(a) If the parolee requests a local revocation hearing, he shall be given a revocation hearing reasonably near the place of the alleged violation(s) or arrest, if the following conditions are met:
(1) The parolee has not been convicted of a crime committed while under supervision; and
(2) The parolee denies that he has violated any condition of his release.
(b) The parolee shall also be given a local revocation hearing if he admits (or has been convicted of) one or more charged violations, but denies at least one unadjudicated charge that may be determinative of the Commission's decision regarding revocation and/or reparole, and requests the presence of one or more adverse witnesses regarding that contested charge. If the appearance of such witness at the hearing is precluded by the Commission for good cause, a local revocation hearing shall not be ordered.
(c) If there are two or more alleged violations, the hearing may be conducted near the place of the violation chiefly relied upon as a basis for the issuance of the warrant or summons as determined by the Regional Commissioner.
(d)(1) A parolee shall be given an institutional revocation hearing upon the parolee's return or recommitment to an institution if the parolee:
(i) Voluntarily waives the right to a local revocation hearing; or
(ii) Admits (or has been convicted of) one or more charged violations without contesting any unadjudicated charge that may be determinative of the Commission's decision regarding revocation and/or reparole.
(2) On his own motion, the Regional Commissioner may designate any case described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section for a local revocation hearing. The difference in procedures between a “local revocation hearing” and an “institutional revocation hearing” is set forth in § 2.50(c).
(e) A parolee retaken on a warrant issued by the Commission shall be retained in custody until final action relative to revocation of his release, unless otherwise ordered by the Regional Commissioner under § 2.48(e)(2). A parolee who has been given a revocation hearing pursuant to the issuance of a summons under § 2.44 shall remain on supervision pending the decision of the Commission.
(f) A local revocation hearing shall be scheduled to be held within sixty days of the probable cause determination. Institutional revocation hearings shall be scheduled to be held within ninety days of the date of the execution of the violator warrant upon which the parolee was retaken. However, if a parolee requests and receives any postponement or consents to a postponed revocation proceeding, or if a parolee by his actions otherwise precludes the prompt conduct of such proceedings, the above-stated time limits may be extended. A local revocation hearing may be conducted by a hearing examiner, hearing examiner panel, or other official designated by the Regional Commissioner.
[42 FR 39809, Aug. 5, 1977, as amended at 44 FR 3408, 3409, Jan. 16, 1979; 68 FR 41530, July 14, 2003]
Notes of Decisions
United States Ex Rel. Carrasquillo v. Thomas, 527 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
· cites it 4× “The minutes of the proceeding indicate that the Assistant United States Attorney made a brief statement to the court: “During the course of the trial preparation certain information came to the attention of the U. S. Attorney. In fact in connection with that and after discussion…”
Mychael W. McCoy v. United States Bd. of Parole, 537 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1976).
· cites it 2× “§ 4205 ; 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (1975). McCoy was provided with a copy of the warrant application, but the warrant itself was not served at that time.”
King v. Hasty, 154 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D.N.Y 2001).
· cites it 4× “On September 19, 2000, King filed the instant habeas petition, alleging that he was being denied due process because he had not been given a revocation hearing within 90 days after his arrest, as required by the 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (e). 3 On Septem *399 ber 28, 2000, the Court…”
Dennis Luther v. Vincent Molina, 627 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1980).
“See 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (d). Section 4214(a)(1)(A) provides that the parolee is entitled to a “preliminary hearing .”
Carmel v. Thomas, 510 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
· cites it 2× “On September 17, 1979, the Commission found probable cause to believe that Carmel had *787 violated the conditions of his parole and requested pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (c) 3 that he be designated to a federal institution for a final revocation proceeding.”
Craig McGraw Northington v. United States Parole Comm'n, 587 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1978).
“§ 4214 (c) (1976) ( 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (e)) had been violated by the Parole Commission because the hearing which revoked his parole was held 114 days after he had been arrested on a parole violator warrant, whereas the statute provides that he shall “receive a revocation hearing…”
Toomey v. Young, 442 F. Supp. 387 (D. Conn. 1977).
“*392 28 C.F.R. § 2.49 (b), (c) (1975) (now at 28 C.”
Boone v. Menifee, 387 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
“28 C.F.R. 2.49(f). Accordingly, the modest delay between Boone’s arrest on the parole violation warrant and his subsequent revocation hearing is insufficient to give rise to a due process claim.”
— 28 C.F.R. § 2.49(d) — 1 case
— 28 C.F.R. § 2.49(e) — 2 cases
United States Ex Rel. Carrasquillo v. Thomas, 527 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
“The minutes of the proceeding indicate that the Assistant United States Attorney made a brief statement to the court: “During the course of the trial preparation certain information came to the attention of the U. S. Attorney. In fact in connection with that and after discussion…”
— 28 C.F.R. § 2.49(f) — 1 case
Boone v. Menifee, 387 F. Supp. 2d 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
“28 C.F.R. 2.49(f). Accordingly, the modest delay between Boone’s arrest on the parole violation warrant and his subsequent revocation hearing is insufficient to give rise to a due process claim.”
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