(a) In determining the meaning of any provision of this part, unless the context should indicate otherwise, the first three provisions of 1 U.S.C. 1 (rules of construction) shall apply.
(b) If benefits are denied to any individual pursuant to the Act, at 34 U.S.C. 10282(a)(4), or otherwise because his actions were a substantial contributing factor to the death of the public safety officer, such individual shall be presumed irrebuttably, for all purposes, not to have survived the officer.
(c) Any provision of this part held to be invalid or unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or circumstance, shall be construed so as to give it the maximum effect permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter invalidity or unenforceability, in which event such provision shall be deemed severable herefrom and shall not affect the remainder hereof or the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other, dissimilar circumstances.
(d) Unless the same should expressly provide otherwise (e.g., by use of the word “hereafter” in an appropriations proviso), any amendment to the Act (or any statutory enactment otherwise directly referent or -applicable to the program that is the subject of this part), shall apply only with respect to injuries (or, in connection with claims under the Act, at 34 U.S.C. 10281(k), shall apply only with respect to heart attacks, strokes, or vascular ruptures referred to in the Act, at 34 U.S.C. 10281(k)(2)) occurring on or after the date it takes effect.
(e) Unless expressly provided otherwise, any reference in this part to any provision of law not in this part shall be understood to constitute a general reference under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, and thus to include any subsequent amendments to the provision.
[73 FR 76531, Dec. 17, 2008, as amended at 83 FR 22382, May 15, 2018]
Notes of Decisions
Juneau v. Dep't of Just., 583 F.3d 777 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
· cites it 10× “In particular, Claimants argue that the BJA should have applied the versions of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 , providing that "any reasonable doubt arising from the circumstances of the officer's death" should be resolved "in favor of payment of the death .”
Bice v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 432 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
· cites it 5× “See 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 . The BJA refused to apply this reasonable doubt standard because it found that Mr.”
Davis v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 192 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
· cites it 5× “The Director also determined that because Officer Davis was not on duty at the time of his death, the reasonable doubt rule of 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 does not apply. Id. at 5-6 .”
Bice v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 420 (Fed. Cl. 2004).
· cites it 4× “Found at 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 , it requires the Bureau to resolve “any reasonable doubt arising from the circumstances of the public safety officer’s death” in favor of the claimant for benefits.”
Tafoya v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 256 (Ct. Cl. 1985).
· cites it 4× “While the conclusion that a public safety officer was acting in the line of duty need not be the only possible one to be drawn from the circumstances of death in order for 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 (reasonable doubt of coverage) to come into play, there is simply not enough evidence…”
Morrow v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 290 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
· cites it 2× “” 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1980). The "Commentary” states: "In those cases where LEAA cannot reasonably determine which factor — the heart condition or the personal injury — was the substantial causal contribution to death, it 'shall resolve any reasonable doubt’ ” in accordance with…”
Davis v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 421 (Fed. Cl. 2000).
· cites it 3× “” 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1999). The issue to which the Hearing Officer applied the reasonable doubt standard was “whether Officer Davis was aware that Knowles was fleeing an officer or observed his dangerous driving and was acting to intervene in a law enforcement capacity at the…”
Demutiis v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 81 (Fed. Cl. 2000).
· cites it 2× “” 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 (1999). See Davis v. United States, 46 Fed.”
Alma E. Greeley, of the Est. of Lawrence E. Greeley v. United States, 50 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
“4 (“The Bureau shall resolve any reasonable doubt arising from the circumstances of the officer’s death or permanent and total disability in favor of payment of the death or disability benefit.”). Yet, where a claimant does not even make a prima facie showing of a traumatic…”
Hawkins v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 74 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
“5 The court has determined, as a matter of fact and law, that Ms. Hawkins was a law enforcement officer who “died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty.”
Woodward v. Dep't of Just., 598 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
“Moreover, the Director applied 28 C.F.R. § 32.4 (2007), a regulation implemented in 2006 which provides a more burdensome standard of proof for certain aspects of claims made under the amended version of the PSOBA.”
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