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in §§ 2.12 and 2.13. The entry of a new order following such hearing shall void the previously established release date.

[44 FR 3406, Jan. 16, 1979, as amended at 46 FR 36138, July 14, 1981; 49 FR 44098, Nov. 2, 1984; 61 FR 55743, Oct. 29, 1996; 68 FR 41529, July 14, 2003; 86 FR 51612, Sept. 16, 2021; 86 FR 56646, Oct. 12, 2021]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 94 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1973–2024 · leading case: Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011).

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Bowers v. Keller, 651 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2011). · cites it 7× “28 C.F.R. § 2.28 . Upon the “receipt of new and significant adverse information,” § 2.”

Vincent Fardella v. William L. Garrison, Warden Cecil C. McCall Chairman, U.S. Parole Comm'n, 698 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1982). · cites it 6× “It proposed, however, to reopen the case under 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f), which provides for reopening a parole determination “[u]pon receipt of new and significant adverse information.”

Armando Torres-Macias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1984). · cites it 6× “See 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f). On reconsideration, it concluded Torres-Macias should serve the full term of his sentences and delayed his parole until 1990.”

Iuteri v. Nardoza, 560 F. Supp. 745 (D. Conn. 1983). · cites it 7× “Of importance is whether new information was actually presented to the Commission as required by 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f) (1982). As discussed below, this court finds that new information was presented to be considered by the Commission, namely, the transcript of the sentencing…”

Gary Robert Williams v. United States Parole Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 1983). · cites it 5× “A presumptive parole date is conditional, and is subject to reopening under 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 . 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (d) (1982).”

Veronza L. Bowers, Jr. v. United States Parole Comm'n, Warden, 760 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “After the Parole Commission made its decision, Bowers learned of Commissioner Spagnoli’s memorandum and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of Georgia, challenging the Parole Commission’s decisions to reopen his case, first on February 17, 2005,…”

Hughes Anderson Bagley v. J.J. Harvey, U.S. Marshal, & Audrey Kaslow, U.S. Parole Comm'n, 718 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1983). · cites it 3× “The National Commissioners responded by reopening Bagley’s case and retarding the November 30, 1981, parole date under the purported authority of 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f), which allows reopening upon receipt of “new and significant adverse information.”

Rowe v. W. Va. Dept. of Corr., 292 S.E.2d 650 (W. Va. 1982). · cites it 2× “28 C.F.R. § 2.28 . 10 This provision at least provides for some hearing mechanism that enables the Board to reevaluate the prisoner’s release date in light of possible problems with the release plan.”

Philip Weinstein v. United States Parole Comm'n, Harvey Cox, Warden, 902 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1990). · cites it 5× “In addition, Weinstein asks us to find as a matter of law that (1) the Parole Commission’s decision to reopen his ease following his successful habeas corpus petition violated 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 because there was no “new information” to consider; and (2) that the Parole…”

Conklin Wallace v. Robert Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539 (9th Cir. 1986). “28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (a) (1985). This “in *1559 ternal appeal process is provided to assure fairness in every decision, and to be sure that both law and guidelines are administered fairly across the country.”

Iuteri v. Nardoza, 732 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984). · cites it 6× “He argues that his habeas corpus petition should have been granted because (1) the parole retardation procedure employed by the United States Parole Commission (“Commission”) pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f) denied his constitutional right to due process, (2) the information…”

Ready v. United States Parole Comm'n, 483 F. Supp. 1273 (M.D. Penn. 1980). · cites it 3× “34 (a) (1979), but may not be rescinded unless the prisoner is found to have committed an institutional disciplinary violation, 28 C.”

Show all 94 citing cases →

— 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(a) — 1 case

Schiselman v. United States Parole Comm'n, 858 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988).

— 28 C.F.R. § 2.28(f) — 7 cases

Armando Torres-Macias v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1984). “See 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f). On reconsideration, it concluded Torres-Macias should serve the full term of his sentences and delayed his parole until 1990.”

Schiselman v. United States Parole Comm'n, 858 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988).

Montemayor v. Martin, 645 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Okla. 1986).

Schiselman v. United States Parole Comm'n, 858 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988).

Davis v. United States (N.D. Tex. 2024).

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