(a) Except to the extent a court orders otherwise, a sentence of death shall be executed:
(1) On a date and at a time designated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which date shall be no sooner than 60 days from the entry of the judgment of death. If the date designated for execution passes by reason of a stay of execution, then a new date shall be designated promptly by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons when the stay is lifted;
(2) At a penal or correctional institution designated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons;
(3) Under the supervision of a United States Marshal (Marshal) designated by the Director of the United States Marshals Service, assisted by additional qualified personnel selected by the Director of the United States Marshals Service and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, or their designees, and acting at the direction of the Marshal; and
(4) By intravenous injection of a lethal substance or substances in a quantity sufficient to cause death, such substance or substances to be determined by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, or by any other manner prescribed by the law of the State in which the sentence was imposed or which has been designated by a court in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3596(a).
(b) Unless the President interposes, the United States Marshal shall not stay execution of the sentence on the basis that the prisoner has filed a petition for executive clemency.
[57 FR 4901, Jan. 19, 1993, as amended by Order No.
4911-2020, 85 FR 75854, Nov. 27, 2020]
Notes of Decisions
In re: FBOP Execution Protocol Cases, 955 F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
· cites it 4× “” 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (a)(4) (2019). The regulation also addresses various other matters including the time and place of execution, when the prisoner must be notified of the execution, and who may attend it.”
In re: FBOP Execution Protocol Cases, 980 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
· cites it 2× “” 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (a)(4). The regulations include no details regarding the specific substances to be used or how those substances are to be chosen or administered.”
William Emmett LeCroy, Jr. v. United States, 975 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2020).
· cites it 3× “] 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (a)(1). Section 26.4 further provides: Except to the extent a court orders otherwise: (a) The Warden of the designated institution shall notify the prisoner under sentence of death of the date designated for execution at least 20 days in advance, except when…”
Roane v. Holder, 607 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D.D.C. 2009).
· cites it 4× “In addition, because the plaintiffs do not seek to challenge 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 , the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV to the extent it challenges this regulation will be denied as moot.”
United States v. Lezmond Mitchell, 971 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2020).
· cites it 2× “The Execution Warrant states that it “serve[s] as official notification that pursuant to [ 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (a)(1)], the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons has set August 26, 2020, as the date for your execution by lethal injection.”
State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994).
· cites it 2× “28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (a)(4). Thus, with the federal government currently utilizing the same method of execution as that of Delaware, it would be, at a minimum, incongruous, to conclude that Delaware’s Lethal Injection Statute violates federal law.”
State v. Webb, 750 A.2d 448 (Conn. 2000).
“Ann. § 7-13-904 (Lexis Law Publishing 1999).”
Higgs v. United States, 711 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Maryland 2010).
“The Department of Justice has violated this provision by delegating to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons responsibility for promulgating the Bureau’s own Protocol for the execution of federal prisoners, see 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 (a)(4), instead of following procedures prescribed…”
United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996).
“4898, 4901-02 (1993) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 ). Invoking these regulations as authority, the Government moved for issuance of an order of execution that would permit a United States Marshal to carry out appellants’ several death sentences at a time and place to be…”
Montgomery v. Barr (D.D.C. 2020).
· cites it 19× “that th[e] Court’s stay suspended Defendants’ authority to designate a new execution date during the pendency of the stay” and “that nothing in the Court’s order relieved Defendants of their independent obligation under federal law to wait until ‘the stay is lifted’ to designate…”
Roane v. Gonzales (D.D.C. 2009).
· cites it 4× “In addition, because the plaintiffs do not seek to challenge 28 C.F.R. § 26.3 , the defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IV to the extent it challenges this regulation will be denied as moot.”
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